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SUMMARY 
On the basis of the reference concept evolved within the frame-
werk of the research and development programme "Alternative 
Waste Management Techniques", safeguards concepts for a direct 
final repository are being compiled and evaluated, The safeguards 
under discussion begin with the arrival of the products for 
final disposal at the reception area of the geological repository 
and terminate with the measures envisaged for the post-apera-
tional phase of the repository. Safeguards for the conditioning 
facility or the transport of final disposal packages are not 
included in this study. 
First of all in Chapter 2, important aspects of the reference 
concept have been selected and compiled for safeguards applica-
tions. The considerations are based on a standard PWR fuel 
element of the Biblis B type with a burn-up of 40,000 MWd/t 
HM at an initial enrichment of 3.6 %. After a cooling-down 
period of at least 10 years, the spent fuel elements are 
transferred in flasks of 12 fuel elements each to a conditioning 
facility which need not necessarily be at the site of the final 
repository. Conditioning is implemented in two sub-steps, pre-
liminary conditioning and final conditioning. During preliminary 
conditioning three intact fuel elements are enclosed gas-tight. 
in a so-called dry storage bin. The resulting intermediate 
storage package is brought into the final conditioning sector 
in a final disposal canister. A facility capacity of 700 t 
of heavy metal per year requires that 6 - 9 fuel elements 
be conditioned per day. 2 - 3 final disposal packages per 
day thus result in the final conditioning sector. 
The geological repository is constructed in a vifgin salt 
dome, the reference concept envisaging emplacement in tunnels 
with lost shielding, Access to the repository is obtained via 
two shafts. The first shaft serves to transport the salt, 
material and personnel. The second shaft is envisaged for 
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emplacement and special transports. Air inflow is effected via 
Shaft 1; exhaust air flows out through Shaft 2. Exploration 
of the envisaged emplacement area is implemented by exploratory 
drillings and tunnels. The exploratory tunnels roughly demarcate 
the emplacement area and are later to be used as ventilation 
galleriss for exhaust air from the emplacement fields. After 
completing underground exploration, the position and size of 
the emplacement fields is determined, The emplacement floor 
will probably be 30 m below the explora~ory floor at a depth 
of between 700 m and 900 m, Aceass to the emplacement area is 
obtained by driving two parallel access galleriss joined by 
connection drifts at intervals of 200 m. Starting from the 
connection drifts, the emplacement galleriss are driven parallel 
to the access galleries, Before beginning emplacement, emplace-
ment galleriss will only be driven starting from the emplacement 
connection drift furthast from the shaft. Emplacement galleriss 
are driven from the next connection drift at the same time as 
emplacement is implemented in the first sector of the emplacement 
field. 
The final disposal package is transported under ground on a 
rail-bound plateau tranaparter via Shaft 2. Underground transport 
to the emplacement connection drift is rail-bound; whereas tran-
spart through the emplacement connection drift to the emplacement 
gallery is railless. This is effected by an emplacement vehicle. 
After emplacing the package, the gallery section with the 
package is backfilled (mechanical or pneumatic stowing). When 
all the galleriss of an emplacement sector are occupied by 
packages and filled-in the emplacement connection drift and 
ventilationgalleriss are also backfilled, After terminating 
emplacement operation - 40 weeks' Operationper year, 11 FDP's 
per week - all the galleriss and cavities are backfilled, 
in the same way as the shafts. It is intended to oparate 
the mine for 50 years at an emplacement rate of 437 FDP's 
per year. 
The NP aspects of a direct final repository are dealt with 
in Chapter 3. The accumulation of plutonium in a direct final 
repository is regarded as especially dubious with respect to 
non~proliferation ("plutonium mine") 1 since in principle later 
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access by a nation to the very large quantities of plutonium· 
can never be ruled out. Due to the large quantities of stored 
plutonium and the long operational period of such a repository, 
it must finally also be remernbered that notice to or termination 
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty cannot be ruled out in various 
countries. 
In this connection, the results and considerations of the 
INFCE Conference are of special importance. INFCE Group 7 
WASTE MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL concerned themselves with the 
problems of safeguards in final repositories for spent fuel 
elements. INFCE considered it possible in principle to safeguard 
such a repository during the operational phase with safeguards 
techniques currently available, However, in the long term 
INFCE doubts the effectiveness of safeguards since the post-
aperational phase lasting for centuries will be determined 
by numerous unforeseeable technical, political and social 
factors. 
In addition to the political and technical boundary conditions, 
three safeguards models are presented in Chapter 4 intended 
to ensure the Safeguarding of a final repository. The models 
are differentiated by the degree of authorized access for 
IAEA inspectors. Thus in Model 1 access is restricted to 
aboveground facilities, Model 2 envisages limited access 
to the underground facilities and Model 3 unrestricted access 
to all underground facilities. 
In Model 1 the inspector's access is limited to strategic points 
above ground, These strategic points are the key measurement 
points, the reloading facility above ground as well as the 
bank eyes of the mine shafts, The essential element of this 
model is that, after the material has been takenunder ground, 
recovery or an internal diversion within the mine is ruled 
out. By transferring the material under ground, it is thus 
released from safeguards monitaring and written off. Since 
according to its definition there is no longer any material 
subject to safeguards present in this model after emplacement 
activities have been completed, neither is there any need 
for safeguards during the post-aperational phase. 
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Before the material can be released from safeguards, proof 
of non-recoverability must be presented. If this cannot be 
presumed then routine inspections of the site will be required 
during the post-aperational phase in order to monitor activities 
which could indicate a. reopening of the mine or other measures 
for recovering the material. 
The basic prerequisite for Model 1 is that the final repository 
itself can be regarded as a sufficient barrier so that measures 
can be dispensed with for ensuring that there is no undeclared 
containment opening through which the material could be recovered 
and that a diversion of material within a containment (repro-
cessing under ground) can be ruled out. 
Model 2 comprises Model 1 and the following additional under-
ground stra~egic points: pit bottarn of both shafts, intersections 
of the access galleries with the emplacement connection drifts 
and the junctions of the emplacement galleries with the re-
spective connection drift. These Underground strategic points 
enable the inspector to safeguard the underground nuclear 
material flow at various stages of intensity. Largely the 
same restrictions as for Model 1 apply to this model. A ter-
mination of safeguards with backfilling of the gallery would 
have to be possible, or the geological repository itself 
would have to be regarded as a sufficiently safe barrier. 
The access of inspectors to strategic Underground points 
would indeed present a serious OQStruction to a diversion 
in the geological repository, but it cannot be ruled out 
with sufficient certainty. 
Model 3 comprises Model 2 and moreover as an additionl measure 
the access of inspectors to all Underground facilities and 
installations. Measures for containment and/or surveillance 
are thus suggested in all the aboveground and underground 
facilities and installations of the final repository, including 
the waste storage area. 
Based upon these three safeguards models, a diversion and abuse 
analysis has been compiled as well as an evaluation of effective-
ness leading to the following results: sufficient safeguards 
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can be ensured both in the phase of aboveground transport 
(Phase 1) as well as in the phase of transporting the final 
disposal package under ground until it is filled-in on site 
(Phase 2). During the operational phase safeguards on final 
disposal packages already backfilled (Phase 3) can consist 
of permanent design reverification (Safeguards Model 3); 
however, unsolved problems can be seen in evaluating their 
effectiveness. The same is true of verifying the integrity 
of the shut-down geological repository in the post-aperational 
phase (Phase 4). 
In Chapter 5 approaches are suggested and discussed for solving 
the safeguards problem. An initial approach is perceived in 
altering the existing IAEA safeguards philosophy. The IAEA 
considers it necessary to quantify objective variables by 
compiling numerical detection objectives (significant quantity, 
detection time, probability of detection, probability of false 
alarms). The probability of detection is the essentiai variable 
in the. IAEA safeguards towards which the planning of safeguards, 
employment of resources and evaluation of effectiveness are 
oriented, Since there is currently no procedure for quantifying 
the probability of detection in applying containment and sur-
veillance measures, safeguards models which are largely or, 
as required in the case of the final repository, almost ex-
clusively based on CIS measures, cannot be objectively planned 
in this model nor is their effectiveness computable. This 
leads to them being classified as unacceptable by the IAEA. 
A second approach is seen in the further development, and 
possibly redevelopment, of safeguards elements, In the opera-
tional phase of the final repository the problern consists 
in communicating a quantifiable certainty to the safeguards 
authority by suitable measures that the emplaced material 
is still present, Strictly speaking this quantification is 
only possible for accountancy measures, No methodology has 
yet been developed for numerically determining the information 
content of CIS measures; the error associated with CIS veri-
fication cannot be precisely specified, This problern can 
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generally be mitigated in other facilities by implementing 
material verification in principle by accountancy measures 
and by only employing CIS measures for subsidiary quantities 
of material and for limited periods as a supportive measurB. 
These restrictions (limitation to subsidiary quaritities and 
defined periods) must be dispensed with in the case of the 
final repository. Safeguards would thus only be possible 
with purely a CIS concept and there is no contractual nor 
methodological basis for this. I.e., even presuming that 
safeguards elements were tobe redeveloped or further developed, 
thus enabling CIS-supported monitaring of the emplaced material, 
its inclusion in the safeguards system would only be possible 
as a supplementary measure. On their own they do not represent 
a basic solut~on to the problern under consideration. 
Adaptation of the reference concept to the currently valid 
safeguard~ practice is discussed as the third approach. The 
starting points for this discussion are conditioning the 
material in such a way (dissolution and dilution) that the 
termination criteria for safeguards monitaring are fulfilled, 
or emplacing the material in such a way (recoverable) that 
it remains accessible for verification measures. Both methods 
of treatment are unacceptable as realistic alternatives. 
By dissolving the fuel and conditioning in the form of PAMELA 
ingots the capacity e.g. of the Gorleben salt dome would 
not even be sufficient for a single annual throughput of 
700 t of nuclear fuel. By emplacement in such a way that 
the material would remain accessible for further verification, 
apart from the technical feasibility, the essential objectives 
of the final repository concept would not be fulfilled, namely 
isolating the material from the biosphere and from possible 
further human access. Accessible underground emplacement 
would probably raise so many problems for reasons of heat 
removal and rock stability that this could no langer be regarded 
as a modification to the reference concept but would rather 
require compiling a new concept. 
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As a fourth approach, possibilities for solutions in the 
institutional sector are discussed, The starting point for 
institutional approaches is the fact that in order to implement 
a diversion a considerable amount of organizational work 
must also be undertaken in addition tb the necessary technical 
measuves. By forms of multinational cooperation, additional 
barriers could be erected in the organizational sector which 
would make a diversion more difficult and would increase 
the risk of detection. A further aspect is that by extending 
international involvements, the states would probably be 
more vulnerable to sanctions. 
Consideration of institutional aspects received essential 
impulses through the INFCE Conference and is reflected in 
the IPS Working Group. It must, however, be remernbered that 
institutional aspects are regarded by the IAEA as supplementary 
measures and not as an alternative to stringent technical 
monitoring. Institutional models with multinational Codeter-
mination or cooperation undoubtedly represent an approach 
to general NP problems of a final repository due to the asso-
ciated proliferation barrier. However, they are not appropriate 
for solving the safeguards problem. In this connection the 
special role of EURATOM will be discussed, which has proprietary 
rights to nuclear material and special rights in the storage 
of nuclear material on the basis of contractual boundary 
conditions. 
An evaluation of the approaches mentioned above is undertaken 
in Chapter 6. The first approach to the safeguards problems 
of a final repository was seen in modifying the existing 
IAEA safeguards philosophy. According to this the IAEA would 
have to accept a safeguards model based largely - or in 
the post-aperational phase exclusively- on C/S measures, 
Since in this case the probability of detection, i.e, the 
essential objective of IAEA safeguards, cannot be quantified 
at the present state of the art, such an approach would be 
regarded as unacceptable by the IAEA. It is not possible 
to verify the nuclear material in the case of anomalies, 
e.g. false alarms. 
8 
For the same reasons the secend approach, envisaging the 
further technical development of safeguards elements, cannot 
be presented as a basic Solution to these inherent safeguards 
problems either. 
The third approach consists in ensuring the safeguardability 
of the final repository according to current safeguards practice 
by altering the reference concept (e.g, by dissolving and 
diluting the nuclear fuel). No realistic possibilities are 
in sight in this case either, since doubt is thus cast on many 
of the desired cha'racteristics of a direct final reposi tory. 
Institutional models with multinational participation and Co-
operation (fourth approach) undoubtedly represent a simpli-
fication of the NP problems of the final repository due to 
the associated proliferation barriers. But in addition to 
the resulting problems of political acceptance they are not 
suitable for solving the safeguards problern either, In this 
context the role of EURATOM, resulting from its safeguards 
functions and its proprietary rights to all special fissionable 
materials, must be taken into particular consideration in 
establishing a direct final repository. 
Before a concluding resolution, it will be of interest to 
compare the essential NP aspects of direct final emplacement 
with reprocessing. This comparison clearly reveals the advantages 
of a waste disposal strategy with reprocessing. 
On the basis of the facts and analyses compiled, the conclusion 
becomes apparent that the waste management strategy with 
a direct final repository is problematic from safeguards 
aspects since doubt is cast on the technical realization 
of a safeguards concept. 
For certain types of fuel element where reprocessing is not 
envisaged and not worthwhile, Art. 35 VA can offer a possibility 
of a solution. In this case of the limited emplacement of spent 
fuel elements it could be possible to negotiate international 
safeguards according to this Article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The possibility of the direct final disposal of spent fuel ele-
ments is considered a.s an alternative to the commercial re-
processing of fuel elements. Final disposal aims at isolating 
radioactive material from the biosphere and from possibilities 
of accidental human access without any time limit. The safety 
concept is designed to ensure the integrity of the repository 
without requiring human maintenance or monitaring after the 
final closure of the repository. Final disposal is conceived 
of as irreversible disposal. 
Within the framework of the research and development programme 
"Alternative Waste Management Techniques" the emplacement of 
spent fuel elements in a salt dome is being studied. Several 
concepts have been compiled for conditioning 1 for the final 
disposal canister and emplacement techniques for this direct 
final disposal of spent fuel elements. One concept which best 
fulfills the criteria of safety engineering 1 technical feasi-
bility, availability of raw materials, and also approaches to 
economic efficiency and nuclear materials safeguards 1 was 
selected as a reference in each case. Back-up solutions for 
each component were also determined over and above estab-
lishing the reference concepts. 
A nuclear materials safeguards concept is to be developed by 
the KFA-TUG on the basis of the reference concept. This safe-
guards concept for Alternative Waste Management comprises· Safe-
guarding the products for final disposal from their arrival at 
the geological repository. Individual aspects important for 
applying international safeguards measures have been selected 
and compiled in Chap. 2 from the large volume of information 
required for this concept and from detailed technical problems 
already known. 
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The reference concept is based on a pressurized water reactor 
standard fuel element of the Biblis B typi with a burn-up 
of 40,000 MWd/tHM at an initial enrichment of 3.6 %. 
After a cooling-down period of at least 10 years the spent 
fuel elements are transported in flasks of 12 fuel elements 
each to a conditioning facility. Conditioning is effected 
in two steps, preliminary conditioning and final conditioning. 
In order to ensure that its c~pacity is continuously exploited 
the facility has a reception store for approx. 20 flasks. 
The spent fuel elements are enclosed in a final disposal 
package (FDP) in the conditioning plant. An FDP consists 
of three Containers: the dry storage bin (DSB) as a gas-tight 
barrier, the final disposal canister (FDC) primarily designed 
according to the criteria of corrosion protection and stability, 
and the lost shielding (LS) which serves as a protection 
against neutron and gamma radiation during handling and transport. 
The finished FDP's are transported from the conditioning 
facility to the geological repository in special flasks on 
special freight cars owned by the Deutsche Bundesbahn (Federal 
German Rai~ways). The FDP's are taken out of flasks and in-
dividually loaded onto plateau transporters at the reloading 
plant of the geological repository for transport under ground. 
A reception buffer store serves to accommodate FDP's in the 
case of disturbances in emplacement operation. During normal 
operation the FDP's delivered are taken directly under ground 
and there emplaced according to regulations. 
With respect to nuclear materials safeguards, no experience 
is yet available for direct final disposal. From the point 
of view of proliferation, a final repository for spent fuel 
elements containing strategic material represents an increasingly 
attractive object for a potential diverter and thus requires 
effective safeguards for which new techniques and concepts 
must be developed due to the special problems involved. 
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Safeguards instrumentation currently available is based on 
material accountancy and independent material verification 
which in the case of a final repository with the purpose 
of isolating material from the biosphere and preventing further 
possibilities of access can no longer be directly applied, 
In the following the direct final emplacement of spent fuel 
elements, an interesting possibility also for other states, 
is therefore investigated from safeguards aspects with respect 
to the Federal Republic of Germany which, in cantrast to other 
signatory states of the NP Treaty, does not have a national 
safeguards system. Whether and to what extent available safe-
guards elements can be.combined into an effective safeguards 
concept is analyzed under the boundary conditions given for 
the final repository, or which modifications may possibly 
be necessary, 
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2 TECHNICAL REFERENCE CONCEPT 
WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO SAFEGUARDS 
2.1 Conditioning the Products for Final Disposal 
2.1.1 Preliminary Conditioning 
In the preliminary conditioning functional area 3 intact fuel 
elements are each enclosed gas-tight in a so-called dry storage 
bin (DSB). The individual process steps are distributed between 
3 separate cells connected to each other by a DSB transport 
vehicle coupled to the cell openings in a ventilatively tight 
manner. The preconditioning sequence proceeds as follows: 
The flasks taken from the reception buffer store are docked 
onto the opening in the floor of the fuel element unloading 
cell. After removing the fuel elements (FE), they are examined 
and deposited in the FE buffer store. 
After docking the DSB onto the opening in the floor of the fuel 
element buffer cell, the lid of the opening is opened and the 
fuel elements placed in the DSB, The fuel elements are trans~ 
ported suspended on a cell crane when removing them from the 
fuel element buffer stor~. The trap door in the bin-loading 
cell is then closed again and the loaded DSB proceeds to the 
next cell, the welding cell. 
In the welding cell the screw cap is inserted in the DSB and 
welded on. Helium is then f~d in for the subsequent leak test 
and the filling hole is closed by welding, 
The transport vehicle then proceeds to the opening in the 
floor of the testing cell and is coupled to the cell opening. 
In the testing cell the dry storage bin is taken over by the 
cell crane, The DSB transport vehicle is uncoupled and proceeds 
to the material transfer room where it is loaded with an empty 
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dry storage bin. The welded DSB is taken to the decontamination 
device in the testing cell and after a wipe test is decontami-
nated if necessary. The DSB is subsequently subjected to 
an integral helium leak test in a pressure container and 
then after passing the test is transferred out of the cell 
and placed in a buffer store, 
The dry storage bin used during preliminary conditioning 
can accommodate three intact fuel elements. It consists of 
a tube, bottom, cap and internals. On the lid there is a 
device for suspending it from a crane. The tube length of 
the DSB is 5.14 m, the tube diameter is 66.5 cm and the walls 
are 8 mm thick. 
As a parallel approacb to the preliminary conditioning described 
above, the metbad of "Fuel Elements Separated Into Fuel Rods" 
is currently being investigated. Tbis will not be discussed 
in detail bere since tbose components of the final disposal 
package relevant to safeguards in tbe final repository are 
practically unaltered by tbis alternative metbad of treatment. 
2.1 .2 Final Conditioning 
The process steps in final conditioning begin by taking over 
tbe dry storage package (DSP), tbat is to say tbe loaded 
DSB, from tbe buffer store in preliminary conditioning and 
are terminated by passing on tbe final disposal package. 
In order to take over the DSB, an empty FDC is driven on 
a railway truck under tbe outward transfer room of tbe pre-
liminary conditioning. Tbe dry storage package coming from 
tbe buffer store is placed in tbe final disposal canister 
by tbe crane. The railway truck then transports the loaded 
FDC under the inward transfer room of final conditioning. 
Tbe final disposal canister is first raised here by means 
of lifting tackle on tbe railway truck and tbe lid is placed 
in position by the cell crane and tben screwed on. Tbe crane 
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then picks up the FDC and deposits it at the welding facility. 
Automatie welding equipment applies the seal weld of the 
second lid at several positions. The weld seam is then visually 
inspected and a helium leak test then follows for liquid-
tightness. 
The tested final disposal canister is then inserted in the 
lost shielding by the cell crane located in the output transfer 
room. The lost shielding is closed by means of a screw cap. 
The final disposal package in a Type B flask then proceeds 
to the geological repository on a special Federal Railways truck. 
The final disposal canister is intended to ensure the safe 
containment of the radioactive material for a period of about 
500 years. Due to the geometry of the intact fuel elements, 
a maximum length for the final disposal package of 6.2 m 
would seem to be appropriate. This weighs approx. 50 t, it 
is designed for a heat output of 2.4 kW. 
Nine fuel elements must be conditioned per day in order to 
achieve an annual capacity of 700 t heavy metal; the preliminary 
conditioning functional area is therefore designed in two 
legs. 2 - 3 final disposal packages therefore reach the final 
conditioning functional area per day. 
2.2 The Geological Repository 
2.2.1 Specifications 
The geological repository will be constructed in a virgin 
salt dome. The reference concept envisages emplacing FDP's 
with lost shielding in tunnels. The emplacement level is 
to be at a depth of approx. 730 m. The repository is to be 
operated for 50 years at an emplacement rate of 437 final 
disposal packages per year. With 40 operating weeks per year 
two final disposal packages must be emplaced on four·days 
of the week and three final disposal packages on one day, 
i.e. 11 final disposal packages per week. Only one emplacement 
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level is envisaged. A maximum temperature of 200°C is presumed 
for the salt in the emplacement area 1 as in the HAW concept. 
It is hoped to achieve a temperature of 150°C at the salt-
canister interface. Before beginning emplacement the rock 
temperature at a depth of 730 m is approx. 37°C, 
Number of Shafts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
Interna! Diameter of the Shafts ........ . 7.50 m 
Shaft lntervals ...................... . approx. 400 m 
Werking Load Shaft I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 t 
Werking Load Shaft II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . approx. 60 t 
Table 2 -1 : Shaft Data 
The shaft transport equipment for emplacement operation 
is to be designed for a working load of approx. 60 t. At 
the same time as emplacing fuel element packages from fuel 
conditioning, secondary waste is emplaced via the same shaft 
but in a separate emplacement field. 
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Oparational Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 a 
Depth of the Emplacement Level . . . . 
Emplacement Rate for FE Packages . . . . . . . . . . . 
Admissible T emperature of the Salt in the 
· Emplacement Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Tamperature at the Salt-Canister Interface ......... . 
Rock T emperature Before Beginning Emplacement . . . . 
Warking Load of the Shaft Transport Equipment for 
Emplacement Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Products for Final Disposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Cross Section of the Tunnels in the Emplacement Floor . . . 
Table 2-2: Specifications for the Geological Repository 
approx. 730 m 
2 or 3 per day 
max. 2000C 
approx. 1500C 
370C 
approx. 60 t 
Spent LWR-FE's, 
waste from the 
conditioning facility, 
nuclear power 
stations, regional 
collecting depots, 
research 
establishments etc. 
approx. 22 m2 
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Cross Section of the Exploratory Tunnels . 
Connection Drift lntervals . 
Distance of the Emplacement 
Floor from the Exploratory Floor . 
Access Gallery lntervals ......... . 
Dimensions of the Emplacement Fields . . . . . . . . . . 
Cross Section of the Access Galleries 
and Connection Drifts . . ·. . . . . . . . 
Cross Section of the Emplacement Tunnels . 
Thickness of the Pillars from the End of the 
Emplacement Gallery to the Next Connection Drift . 
Ascending Gradient of the Connection Galleries . . . . . 
approx. 15 m2 
(without vaulting) 
200m 
30m 
500 m - 1800 m 
500 x 200m2 
to 1800 x 200m2 
7 x 4m2 
5 x 4m2 
7m 
10 - 12 % 
Table 2-3: Data on the Position and Dimensions of Tunnelsand Fields 
2.2.2 Developing the Geological Repository 
A final evaluation on the suitability of the salt dome requires 
underground exploration by mining development. This mining 
development will not be conventional 1 i.e. largely without 
blasting. Access to the repository will be obtained via two 
shafts each 7.5 m in diameterat a distance of approx. 
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400 m. The first shaft serves for removing salt 1 transporting 
the material, man-riding and the incoming air. The working 
load of the transport facility is approx. 25 t. The second 
shaft, where the transport facility has a working load of 
approx. 60 t, serves for emplacement transport and the exhaust 
air. 
Exploration in the envisaged emplacement area is undertaken 
by exploratory drillings and tunnels. The exploratory tunnels 
will have a cross section of 5 x 3 m2 without vaulting. They 
roughly delineate (deviation of up to 25 m) the emplacement 
field and will later be used as ventilation galleries for 
the exhaust air from the emplacement fields. 
The underground infrastructure area will be constructed between 
the two shafts. This includes the pit bottom, hopper, crushing 
and dust-removing facilities, as well as Workshops for the 
assembly and maintenance of the machines, facilities and 
motor vehicles used under ground. The planned dimensions 
of the mechanical workshop are given in Table 2-4. The Workshop 
is equipped with lifting platforms. A travelling crane with 
a load of 25 t is envisaged. 
Dimensions of the Workshop 
Length. 85 m 
Width 15m 
Height 6- 8 m 
Load of the Travelling Grane in the Workshop . max. 25 t 
Table 2-4: Data on the Workshop 
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The position of the emplacement fields will be determined after 
completing underground exploration. The emplacement floor will 
be 30 m below the exploratory floor. 
Access to the emplacement area will be obtained by driving two 
parallel access galleries up to the boundaries of the field. 
The access galleries are joined by connection drifts at intervals 
of 200 m. The emplacement galleries are driven parallel to the 
access galleries starting from the connection drifts. The 
emplacement tunnels are not driven right through so that 
a pillar of 7 m remains between the end of the tunnel and 
the next connection drift. The access galleries and connection 
drifts have a cross section of 25 m2 , the emplacement tunnels 
18m 2 . The distance between the two access galleries depends 
on geological conditions in the salt dome and may be between 
500 m and 1800 m. The individual emplacement fields correspond-
ingly have dimensions of 500 m x 200 m to 1800 m x 200 m. 
In the final disposal package emplacement field, 18 connection 
drifts with 50 emplacement tunnels each and 1 connection drift 
with 40 emplacement tunnels are planned. Only the emplacement 
tunnels of the connection drift furthest from the shaft will 
be driven before beginning emplacement. The emplacement tunnels 
in the next emplacement connection drift ·are driven at the 
same time as emplacement is effected in the adjacent emplacement 
connection drift. 
The emplacement floor is connected to the infrastructure area 
on the exploratory floor in the form of sloping tunnels as 
belt and chute raises with an ascending gradient of 10 - 12 %. 
2.2.3 Emplacement Operation 
Emplacement is effected by retreating working, i.e. from 
the most remote boundaries of the underground excavations 
towards the shafts. Before beginning emplacement, all emplacement 
tunnels are first driven in the field furthest from the shaft. 
A pillar of 15 m remains between the first emplacement tunnel 
and the access gallery. The width of the pillars between the 
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emplacement tunnels is 10 m. After the first emplacement 
connection drift has been completely driven, emplacement 
operationwill begin in it. Tunnelling the second connection 
drift proceeds parallel to emplacement. 
The final disposal package is transported below ground on a 
rail-bound plateau transporter via the shaft envisaged for 
emplacement operation ( cf. the sequence diagram in Fig. 2-1). 
The plateau transporter does not have any driving mechanism 
of its own and no brakes, and has to be propelled by a loco-
motive. The technical specifications are given in Table 2-5. 
Plateau Transporter 
Length. 
Width . 
Weight . .................... . 
Axle Load . .................. . 
Track Gauge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Table 2-5: Plateau Transporter Data 
approx. 6.0 m 
approx. 2.5 m 
approx. 8 t 
approx. 35 t 
1.435 m 
(Federal Railway gauge) 
The plateau transporter with the final disposal package is 
driven into the hoisting cage of the shaft winding equipment, 
is secured and transported through the shaft to the emplacement 
floor. A locomotive then takes over the transportation and 
drives the plateau transporter on rails along the access 
gallery solely designed for package transport to the emplacement 
connection drift. The gaugealso corresponds to Federal Railway 
standards. Still on the access gallery, the emplacement machine 
takes over the package from the plateau transporter at the inter-
section of the connection drift and tunnel, and transports it 
without rails through the emplacement connection drift to the 
emplacement tunnel. After placing the package at the location 
of emplacement, the emplacement machine returns to the access 
gallery where the plateau transporter has in the meantime 
been driven back to the shaft and then taken to the surface. 
The section of the tunnel with the FDP is then filled in 
with crushed salt for a distance of 7.5 m, Mechanical or 
pneumatic stowing is used as the filling process. The filling 
vehicle is a railless vehicle with sliding sides on which 
a mechanical stowing machine is mounted, The emplacement 
sequence is shown in Fig, 2-1. 
The stowing material is fed to the stowing machine via a con-
veyor system from the advanced working or a hopper. Aggregates 
in the form of MgO concrete can be added, The stowing machine 
drives to the emplacement location and mechanically fills 
the section of the tunnel to be closed. This method achieves 
a 98 % degree tunnel filling. 
The distance between adjacent emplacement connection drifts 
is 200 m. Since 7 m remains as the end pillar and 13 m is 
required for barricading the filled-in section, 180 m can 
be used for emplacing the packages. With a package length 
of 6.2 m and a distance between the packages of approx. m, 
a tunnel can accommodate 24 packages. 
If all the tunnels of an emplacement connection drift are 
occupied by packages and filled in, then the emplacement 
connection drift, the parallel and flanking galleries, as 
well as the ventilation galleries (if they are no longer 
required) are filled in and closed by dams. Table 2-6 shows 
the most important data of an emplacement field, 
At the same time as emplacement is being effected, the next 
sector of the emplacement field relative to the shaft area 
is opened up. The galleries are driven by a cutting tunnelling 
machine. The debris is either removed by direct belt feed 
and transportation via the conveyor system as stowing material 
to the emplacement location, a hopper area or the pit bottom 
at Shaft I. Or alternatively 
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Delivery by the Federal Railway * 
I 
Unloading and Placing the FDP in Storage 
Positions of the Butter Store 
-' 
Loading the Plateau Transporter with 1 FDP perTruck 
-' 
Transport to the Shaft* 
J 
Placing the Plateau Transporter in the Hoisting Cage 
I 
Transport Below Ground* 
I 
Coupling the Truck to the Underground Locomotive 
I 
Transport to the Emplacement _Qonnectign Drift* 
I 
FDP Taken Over by the Emplacement Machine 
I 
Transport to the Emplacement Tunnel 
I 
Placing the FDP in the Emplacement Tunnel 
I 
Filling in the Tunnel Sections 
* Raii-Bound Transport 
Figure 2-1 : Diagram of the Emplacement Sequence 
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a shovel loader takes over the debris from the tunnelling 
machine and transports it to the belt feed. All transportation 
of debris in the emplacement sector is railless and is effected 
without exception through the connection drifts to the access 
gallery not used for emplacement transport. The maximum distance 
covered by the shovel loader to the belt feed is approx. 300 m. 
The hopper area is a maximum of 2 km from the emplacement loca-
tion on the access gallery. 
Width of the Pillar Between the Access Gallery and the 
First Emplacement Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Width of Pillars Between the Emplacement Tunnels . 
End Pillar Between the Em'placement Tunnel 
and Next Connection Drift . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Length of the Glasure Plug of an Emplacement Tunnel . 
Effective Length of the Emplacement Tunnel . 
Package Length . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Distance Between Two Packages . 
15m 
10m 
?m 
13m 
180m 
6.2 m 
approx. 1 m 
Number of Packages Per Tunnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
Table 2-6: Dimensions in the Emplacement Field 
After terminating emplacement Operation, all the tunnels and 
cavities are filled in and closed by plugs and dams. The 
shafts are also filled, whereby the natural geological structures 
are largely taken into consideration. Barriers of concrete and 
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asphalt are also incorporated, Although the walls of the shaft 
arenot removed 1 it will be impossible to use the shafts 
again. 
2.2.4 Machines and Vehicles 
The following machines and vehicles are available in the geo-
logical repository for developing the mine and filling in 
the tunnels after emplacement: 
cutting tunnelling machine 
shovel loader 
mechanical stowing machine. 
These machines and vehicles are partly diesel-driven or they 
have electric engines and are railless, As self-propelled 
vehicles they can be equipped with a tachograph to record 
the distance covered, driving time and speed. The cutting 
tunnelling machine .weighs approx. 80 t and can be equipped 
with an air-conditioned cab. However, this is not envisaged 
at the prevailing work temperature of 37°C, The shovel loader 
weighs approx. 25 - 30 t and is not suitable for transporting 
final disposal packages. The machines and vehicles described 
here can be used both in the FDP store as well as in the 
waste store. In addition to the vehicles mentioned, vehicles 
for inspection, transporting crews and material, clearing, 
loading and special purposes are used both in the mining 
and emplacement sector. The following are envisaged for em-
placement operation: 
plateau transporter 
locomotive 
emplacement machines, 
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The plateau transporter is rail-bound and is not self-propelled. 
It weighs 8 t and carries a working load of 55 t. It is moved 
by a diesel- or battery-driven locomotive. However, a further 
plateau transporter is available with a lower load of 25 - 30 t 
for emplacing waste. 
The only railless machine capable of picking up a package 
and transporting it independently is the emplacement machine. 
For reasons of redundancy, two emplacement machines are avail-
able. Their motor and brakes are designed for transporting 
packages over ascending and descending gradients of up to 
1 %. The emplacement machines are not able to transport packages 
over sloping tunnels with a gradient of 10 - 12 %. The final 
design of the emplacement machines has not yet been decided. 
Two concepts are being discussed, on the one band an articulated 
shovel loader with fork, also known as the Kiruna truck, 
and alternatively a portal lift truck on four stilts as e.g. 
used for container transport. 
2.2.5 Ventilating the Geological Repository 
Fresh air is brought in via the debris transport shaft to 
the emplacement floor and is then fed into the emplacement 
and advance working operations via the access gallery. The 
emplacement tunnels receive special ventilation via air ducts 
during advance working and emplacement. Outgoing air is fed 
directly to the former exploratory floor via ventilation 
chutes at the ends of the connection drifts and is then directed 
to the emplacement shaft where it escapes, Package transport 
on the emplacement level also takes place in the fresh air 
flow. A monitaring of the exhaust air for radioactivity is 
envisaged at least for the exhaust shaft, 
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3 NP ASPECTS OF DIRECT FINAL DISPOSAL 
3.1 Direct Final Disposal in Comparison to Waste Management 
by Reprocessing 
3.1 .1 Consequences of a Direct Final Repository as a Model 
for Third Countries 
From the proliferation point of view there are two areas 
in the nuclear fuel cycle requiring special protection: 
On the one hand there are the two sensitive steps of enrichment 
and reprocessing whose technologies can in principle be used 
to separate strategic nuclear material, and on the other 
hand the accumulation of sensitive nuclear material for example 
in storing separated plutonium or spent fuel elements. 
The protection and control of sensitive technology is the 
subject of the London Guidelines in which the individual 
components to be protected are listed in detail. A possible 
abuse of the facilities themselves is covered by the various 
international safeguards agreements with the IAEA within 
the framewerk of the NP Treaty or bilateral agreements. 
An accumulation of spent plutonium can result in a fuel cycle 
with reprocessing for example by delaying the expansion of 
nuclear energy programmes, e.g. for breeder reactors. Insti-
tutional models have already been developed based on Article XII AS 
of the IAEA Statute envisaging an international plutonium 
storage system for excess separated plutonium. Amongst other 
aspects, storage of excess plutonium is envisaged as well 
as a reduction in the storage capacities at fuel element 
factories for reactor fuels containing plutonium. 
The accumulation of plutonium in the intermediate storage 
of spent fuel elements has also been identified as a sensitive 
point in the nuclear fuel cycle. The ISFM Group, meeting 
within the framewerk of the IAEA, has suggested appropriate 
countermeasures /3-1/. 
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The accumulation of plutonium in direct final disposal is re-
, 
garded as especially disturbing in many quarters with respect 
to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, In this connection 
the concept of a "plutonium mine" has been introduced /3-2/. 
Particularly on the part of the Europeans and Japanese, the 
inherent proliferation danger at such final repositories 
was pointed out at the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evalua-
tion Conference (INFCE) since in principle later access by 
a state to the very large quantities of plutonium which would 
be present in a geological repository with spent fuel elements 
can never be ruled out. This is of special significance because 
access to the plutonium will become easier in the long term 
due to the decreasing radioactivity of the spent fuel elements 
and thus the strategic value of the material will increase.· 
In connection with the large quantities of stored plutonium 
and the long operational l~fe of such a repository of approx. 
50 years, it must be pointed out that notice to or termination 
of the NP Treaty cannot be ruled out in various countries. 
In this case the state thus has the legal possibility of 
excavating spent fuel elements from the direct final repository 
and separating the plutonium for atomic weapons. It can be 
assumed that notice to the NP Treaty by the Federal Republic 
of Germany is out of the question. 
Furthermore 1 it is not possible to waive the application 
of safeguards for a certain quantity of nuclear material 
on the basis of bilateral agreements. On the basis of these 
bilateral agreements it could rather result that the contracting 
parties would be able to participate in formulating safeguards 
application in the long term, which could lead to a tightening 
of safeguards (prior consent). On the basis of these overriding 
proliferation aspects it seems difficult to discuss the estab-
lishment of such repositories as a model for worldwide applica-
tion since other states without the appropriate contractual 
conditions for controlling non-proliferation (non-proliferation 
credentials) would be in a position to obtain long-term access 
to sensitive plutonium.· 
3-3 
In examining the question of the extent to which a Don-re-
coverability concept would hinder later access 'to sensitive 
plutonium it must generally be presumed that in principle 
there will always be technical possibilities of bringing 
an emplaced fuel element back into the light of day. The 
technical difficulties depend, amongst other aspects, on 
the final disposal medium and they are probably greater for 
disposal in salt than for other media. It must be remernbered 
that not all countries have this storage medium available 
and thus different proliferation profiles would result in 
the corresponding countries. The unusually large quantities 
of plutonium would make it possible to create large nuclear 
programmes for atomic weapons. 
3.1 .2 Possibility of Terminating Safeguards 
The criteria for terminating IAEA safeguards are laid down 
in Paragraphs 26(C) of INFCIRC/66 and 11 öf INFCIRC/153 cor-
responding to Art. 11, Verification Agreement (VA):" ... uponde-
termination by the Community and the Agency that the material has been con-
sumed, or has been diluted in such a way that it is no longer usable for any 
nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, 
or has become practically irrecoverable" /3-3, 3-4/. 
The conditions of Paragraph 11, INFCIRC/153 are thus not 
applicable to spent nuclear fuel. The INFCE Warking Group 7 
established in their concluding report /3-5/ that waste from 
the LWR fuel cycle (recycled and non-recycled) is relatively 
unattractive for weapons production. Depleted uranium must 
either be enriched or irradiated and reprocessed, Pu waste 
is difficult to recover because of the great dilution in 
glass or cement. In the opinion of the INFCE, both types 
of waste probably correspond to IAEA criteria for terminating 
safeguards~ 
Since it becomes easier to handle spent FE's from the LWR 
cycle without recycling due to decreasing fission product 
activity, this is the type of waste in the LWR fuel cycle 
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which, according to INFCE, is more attractive with respect 
to diversion. The easier recovery of fissionable material 
by reprocessing is in cantrast to the fact that in a final 
repository in salt recovery of the final disposal package 
in the course of time will not be made easier in the foreseeable 
future due to the high temperatures occurring in the lang term. 
~he extent to which future technologies will alter this assess-
ment does not only depend on the development of highly sophisti-
cated technologies for the enrichment and recovery of recycled 
nuclear material but also on technical progress in mining 
engineering. At this moment in time, the question of long-term 
safeguardability arises in connection with the direct final 
disposal of spent nuclear fuels in a suitable geological 
formation. The essential aspects for terminating safeguards, 
as well as for long-term safeguarding, are listed in Table 3-1. 
Termination of Safeguards 
Non-Recoverability 
(not fulfilled without further provision) 
Degree of Dilution of the Fissionable 
Material 
Solution Pursuant to INFCIRC/153, 
Paragraph 35 or VA, Art. 35 
Conceivable for Such Types of FE 
Not Envisaged and Not Economic for 
Reprocessing 
Long-Term Safeguards 
Novel Problem 
Cancellation of Membership in the 
NP Treaty 
Duration of the NP Treaty until 1995 
NP Credibility 
Model Character of the Direct Final 
Repository 
Table 3·1: Termination of Safeguards Measures and Long-Term Safeguards: 
Essential Aspects 
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3.1 .3 Considerations on a Final Repository for HAW and Spent 
Fuel Elements 
For certain kinds of spent fuel elements (e.g, AVR, THTR 
or special types of light~water reactors) reprocessing is 
either not envisaged or not economical. For such fuel elements 
direct final disposal is therefore necessary. The question 
thus arises whether a termination of safeguards can be possible 
for such nuclear material. If the quantities of spent fuel 
elements were to be small in relation to highly active waste, 
which would also be taken into the final repository, then 
although the conditions of Paragraph 11 arenot fulfilled -
Paragraph 35 of INFCIRC/153 or Art. 35 VA could come into 
effect, which says: 
"·· .Where the conditions ofthat paragrapharenot met, 
but the State considers that the recovery of safeguarded 
nuclear material from residues is not for the time being 
practicable or desirable the Agency and the State shall 
consult on the appropriate safeguards measures to be 
applied. It should further be provided that safeguards 
shall terminate on nuclear material subject to safeguards 
under the Agreement under the conditions set forth in 
paragraph 13 above, provided that the State and the 
Agency agree that such nuclear materil is practicably 
irrecoverable." 
A termination of safeguards is therefore not impossible in 
principle, an application of simplified safeguards is conceivable 
at any rate. 
3.1 .4 Extrapolation of IAEA Discussions on Sensitive Facilities 
to a Direct Final Repository 
Recent discussions at the IAEA in connection with the implementa-
tion of safeguards concepts for sensitive facilities in repro-
cessing and enrichment have indicated that concepts making 
intensive use of containment/surveillance systems are not 
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acceptable /3-6/. Since precisely this conception with intensive 
CIS could be of essential significance in the case of a direct 
final repository, a conflict can be expected here. The IAEA 
would have to make considerable cuts and reorientations in 
their previous safeguards philosphy if this problern is to 
be solved, Only a few problems can be mentioned here such 
as design verification, availability and reliability of instru-
ments, verification of nuclear material in the case of instru-
mentation failure, internal diversion etc, 
In spite of all these difficulties it must be seen that pursuant 
to the safeguards agreement, e,g, INFCIRC/153, all nuclear 
facilities, such as a direct final repository for spent fuel 
elements, would in principle have tobe internationally safe-
guardable, However, in this case, considerable cuts would 
have to be made for such a safeguards concept in the "effective-
ness" demands as currently discussed at the IAEA. 
3.2 Results of NP Discussions in INFCE 
Since about 60 nations and various international organizations, 
such as the IAEA, participated in INFCE the results and con-
siderations of this conference are of particular significance 
for further approaches, This is especially true since the 
numerous previous discussions were combined and extended 
at INFCE, Thus INFCE Group 7 "WASTE MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL" 
concerned itself with the problems of safeguards in final 
repositories for spent fuel elements, the salient points 
of which will be given in the following. 
Only waste containing U-235, U-233 and plutonium is of signif-
icance from a safeguards point of view. Other transuranic 
elements, such as neptunium and americium could also be of 
significance in future. Depending on their content of nuclear 
material the following categories of waste are differentiated 
in the INFCE considerations: 
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(I) Waste in the form of depleted uranium 1 natural uranium 
or low enriched uranium ( < 20% U-235) 1 so-called non-HEU 
waste. 
(II) Highly active waste containing plutonium (or U-233 
in the thorium cycle) and U-235. 
(III) Waste with a low plutonium content and low content 
of high-enriched uranium, so-called HEU waste. 
Spent LWR fuel elements thus fall into waste category (II). 
The flow of nuclear material in the fuel cycle can be quantified 
from the safeguards aspect with the aid of the concept of 
the "significant quantity". In the case of uranium waste' 
in category (I), the significant quantity is 75 kg of U-235. 
In the case of plutonium and HEU waste the significant quantities 
are 8 kg for plutonium and U-233, and 25 kg for U-235. ~ 20 %) . 
These values also correspond to the guidelines for target 
quantities suggested by the IAEA. If one finally also considers 
that the waste is generally not present in the form of an 
open flow but rather packed in containers then the concept 
can be meaningfully characterized as "target batch". This 
is taken as the number of waste containers which tagether 
contain a significant quantity of nuclear material. In the 
case of LWR fuel, two spent fuel elements form a target batch. 
The most attractive target for a diversion of nuclear material 
is represented by the spent fuel from the light-water reactor 
once-through cycle in the waste categories under consideration. 
The high radioactivity of the fission products initially 
functions as a self-protection for the fuel, thus making 
handling of the material more difficult. Moreover, reprocessing 
technology is required to separate the fission products and 
actinides, as well as toseparate uranium and plutonium. 
However, after a correspondingly long storage period the 
radioactivitiy is significantly reduced and access to the 
plutonium after recovery becomes easier. Nevertheless, if 
the spent fuel elements are at that time enclosed in suitable 
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containers in a final repository deep in the geological sub-
stratum at a salt temperature of 120°C then this makes re-
coverability and thus access to plutonium more difficult. 
The remaining types of waste in category (II), as well as 
the waste in categories (I) and (III) do not represent attractive 
diversion targets in the view of INFCE. Safeguards measures 
for spent nuclear fuel. in a final repository consist of account-
ancy and verification from the time of unloading from the 
reactor until emplacement in the salt dome or a different 
geological formation. The monitaring of loading and unloading 
activities by inspectors ahd/or television units is currently 
state of the art of IAEA safeguards. The automatic Safeguarding 
of fuel movements in a repository is currently being developed, 
in the same way as non-destructive analysis (NDA) for determining 
the fuel burn-up or plutonium content. 
All processes from storing spent fuel until emplacement in 
the final underground repository are safeguards-relevant. 
According to the INFCE discussions, the following demands 
must be made: 
(1) Surveillance of final disposal canister loading, 
item counting of the fuel elements changing to 
item counting of the final disposal packages. A 
tamper-resistant seal on the FDP would be able 
to detect attempts at breaching the integrity of 
the package; 
(2) counting the fuel elements or final disposal packages 
before and after each transport step; 
(3) containment/surveillance and verification of the 
FDP from receiving the package until emplacing 
it in the final repository; 
(4) containment/surveillance in order to ensure that 
there is no material retransport (possibly supported 
by monitors to detect the movements of radioactive 
material); 
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(5) inspections to verify the plant design in order 
to rule out the existence of clandestine transport 
paths 1 stores or equipment. 
Three phases can be differentiated in safeguards measures 
with respect to a direct final repository: 
During the .first, or active, phase of the geological repository, 
item counting, inventory verification and surveillance are 
applied. 
The second, or ·passive phase begins when individual areas 
of the repository are filled in again after emplacing the 
final disposal packages. Since during this phase recovery 
of waste becomes increasingly more difficult due to the filling 
in and the associated enlargement ~f the containment, the 
safeguards activities would be shifted from item counting 
to containment/surveillance after agreement between the IAEA 
and the operator. 
The third, or post-aperational phase, begins with the closure 
of the geological repository. It must be established by sur-
veillance measures and periodic inspections of the area in 
question that no attempts at recovery have been undertaken. 
After deactivating the final repository the degree of safeguards 
measures will be able to be reduced according to the concluding 
report of INCFE Warking Group 7, pages 101 and 102 1 namely 
for the following reasons. Assuming there was an incentive 
to recover nuclear material from the shut-down repository 
if a considerable fraction of the emplaced nuclear fuel were 
to be recovered then this would practically mean reactivating 
the geological repository, associated with considerable efforts: 
drillings, shaft construction, Ventilation, transport of 
excavated material, canister transport etc. In this case 
it would take 12 - 18 months before nuclear material would 
begin to emerge from the final repository. Such an undertaking 
would thus be easily observable. On the other hand 1 analyses 
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have indicated that the recovery of a few final disposal 
canisters would be possible within a brief period (8 - 10 
weeks). However since even for this undertaking, whose costs 
would amount to roughly $ 25 million, several large drilling 
facilities would be required which could hardly be concealed, 
This is, however, not directly transferable to the reference 
concept since in the analysis quoted in the INFCE report studies 
were undertaken for a final disposal canister 35 cm in diameter. 
Several of these canisters would therefore be required fÖr 
a significant quantity of nuclear material. 
In the long term the effectiveness of safeguards measures 
is questioned by INFCE (Concluding Report Group 7, page 101) 
since the post-aperational phase lasting for centuries will 
be determined by numerous, hardly foreseeable factors such 
as: 
alterations in the institutional and social system, 
large inventory of fissionable material in repositories 
for spent FE's, 
decrease in radioactivity and thus better possibilities 
of recovering the fissionable material, 
development of new technical safeguards measures 
(i.e. processes and equipment), 
possible technological developments to aceeierate 
the recovery of very diluted waste, 
degree of integrity of canisters with spent FE's 
in shut-down geological repositories and possibilities 
of recovery, 
later incentives for recovering the fissionable 
material from spent fuel for energy generation 
purposes. 
No detailed predictions can be made about most of these factors. 
It is therefore not possible from current perspectives to make 
a decision on the possibility of monitaring a direct final 
repository in the post-aperational phase or terminating safeguards. 
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4 APPLICATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS REGULATIONS TO THE 
REFERENCE CONCEPT 
4.1 Political and Technical Boundary Conditions 
4,1. 1 Legal Bases for Safeguards 
In the Federal Republic of Germany the tasks of international 
nuclear material safeguards - conditioned by the commitment 
to the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NP Treaty) - are undertaken by 
two institutions: 
the Commission of the European Communities and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
4. 1. 1.1 The EURATOM Treaty 
The obj~ctive of the treaty establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community is a common market in the sector of the peace-
ful uses of nuclear energy; the major aspects being of equal 
priority in the assured supply of ores and nuclear fuels, 
promotion of research and the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. The following boundary conditions can be derived 
from the EURATOM Treaty /4-1/ for direct final disposal: 
The material in the final disposal packages is 
special fissionable material and property of the 
European Atomic Energy Community. 
The Commission of the Community is obliged to safeguard 
the material with the aim of convincing themselves 
that it is being used for no other purposes than 
those specified by the users. 
The Commission inspectors shall have access to 
all locations, documents and persans related to 
the use or storage of nuclear material at all times. 
A purely national solution to the problern of the 
direct final disposal of spent fuel elements cannot 
be derived from the articles of the EURATOM Treaty 
quoted in detail in the following, 
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The aims and procedures of nuclear material ~afeguarding by 
the Commission of the European Communities are specified in 
detail in Chapter VII of the EURATOM Treaty. Safeguards are 
accordingly based on nuclear material accountancy 1 reports 
to EURATOM and the unimpeded access of EURATOM's inspectors 
to all nuclear facilities, 
Pursuant to Art. 79 it is incumbent upon the operator of a 
nuclear facility to keep and present records of oparational 
processes in the utilization or generation of materials subject 
to safeguards, thus enabling account to be kept of these 
materials. This is also valid for transportation of these 
materials. Whoever shall erect or operate a nuclear facility 
must inform the Garnmission of the plant design, insofar as 
this is necessary for the Commission to fulfill its tasks 
(Art. 78). The tasks of the.Commission arise in part from 
Art. 77. Pursuant to this 1 it must ensure by appropriate 
safeguards: 
that the nuclear materials are not used for any 
purposes other than those envisaged; 
that the regulations concerning supply and all 
special safeguards obligations (prior consent) 
undertaken by the Community are observed. 
The safeguards comprise ores 1 source materials and special 
fissionable materials. Pursuant to Art. 81 the Garnmission 
inspectors shall have access to all places and data and to 
allpersans professionally concerned with materials 1 articles 
of equipment or facilities subject to safeguards at all times. 
Article 86 says: 
Special fissile materials shall be the property of the Community. 
The CommunityJs right of ownership shall axtend to all special 
fissile materials which are produced or imported by a Member 
State, apersonor an undertaking and . 
safeguards, 
. are subject to 
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Whereas the proprietary rights of ,the Community to all special 
fissionable materials are laid down in Chapter VIII (Art. 86), 
Chapter VI regulates ·the supply of the member states with 
' orBs, source materials and special fissionable materials: 
In order to ensure a common supply policy according 
to the principle of equal access to the sources 
of supply, an agency was established to direct 
rights to the materials mentioned above generated 
on the territory of the member states. It has the 
exclusive right to conclude contracts on the supply 
of these materials from countries within and without 
the Communi ty. (Art. 52) . 
Pursuant to Art. 57, the rights of the EURATOM 
Supply· Agency comprise the acquisition of 
a) rights to the utilization and consumption 
of special fissionable materials and 
b) proprietary rights in all other cases. 
Pursuant to Art. 62, Subsection 1, the Agency ex-
ercises its rights to the special fissionable materials 
generated in the member states in order to: 
a) cover consumer demand 
b) store these materials itself or 
c) export them. 
In Art. 62, Subsection 2 the possibility is conceded of leaving 
these materials and the residues suitable for reprocessing with 
the producer so that they can be stored with the consent of 
the Agency. Furthermore, attention should be drawn here to 
Art. 80 of Chapter VII (Safeguards) according to which the 
Commission may demand that all excess special fissionable 
materials be deposited at the Agency or in other repositories 
subject to safeguards. 
4-4 
4. 1. 1. 2 Effects of the NP Treaty 
In order to fulfill the obligations of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty the non-nuclear-weapons states of the European Atomic 
Energy Community concluded an agreement (Verification Agreement) 
with the IAEA and EURATOM in 1973. This agreement (VA) essen-
tially corresponds to the IAEA standard agreement INFCIRC/153. 
The basis for safeguards in the sector of the peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy is created for the nuclear weapons states 
of the Community by corresponding agreements. 
Subsidiary Arrangements are appended to the Verification 
Agreement in which, amongst other aspects, inspection activities 
and efforts are determined on a model basis. The Verification 
Agreement and the Subsidiary Arrangements have the character 
of treaties concluded between the states, EURATOM and the 
IAEA, in which EURATOM and its member states undertake obliga-
tions to the IAEA. In order to be able to fulfill these obliga-
tions EURATOM adapted its safeguards system to the new re-
quirements. This was implemented by directive no, 3227/76 
/4-2/ replacing the old directives no. 7 and no. 8. 
The Subsidiary Arrangements comprise the Facility Attachments 
separately compiled by EURATOM and the IAEA for each nuclear 
facility. These Facility Attachments (FA) are the basis of 
the special safeguards provisions determined by EURATOM for 
each facility. 
4. 1 . 1 . 3 Safeguarding by IAEA and EURATOM 
EURATOM undertakes safeguards in the nuclear facilities of 
the Community pursuant to the EURATOM Treaty and EURATOM 
directive no. 3227/76. IAEA safeguards are based on the NP 
Treaty and the Verification Agreement. Details of this imple-
mentation are determined in the Subsidiary Arrangements and 
the Facility Attachments (FA). The EURATOMspecial safeguards 
provisions transfer safeguards based upon the FA to the EURATOM 
level, insofar as these measures are not already determined 
by the EURATOM directive. 
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EURATOM and IAEA cooperate in detecting possible diversions 
of nuclear material for nuclear explosive devices. To this end 
in discussing the FA, EURATOM communicates the 
facility data provided by the facility operators 
to the IAEA with the exception of information to 
be commercially protected, 
EURATOM communicates to the IAEA in a modified 
form the reports on nuclear material it has received 
from the operators of the nuclear facility, 
the IAEA obtains the right to monitor part of EURATOM's 
inspections. 
The IAEA verifies the results of EURATOM's safeguards insofar 
as these are implemented on the basis of the Verification 
Agreement and the FA's. The following principles are valid 
for the IAEA verification activity (see also Table 4-1 ): 
1. The concept of preventing diversion used in the 
NP Treaty is restricted to the timely detection 
of a diversion and the deterrent effect. 
2. Restrietion of safeguards to nuclear material, 
i.e. the facilities themselves are not monitored. 
3. Principle of applying safeguards only at certain 
strategic points in the flow of fissionable material. 
4. Restricting the IAEA to verifying the results of 
the EURATOM safegu~rds system. 
5. A~plication of safeguards in such a way that the 
economic and technical development in a state or 
international cooperation in the field of nuclear 
energy is not impeded, 
6. In certain cases substantiated by the IAEA, it shall 
obtain the right to undertake its own independent 
special inspections, 
4-6 
Preventing diversion by a deterrent effect (timely detection) 
Nuclear material safeguards (not: facility safeguards) 
by measurements as weil as containment/surveillance 
Strategie points principle 
Verification of EURATOM results (reports) 
No impediment to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
Right to own independent inspections 
Table 4~1: Principle of IAEA Safeguards Pursuant to the Verification Agreement 
4.1 .2 Boundary Conditions for Implementing Safeguards 
On the basis of the principles described above, the following 
problern areas result as boundary conditions for the development 
of the safeguards concept: 
4. 1 . 2. 1 By EURATOM 
1. Clarification of the question of the extent to which 
the unrestricted utilization and consumption rights 
of a member state exercised on the basis of possessive 
rights to nuclear material (Art. 87) are restricted 
by the proprietary rights of the Community. It must 
be assumed that in the case of final disposal conceived 
of as non-recoverable this decision on disposition must 
be regarded as irreversible and thus requiring at least 
the consent of the Community as the owner of the material. 
Various models are conceivable in which the owner and 
the possessor share responsibility for and implementation 
of final disposal, e.g.: 
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- The Community declares that it does not regard 
its proprietary rights as impaired by the non-
recoverable final disposal of the material and 
cedes responsibility for and implementation of 
final dispcsal to the member state. 
- The member state implements national final disposal 
on behalf of the Community, whereby conditions must 
be expected to be imposed by the Communiiy. 
Final disposal is carried out as a multinational 
undertaking by the Community itself, the member 
state making territory and infrastructure available 
(cf. Art. 80 1 Deposition). 
Variant 1 underestimates the long-term proliferation 
aspects of a direct final repository. In this case 
the interest of the Community does not concentrate 
on proprietary rights but rather on effective safe-
guards. 
Variant 2 corresponds most closely to the interests 
of the Federal Republic 'of Germany. Retention of 
ownership and safeguards is ensured on the part 
of the Community and is internationally verifiable. 
A national final repository is also more advantageaus 
from the point of view of acceptance than 
Variant 3. This includes the possibility of a final 
disposal of foreign final disposal products from 
EURATOM states and thus presents significant acceptance 
problems. In view of the geographical and political 
situation of the Federal Republic of Germany, Variant 3 
cannot be desirable. 
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2. EURATOM requirements with respect to nuclear material 
accountancy and the report system are largely in 
agreement with IAEA demands. 
3. With respect to regulations for inspection act~vities, 
EURATOM's inspection rights are comprehensively de-
termined in the EURATOM Treaty Art. 81. 
4.1 .2.2 By IAEA 
The position with respect to IAEA safeguards must be considered 
in much more detail. The following problems are to be discussed 
and clarified on the basis· of the Verification Agreement: 
1. Quantification of timeliness of detection and signif-
icance of nuclear material quantities. 
2. Determination of strategic points with clarification 
of access rights for IAEA inspectors. 
3. Clarification of the problern of the extent to which 
the IAEA can implement safeguards independently 
of EURATOM. 
4. Clarification of the question of the extent to 
which safeguards can be terminated if proof of 
non-recoverability of the material is furnished. 
These points will in part only be finally determined in the 
Facility Attachments, however they must be considered in 
the safeguards concept of the facility. 
Re 1 Quantification of timeliness of detection and signif-
icance of nuclear material quantities. 
The IAEA detection goals are described by 
the following parametersstill tobe quantified: 
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- significant quantity 
- timeliness of detection 
- detection probability of a diversion 
- probability of false alarms. 
The quantification of these variables, as well as the 
total inventory and its strategic significance, serve 
the IAEA as a basis for developing its safeguards model 
for the facility to be safeguarded. In implementing the 
model for a specific facility, the inspection goals 
aimed at for the facility in question will be derived 
from these detection goals. 
The detection goals depend greatly on the type and com-
position of the material tobe safeguarded. If one bases 
the products for final disposal on LWR fuel elements 
of the Biblis type then the data listed in Table 4-2 
result for the irradiated FE's. 
Annuallncrement Totallnventory of 
Fissionable Materials FE FDP ofthe the Final Repository 
Final Repository after 50 Y ears 
U-235 4.1 kg 12.3 kg 5.4 t 268 t 
Pu-239 3.1 kg 9.3 kg 4.0 t 201 t 
Pu-241 0.4 kg 1.2 kg 0.6 t 11 t 
Total 7.6 kg 22.8 kg 10.0 t 480 t 
Uranium 506.0 kg 1518.0 kg 663.0 t 33,140 t 
Plutonium 5.3 kg 15.9 kg 7.0 t > 212 t 
Fission Products 22.0 kg 66.0 kg 28.8 t 
Table 4~2: Final Repository lnventory of Spent FE's /4-3/ 
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The variables currently set as guidelines by the IAEA 
for significant quantities (SQ) are 8 kg for plutonium 
and 75 kg for low enriched uranium U-235; that means 
that each final disposal package contains more than 
the significant quantity of plutonium. 
Bulk handling facilities (BHF) are classified by the 
IAEA according to a nuclear material index (NMI). This 
is based on the facility throughput or the facility 
inventory, expressed in weighted significant quantities 
(WSQ). The inspection and verification activities of 
the IAEA are concentrated on facilities with a high 
nuclear material index. In the Safeguards Implementation 
Report (SIR) for 1981 the following statistical maximum 
values are given for the safeguarded BHF's in order 
to characterize the spread: 
max. plutonium inventory (in significant quantities) 137 
max. annual plutonium throughput (in significant 
quantities) 
In the case of·a direct final repository these values would 
already be considerably exceded in the first year of 
operation, as can be seen from the following summary 
of significant quantities: 
Pu U 
2 0. 16 
875 71 
> 26,500 35 73 
Final Disposal Package 
Annual Increment of the 
Final Repository 
Total Inventory of the Final 
Repository after 50 Years 
Simply from the quantity of material to be safeguarded, the 
final repository represents a new dimension for safeguarded 
facilities, 
167 
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The IAEA does not specify any fixed value for detection 
time. It is aimed to achieve a timeliness goal of three 
months in the case of storage ponds for spent fuel elements 
in LWR facilities containing the same kind of fuel elements. 
It would have to be possible to take over this value 
for the final repository, 
With respect to the probability of detection, a value 
between 90 an~ 95 % is usually aimed at, the probability 
of false alarm being assumed as smaller than or equal 
to 5 %. 
However, a probability of false alarms of approx. 5 % 
is not acceptable for the final repository. On a compu-
tational basis this would mean 10 false alarms during 
the operating time with an inspection period of three 
months and a repository operating life of 50 years. 
It must be assumed that in the case of a final repository 
the clarification of a false alarm, i.e. the reopening 
of tunnels already filled in, is impossible or only 
possible with unjustifiably high expenditure. The fact 
that the material is no longer accessible to direct 
verification, or only with excessively great efforts, 
requires that a safeguards system for the facility be 
a) resistant to failure and 
b) resistant to false alarms. 
This can probably only be achieved by an appropriate 
redundancy in safeguards measures. 
Other materials which could be considered for direct 
final disposal are e,g. fuel elements from thorium high-
temperature reactors. Reprocessing of these fuel elements 
is not currently envisaged or economical. A reference 
concept is currently being developed for the disposal 
of these fuel elements. 
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Re 2: Determination of strategic points with clarification of 
access rights for IAEA inspectors. 
In accordance with the concept of the Verification 
Agreement, nuclear material safeguards are based on 
the principle of material accountancy and material 
balancing 1 as weil as auditing and material verification: 
the facility operator keeps account of the changes 
in reserves and the reserves of nuclear material 
in his facility and prepares a balance sheet at 
at least annual interNals. 
Inspectors from the safeguards organizations examine 
the balance sheet and verify the data recorded 
in it. 
The locations where data are verified and the locations 
where containment and surveillance measures are implemented 
are termed strategic points. It is a basic principle 
of nuclear material safeguards pursuant to the Verification 
Agreement that the activities of the IAEA inspectors 
and their rights of access are normally limited to 
the strategic points in the facilities, With respect 
to the inventory and verification of reserves, the 
safeguards model is based on assumptions of significance 
for practical implementation. The most important is: 
During inventory taking all batches of nuclear material 
are to be presented at the key measurement points determined 
for the inventory 1 irrespective of the quantity of 
nuclear material they contain so that they can be verified 
by the safeguards organization. The verification is 
generally restricted to identification and visual checking 
of all batches and random measurement of individual 
batches. 
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Verification can either be direct, i.e. by verifying 
the values specified by the operator by means of measure-
ments, or indirect, e.g. by examining attached seals 
and verifying the containment. 
This basic safeguards model can only be technically applied 
to a very limited degree in the final repository. As soon 
as the final disposal canister is packed in or the tunnel 
is filled, a direct verification can no longer be tech-
nically implemented so that this basic model meets with 
considerable restrictions when applied to the direct 
final repository. Inventory taking is therefore only 
possible indirectly, for example according to the following 
pattern: 
If there are no indications that the material is no longer 
there, then it can be concluded that it is still present 
and the results of the last verifications are therefore 
still valid. 
This form of indirect material verification can only 
be acceptable for the safeguards authority if they can 
assume that all conceivable diversion pathways are safe-
guardable with sufficient reliability. To this end addi-
tional strategic points will have to be defined, 
According to the definition of the Verification Agreement 
(Art. 98) strategic point means a location selected in 
assessing facility data where under normal conditions 
and in conjunction with information from all the strategic 
points necessary and sufficient information for implementing 
safeguards is accessible and can be verified; a strategic 
point may be a location where key measurements for material 
accountancy are implemented and where measures for Con-
tainment and surveillance are undertaken. 
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Emplacing spent fuel elements only represents a small 
fraction of the handling processes in the final repository. 
Apart from the emplacement of fuel elements, it is envisaged 
that radioactive waste will also be deposited in the geo-
logical repository. Waste emplacement is in all cases 
independent of FDP emplacement, although the facilities 
above ground and the shaft equipment is used for both 
emplacement materials. Waste materials are delivered 
in barrels of 200 or 400 1 with concrete shielding. 
It is envisaged that approx. 27 1 500 packages will be 
emplaced per year. Waste packages will be emplaced simul-
taneously with the FDP's. The same mining machines will 
be used for developing the waste emplacement field, 
There is no difference in the machines for the two fields, 
Waste packages are no Ionger subject to safeguards, 
Their emplacement need not be safeguarded. 
However, the simultaneaus and adjacent emplacement of 
radioactive waste must be regarded as an interference 
factor from the safeguards aspect, Due to waste emplacement, 
non-safeguarded activities not subject to disclosure 
are implemented above and below ground which could make 
detection of a diversion more difficult or facilitate 
concealment of a diversion. In order to develop a safeguards 
concept and determine the strategic points and the IAEA 
inspectors' rights of access it is therefore essential 
that all activities in the geological repository can 
be clearly differentiated by the safeguards authority, 
Due to the necessity of having to verify the material 
indirectly the completeness of their information with 
respect to all activities regarding material is of paramount 
importance for the safeguards authority, The safeguards 
authority can only state that they have no indications 
that the material to be safeguarded is no langer present 
if no activities requiring explanation or open to misinter-
pretation have been recorded in the vicinity of final 
disposal package emplacement. This can possibly lead to 
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surveillance and access rights having to be granted 
to IAEA inspectors for processes, facilities and locations 
of waste emplacement in order to make all relevant activ-
ities at the geological repository transparent to them. 
Re 3: Clarification of the question of the extent to which 
the IAEA may implement safeguards independently of EURATOM. 
The Verification Agreement determines that EURATOM and 
IAEA shall avoid any unnecessary duplication of work 
in implementing safeguards. The IAEA implements safeguards 
activities in such a way that, insofar as it can achieve 
the objectives of its inspections, it monitors the activ-
ities of the EURATOM inspectors and verifies EURATOM's 
assessments. Apart from other aspects, the IAEA's verifi-
cations include independent measuremBnts and surveillance. 
Considering the order of magnitude of the safeguards 
problern it is to be assumed that the IAEA will strive 
for the greatest possible independence from EURATOM's 
safeguards activity. This could mean e.g. that CIS measures 
would be applied redundantly for EURATOM and IAEA, or 
jointly evaluated, as is currently the case e.g. in 
camera monitaring in LWR facilities. 
Re 4: Clarification of the question of the extent to which safe-
guards may be terminated if proof of non-recoverability 
of the material is furnished. 
The criteria for releasing material from safeguards are 
described in Art. 11 of the Verification Agreement: 
"Safeguards under this Agreement shall terminate on nuclear 
material upon determination by the Community and the Agency 
that the material has been consumed, or has been diluted 
in such a way that it is no longer usable for any nuclear 
activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, 
or has become practically irrecoverable." 
With respect to evaluating non-recoverability, the type 
of emplacement is undoubtedly of decisive significance, and 
the emplacement envisaged in the reference concept with 
lost shielding makes it considerably more difficult 
to classify the material as "non-recoverable". 
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The operational phases of the repository must also be 
considered in evaluating recoverability. In view of 
the envisaged emplacement with lost shielding it will 
probably be very difficult to provide evidence that 
the material is already non-recoverable in the operational 
phase of the final repository, i.e. after the individual 
emplacement tunnels have been filled in. 
Evaluation of recoverability in the post-aperational 
phase of the repository, i.e. after the shafts have 
been filled in, must undoubtedly be regarded in a different 
light. If the material were still to be classified as 
subject to safeguards even in the post-aperational phase 
of the repository then this would require safeguards 
for an unforeseeable length of time, This also represents 
a completely new dimension for international safeguards 
which in the case of conventional facilities can generally 
be terminated with removal of the inventory or at the 
latest with closure or decommissioning of the facility. 
Safeguards ad infinitum would probably also require 
new safeguards techniques which still have to be developed. 
4.1.3 Current Discussion 
It is generally accepted that a safeguards concept on the 
basis of INFCIRC/153 requires further development, at least 
for certain types of facility. An extended safeguards concept 
has been compiled by the IAEA which, over and above the existing 
model, envisages additional strategic points in the material 
balance areas at which operational records will be kept by 
the operator and measurements on nuclear material implemented 
by the inspector, as well as Observations of operational 
processes in progress. The implementation of safeguards according 
to this model which has been included in some facility attach-
ments for nuclear facilities in the Federal Republic has 
only been accepted on the part of the Federal Republic on 
a trial basis and for a limited period. This is especially 
true of the IAEA demands for: 
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establishment of additional strategic points to deter-
mine the flow of nuclear material within material 
balance areas 
access to operational records concerning the flow of 
nuclear material at the additonal strategic points 
execution of verification activities at the additional 
strategic points 
implementation of safeguards basically independent 
of EURATOM. 
There is no statutory basis in the Verification Agreement for 
these safeguards activities accepted as a trial for a limited 
period of time. 
4.2 Safeguards Ooncept 
The total nuclear material inventory of the final repository is 
contained in individual identifiable items, the final disposal 
packages. The IAEA safeguards concepts for such facilities are 
based on item accountancy. Since in the case of final disposal 
packages there is no possibility of djrect verification, e.g. 
by non-destructive assay methods (NDA), the following methods 
remain as applicable measures within the framewerk of nuclear 
material accountancy: 
item counting, 
item identification, 
verification of the integrity of the item. 
It is assumed for the safeguards concept of the final repository 
that the contents of the final disposal package have been veri-
fied in the conditioning facility before being placed in the 
bin. The final disposal package is subsequently sealed in the 
conditioning facility in such a manner that the validity of 
the final measurement can be extended for an unlimited period 
by verifying the integrity of the item. The data from this 
measurement are retained for the item as long as it is still 
subject to safeguards. After leaving the conditioning facility 
the material contained in the item is only verified by identity 
and integrity verification. 
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4.2.1 Final Disposal Canister 
The final disposal package for the reference concept (three 
intact FE's per FDP) consists of four concentric shells: 
dry disposal bin 
canister body 
corrosion protection 
lost shielding. 
The canister body and corrosion protection form the final disposal 
canister which is cast en bloc in a special process. The floor 
and lid of the FDC are screwed in and welded. The main aspect 
as far as safeguards are concerned is the external cladding, 
i.e. in the case of final disposal with lost shielding the 
subsidiary shielding of the FDP or in the case of borehole 
disposal the corrosion protection of the FDC. 
A cast cylindrical body is used as the lost shielding, the 
bottom and lid of which are screwed in in cantrast to the pro-
cedure in the case of the shells it encloses. Mounting points 
are envisaged in such a way that it is possible to seal the 
floor and lid openings. If electronic seals are to be applied 
then for their protection cavities or recesses are envisaged 
in which the seals can be mounted. As a back-up system for 
the sealing of the lost shielding a weldment verification 
of the corrosion protection (next shell underneath) can be 
envisaged. In the further considerations it is first assumed 
that the cast canister envisaged as the subsidiary shielding 
(the lost shielding) representing the external containment 
of a final disposal package, can be verified with respect 
to its integrity by visual checks and that the containment 
openings are protected by one or more seals verifiable in 
situ. 
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4.2.2 Nuclear Material Flow 
The final disposal packages are transported via the public 
railway network of the Federal Railway. They are delivered 
in a type B flask designed for transport on public routes 
pursuant to the regulations. The incoming trucks are first 
parked in the buffer zone. Buffer capacity is designed for 
three working days, i.e. nine final disposal packages. The 
final disposal packages themsel~es are not yet accessible 
in the buffer zone since they are still in the transport 
flasks. 
The trucks are driven from the buffer zone to the reloading 
area and the final disposal packages are drawn out of the 
flasks and loaded onto the rail-bound internal transport 
trucks (plateau transporter). The final disposal packages 
are transferred by means of a crane facility. The subsequent 
reception control procedure takes the form of a dose rate 
measurement, a wipe test, a visual check and registration. 
The integrity of the containment and seal of the lost shielding 
could also be verified. The plateau transporter is then driven 
to the shaft, loaded into the hoisting cage and transported 
to the emplacement level. At the emplacement level the plateau 
transporter is removed from the hoisting cage and driven to 
the emplacement tunnel. Underground rail-bound transport 
is terminated at the junction of the access gallery and the 
emplacement connection drift. 
The final disposal package is then transferred from the plateau 
transporter to the emplacement machine, or taken up by the 
latter and (not rail-bound) driven to the emplacement tunnel. 
The canister is deposited by the emplacement machine at the 
emplacement location. After the filling material has been 
pneumatically packed the canister is no longer accessible. 
The material flow is shown diagrammatically in Fig. 4-1. 
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4.2.3 Preliminary Considerations on the Safeguards Concept 
On the basis of the material flow sketched above, the following 
considerations can be established: 
The individual final disposal packages can only be identified 
and verified after removal from the flask. This takes place 
after leaving the buffer store at the beginning of the emplace-
ment process, immediately before reception control. It therefore 
does not seem to be meaningful to divide the facility into 
several material balance areas (MBA) (e.g, according to the 
criterion above giound/under ground), The material only resides 
above ground (buffer store) for a maximum of a few days and 
the establishment of a separate MBA for the area above ground 
would require additional identification and accountancy efforts 
without improving the safeguards possibilities. After reception 
checks, the emplacement of the final disposal packages is 
implemented as a continuous process without further intermediate 
buffering. 
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The last opportunity of identifying a final disposal" package 
is after it has been deposited in the emplacement tunnel by 
the emplacement machine, After this the filling process begins 
and this part of the'tunnel becomes inaccessible. It should 
be examined whether this last step (packing·the canister) 
can be coupled to an acknowledgement signal for the function-
ality of the safeguards devices in order to increase the 
system's resistance to failure. 
As long as the emplacement process, including packing the 
final disposal package thus rendering it inaccessible, proceeds 
as a continuous process continuous safeguards are also required 
to verify the material flow. The objective of safeguarding 
the material flow is to verify whether the declared material 
has been emplaced at the declared location. The possibility 
of verifying the identity and integrity of final disposal 
packages already deposited in the emplacement tunnel and of 
only filling th~ tunnel under observation after all emplace-
ment processes have been terminated could make an essential 
contribution to simplifying safeguards. In this case continuous 
safeguarding of the emplacement work could be replaced by 
batch-oriented verification (one or more complete tunnels) 
of the outcome of the work. However, it is technically more 
difficult to backfill the tunnel after completing all emplacement 
processes and leads to a considerably higher dose rate for 
the operating personnel due to direct radiation. 
With respect to nuclear material safeguards, the first subtask 
will be to ensure that the material flow proceeds in the 
declared manner; i,e, that the declared material is transferred 
to the declared location. This can largely be achieved by 
applying surveillance measures (camera and/or human surveil-
lance). 
The next subtask consists of ensuring that the emplaced material 
remains at the emplacement location until its final Containment 
(sealing the emplacement tunnel or tamping the access gallery 
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for fields already backfilled). Surveillance measures could 
also be employed to prevent recovery of the material via 
declared paths. 
Special measures are necessary f.or the final safeguards subtask, 
namely of ensuring that no further clandestine entrances can 
be created to the tunnels already backfilled and tamped via 
which the material could be diverted, or that the material 
could be subjected to clandestine further processing within 
the geological repository after the tunnels have been backfilled. 
This form of diversion would admittedly involve great technical 
efforts, however it cannot be reliably ruled out. Since no 
indicators are currently available or known for reliably 
indicating such a diversion, the strategy for this safeguards 
subtask must consist in increasing the technical efforts 
required for clandestine diversion via these paths by appropriate 
measures to such an extent that this diversion risk can be 
reduced to an acceptable residual risk. Suitable measures 
could for example be comprehensive access concessions to 
all aboveground and underground facilities for inspectors. 
4.2.4 Safeguards Concepts for Different Access Models 
Three models are to be considered in the following differentiated 
by different access rights for the IAEA inspectors. In Model 
access is restricted to the aboveground facilities, Model 2 
comprises limited access to the underground facilities and 
Model 3 unrestricted access to all underground facilities. 
4.2.4.1 Access Model 1 
Version 1 
In this model th~ inspector's access is restricted to strategic 
points above ground. Strategie points (SP) are the key measure-
ment points (KMP), the aboveground unloading facility and 
both shafts to the geological repository. 
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The essential element in this model is that after transferring 
the material underground recovery or an internal diversion 
within the repository is ruled out. By transferring the material 
underground it is thus released from safeguards and written off 
via KMP 2 (exemption from compulsory registration). Since 
according to this model there is by definition no langer any 
material subject to safeguards present after terminating 
emplacement activities, no safeguards are required for the 
post-opera~ional phase either. The essential elements of 
this model are: 
material balance areas 
- the facility forms one material balance area 
strategic points, being key measurement points 
- for determining the flow Df nuclear material 
KMP 1 - entry, intake, cancellation of exemption 
(för rework material) 
KMP 2 - exemption from compulsory registration 
- for physical inventory taking 
KMP A - buffer store 
records system 
- accounting for inventory changes 
- entry, intake at the time of entry 
- exemption from the compulsory registration at the 
time of transfer underground 
- operating records contain the following data 
- place and time of emplacement for each FDP 
- type, place and time of backfilling/sealing measures 
installations and installed devices 
- seals on FDP's 
- optical surveillance of FDP unloading aboveground 
- optical surveillance/detectors at the entrances to 
the two shafts 
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strategic points for containment and surveillance measures 
- FDP unloading aboveground 
- entrance shaft 
- entrance shaft 2 
recording the physical inventory 
- counting and identifying the items at key measurement 
point A 
Safeguards applied: 
- pre-operational phase 
- design verification before startup (only above 
ground) 
- operational phase 
- identity and integrity verification of the final 
disposal package by the inspector at the entrance 
(reception control) 
- camera monitaring at the aboveground unloading 
facility to prevent undeclared unloading processes 
(replacement with dummies) 
-CIS measures (camera, detectors) at the strategic 
points shaft 1 and shaft 2 to prevent undeclared 
material flow (backflow) 
- post-aperational phase 
- no safeguards 
Version 2 
Version 2 of this model is only differentiated by the fact that 
the material under ground cannot be released from compulsory 
registration. KMP B thus takes the place of KMP 2 for inac-
cessible material below ground. The inventory is taken at this 
key measurement point by establishing on the basis of observations 
at the strategic points Shaft 1 and Shaft 2 that no material 
backflow has taken place. The material brought into the repository 
must therefore still be present there. Safeguards in the post-
aperational phase depend on whether requirements for releasing 
the material from safeguards have been able to be fulfilled 
at the closure of the geological repository. The essential 
elements of this version of the model are: 
material balance areas 
- the facility forms one material balance area 
strategic points being key measurement points 
- for determining the flow of nuclear material 
KMP 1 - entry, intake 
- for taking the physical inventory 
KMP A - buffer store 
KMP B - all Underground facilities, material inaccessible 
records system 
- recording inventory changes 
- entry, intake at the time of entry 
- exemption from compulsory registration at the 
time of closing the geological repository if 
termination envisaged on the part of the IAEA 
- operating records contain the following data 
- place and time of emplacement for each FDP 
- type, place and time of filling in/sealing measures 
installations and installed devices 
- seals on FDP's 
- optical surveillance of FDP unloading above ground 
- optical surveillance/detectors at the entrances to 
the two shafts 
strategic points for containment and surveillance measures 
- FDP unloading above ground 
- access Shaft 
- access Shaft 2 
taking the physical inventory 
- counting and identifying items at key measurement point A 
- establishing that no return flows have occurred via 
the SP's Shaft 1 and Shaft 2; concluding that the 
material brought in must still be present. 
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Safeguards applied: 
- pre-operational phase 
- design verification before startup (above and 
below ground) 
- operational phase 
- identity and integrity verification of the final 
disposal packages by the inspector at entry (re-
ception control) 
- camera monitaring at the aboveground unloading 
facility to prevent undeclared unloading processes 
(replacement by dummies) 
- CIS measures (camera, detectors) at the strategic 
points at the two shafts to prevent an undeclared 
material flow (backflow) 
- post-aperational phase 
- termination of safeguards after backfilling all 
shafts, decommissioning of the aboveground facilities 
as well as demonstration of non-recoverability 
(if acknowledged to be impossible by means of 
mining technology) 
- routine examination of the site by visual inspections 
to safeguard against activities which could indicate 
a reopening of the geological repository or other 
measures for recovering the material. 
The two versions of this model assume that the final geological 
repository itself can be regarded as a sufficient barrier so 
that measures ensuring 
- that there are no undeclared containment openings 
through which the material could be recovered and 
- a diversion of the material within the containment 
(reprocessing below ground) can be ruled out, 
can be dispensed with, 
4.2.4.2 Aeeess Model 2 
This model eomprises Model 1 and additional strategie points 
below ground. The strategie points below ground enable the 
inspeetor to safeguard the underground flow of material. 
Safeguarding the flow of nuelear material below ground ean 
be undertaken at various levels of intensity: 
- safeguarding the underground flow of nuelear material 
by camera monitaring and possibly reeording instruments 
at the hoisting and transport installations with the 
possibility of human surveillanee in the ease of 
instrument failure, 
- additional random human surveillance of emplaeement 
processes, 
- every final disposal package to be· personally aceompanied 
by the inspector from transport to the shaft until 
emplacement in the tunnel and backfilling of the tunnel 
section. 
The same restrictions are largely applied· to this model as 
to Model 1. It would have tobe possible to terminate safeguards 
after backfilling the tunnel, or the final geologieal repository 
itself would have to be regarded as a suffieiently reliable 
barrier. 
Aceess of the inspector to strategie points underground would 
admittedly considerably hinder a diversion in the final geo-
logieal repository or out of the repository, however, it 
eannot be ruled out with suffieient reliability. 
The essential elements of Model 2 are: 
material balanee areas 
- the facility forms one material balance area 
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strategic points being key measurement points 
- for determining the flow of nuclear material 
- KMP - entry, intake 
- KMP 2 - exemption from compulsory registration 
if safeguards termination envisaged on the part 
of the IAEA 
- for taking the physical inventory 
- KMP A - buffer store 
- KMP B - tunnels not yet backfilled, underground 
- KMP C - backfilled tunnels, underground 
records system 
- recording inventory changes 
- entry, intake at the time of entry 
- exemption from compulsory registration at closure 
of the geological repository, if termination of 
safeguards possible 
- operating records contain the following data 
- place and time of emplacement for each FDP 
- type, place and time of backfilling/sealing measures 
installations and installed equipment 
- seals on FDP 
- optical surveillance of FDP unloading above ground 
- optical surveillance/detectors at the entrances to 
the two shafts 
- optical surveillance of FDP unloading below ground 
(pit bottom - access gallery, access gallery - emplacement 
connection drift and entrance to the emplacement tunnel) 
- recording instruments I tachograph for the hoisting 
engine, plateau transporter (tractor) and emplacement 
machine (if available and necessary). 
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Strategie points for Containment and surveillance measures 
- ~DP unloading above ground 
- access Shaft 
- access Shaft 2 
- FDP unloading below ground (hoisting cage - access 
gallery and access gallery - emplacement connection drift) 
- entrance to emplacement tunnel 
taking the physical inventory 
- counting and identifying items at the key measurement 
points A and B, if not yet backfilled 
- integrity verification of the ends of the tunnels 
at key measurement point C by visual inspection; con-
~luding that the emplaced material must still be present. 
Safeguards applied: 
- pre-operational phase 
- design verification before startup (aboveground 
and underground) 
- oparational phase 
- design reverification after driving a new tunnel 
- identity and integrity verification of the final 
disposal packages by the inspector at entry (re-
ception control) 
- camera monitaring at the unloading facility above 
ground to prevent undeclared unloading processes 
(replacement by a dummy) 
-CIS measures (camera, detectors) at the strategic 
points at the two shafts to prevent undeclared 
material flow (backflow) 
- camera monitaring at the Underground unloading 
points (from the hoisting cage on rails along 
the access gallery; from the plateau transporter 
on an emplacement machine without rails) to prevent 
replacement by a dummy 
- camera monitaring at the entrance to the emplacement 
tunnel to observe the emplacement process and 
prevent recovery until the tunnel has been sealed 
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- recording the duration and speed of run in the 
case of the hoisting engine, plateau transporter 
(tractor) and emplacement machine as back-up 
measures for camera surveillance (if available 
and necessary) 
- inspector access to the strategic points underground 
either on a random basis or at any time. 
- Post-aperational phase 
- termination of safeguards after backfilling all 
shafts, decommission of the aboveground facilities 
as well as demonstration of non-recoverability 
(if recognized as impossible by means of mining 
technology) 
- routine examination of the site by visual inspection 
for Safeguarding against activities which could 
indicate a reopening of the repository or other 
measures for recovering the material. 
In the case of Model 2, the diversion possibility also remains 
as a residual risk e.g. of opening clandestine access to already 
backfilled tunnels or fields of the fuel element emplacement 
section from the waste emplacement area, diverting final disposal 
packages with a supplementary emplacement machine from the FE 
disposal area into the waste disposal area and either disguising 
them here as MAW, required for rework, for transport above ground, 
or further processing them in the waste section. Abuse of the 
waste disposal area for a diversion from the FE disposal area 
can be made considerably more difficult by permitting IAEA 
inspectors unhindered access to all facilities in the geological 
repository. This possibility is envisaged in Model 3. 
4.2.4.3 Access Model 3 
Model 3 comprises Model 2 and moreover also all Underground 
facilities and installations as supplementary strategic points: 
Strategie points for containment and surveillance measures 
- all facilities and installations of the final geological 
repository, above and below ground, including the 
waste disposal area. 
Safeguards applied (in addition to Model 2): 
operational phase 
- inspector access to all Underground facilities 
(including the waste disposal area) on a random 
basis or 
- unrestricted inspector access to all Underground 
facilities (including waste disposal area). 
4.3 Safeguards Elements 
4.3.1 Requirements 
The final repository is a purely conventionally equipped disposal 
facility. Only conventional hoisting and transport installations 
are envisaged. All the nuclear material is contained in canisters 
in such a manner as to be handled conventionally, Facilities 
for handling, investigating or otherwise treating open irradiated 
material, such as e.g. hot cells, radiochemistry etc., are 
not envisaged, It is not technically possible to verify the 
contents of the FDP's in the final repository since all necessary 
preconditions are lacking. Reception eontrol procedures of the 
package consist of recording, measufing the dose rate and 
a wipe test. All verifications over and above this with respect 
to form, quantity and composition of the nuclear material 
in the FDP, required on the basis of national and international 
safeguards regulations, must therefore be implemented before 
the FDP's are delivered to the final repository, i.e. in 
the conditioning facility. 
A decisive element in designing the safeguards system is the 
fact that the FDP's neither change their form nor their com-
position nor their external appearance in the final repository. 
Solely changes in location of the nuclear material are imple-
mented, in accordance with the precisely predetermined sequence 
model. The objective of safeguards is thus to ensure that 
the declared FDP is transported in the declared form (i,e, 
unaffected integrity) to the declared location and then remains 
there. 
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The following requirements are the starting point for the 
safeguards system: 
1. The period between the last verification of an FDP in 
the condiiioning facility and emplacement of this FDP 
in the final geological repository is less than the 
detection time required for the material so that an 
intermediate inventory verification is not required 
from the safeguards aspect. 
2. A positive verification of the identity of the FDP and 
the integrity of its external cladding, i.e, the lost 
shielding, is a sufficient condition for the verification 
of the nuclear material contained in the FDP. 
3. Continuous monitaring of the flow of packages can be 
dispensed with as long as the FDP remains accessible 
for this verification, or the inspector has access to 
the individual FDP's. 
4. If the FDP itself is no longer accessible, or it is 
in areas to which the inspector does not have access, 
and verification by examining the identity and integrity 
is thus not possible, then safeguarding potential diversion 
paths is sufficient in order to be able to make a statement 
about the inventory of enclosed nuclear material. 
Requirement 1 implies that the time required for transporting 
the FDP from the conditioning facility to the final repository 
and for emplacing the FDP is less than the detection period 
required for diverting the FDP material. No further verifications 
are thus required for reasons of timeliness of detection 
between the time of leaving the conditioning facility and 
the emplacement process. Transport monitaring possibly required 
for reasons of physical protection is not included in the 
safeguards concept. 
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Requirement 2 implies that all nuclear material data with 
respect to type, quantity, composition etc. required for 
the safeguards system have already been determined before 
transportation to the final repository. Verification of the 
nuclear material in the final repository is restricted to 
establishing that these previously determined data are still 
valid since there are no indications for a presumption to 
the contrary. These data are merely carried forward in the 
accountancy of the final repository. 
According to Requirement 2, examination of the identity and 
integrity is sufficient to verify the nuclear material as 
far as safeguards are concerned. In the case of a positive 
result, the safeguards authority can conclude that no changes 
have arisen since the last verification of the material and 
thus that the data from the last verification arestill valid. 
The continuity of knowledge for the period between these 
verifications is thus established for the safeguards authority. 
As lang as Requirement 3 is still valid there is no need 
for permanent safeguards on the flow of nuclear material 
to maintain the continuity of the safeguards authority's 
knowledge, 
The principle of the safeguards system is based on the exami-
nation of the accounting data and independent verification 
of the material. At no time is a direct independent verification 
possible in the final repository. As lang as the FDP's are 
still accessible an indirect verification can be effected 
in accordance with Requirement 2. However, as soon as the 
FDP's have been emplaced and the tunnel sections backfilled 
a verification in this form can no langer be implemented 
either. The outermost covering then consists of the packing 
material, the surrounding salt rocks and the ends of the 
tunnel. Verification can now only be implemented indirectly 
in that the integrity of this covering is verified (Requirement 4). 
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The problern is how can the integrity of a backfi~led or tamped 
tunnel, and in the post-aperational phase the integrity of 
the whole repository, be rendered verifiable for the safeguards 
authority. The safeguards system requires that the safeguards 
authority can make a statement with a quantifiable error 
tolerance about the quantity of nuclear material present. 
The safeguards authority can only make this statement by 
establishing the quantities of material which have been emplaced 
and subsequently determining the probability with which the 
quantities of material could be diverted without their knowledge 
or subjected to an unforeseen application. This means on 
the one hand that the safeguards authority must monitor the 
potential diversion paths known to them for material backflows 
and on the other hand make sure that there are no further 
undisclosed accesses to the emplaced material, or that the 
material is not being used for an undeclared purpose. 
Requirement 4 implies that safeguarding the potential diversion 
paths the requirements have basically been fulfilled for the 
safeguards authority to be able to make the statement necessary 
for the safeguards system concerning the inventory of enclosed 
nuclear material. This is basically a question of quantifying 
the completeness and effectiveness of these measures in the 
safeguards sense. 
4.3.2 Material Accountancy 
Material accountancy is pure item accountancy. Each FDP is 
both item and batch. The shipper data from the 
conditioning facility are taken over unaltered as data on 
the quantity and composition of material, Since measurements 
cannot be made in the case of the final disposal packages, 
these data are not subject to any further alterations. Apart 
from the possibility of exempting nuclear material from safe-
guards and apart from material being retransported for rework 
requirements, the inventory changes to be recorded only consist 
of additions. The emplacement process is documented by operating 
records. 
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The final repository does not display any special features with 
respect to material accountancy. Only the form and content 
of the operating records documenting the emplacement process 
are to be coordinated with the safeguards authority. 
4.3.3 Containment and Surveillance Measures 
4.3.3.1 Seal Devices 
The emplacement process is envisaged as a continuous process. 
As a rule, the incoming FDP's are transported below ground 
without delay. If a continuous emplacement process is also 
to be ensured in applying safeguards measures then this requires 
that the ~dentity and integrity of the FDP's be verifiable 
in situ without expending much time. This requirement must 
be considered in designing the outermost shell of the FDP, 
the lost shielding. 
Design criteria for the lost shielding are e.g.: 
homogeneaus container with only one opening if possible, 
- container made of one material so that it is not possible 
to open abd resear the containment without leaving 
visible traces, 
- container without a protective coating of paint so 
that it is possible to directly verify the container 
walls. 
Appropriate devices should be envisaged on the container 
so that the body and lid can be sealed together. Protective 
devices agßinst mechanical stress during transport should 
be envisaged for the seal mechanism. 
In any case the seal should be designed in a redundant manner 
since otherwise in case of doubt about the identity or integrity 
of the seal it would be necessary to retransport the package 
to the conditioning facility and open the FDP to reverify 
the material content. This redundant seal measure should be 
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very robust with respect to all conceivable interferences. 
For this purpose it would be conceivable to distribute weldment 
sections along the perimeter across the lid seam of the con~· 
tainer. Whereas for the primary seal, the major design criterion 
is the possibility of verification in situ, this criterion 
must possibly take second place to robustness in the back-up 
measure. If back-up sealing requires more time for verification 
then this must be considered in designing the capacity of 
the aboveground buffer store. 
Two types of seals, paper and metal, are currently in use at 
the IAEA. The paper seals consist of gummed seal paper and 
have slits making it more difficult and time-consuming to 
peel off and reapply the seal without destroying it. They 
are designed for short-term use. Disadvantages are, however, 
that they are difficult to handle and are especially easily 
damaged during transportation of the sealed packages. Appli-
cation in the final repository is possible for short-term tasks. 
Metal seals (type E) consist of two metallic semi-shells 
which lock tagether under pressure in such a way that they 
are practically impossible to open without destroying the 
seal. A special seal wire is passed through two holes in 
one semi-shell and knotted inside the shell. By placing the 
second semi-shell in position the knot becomes inaccessible 
and the seal is thus closed. This metal seal has the advantage 
of being easy to handle but it can only be verified in the 
IAEA laboratory. Verification of the seal is thus generally 
delayed by several weeks. The metal seal can possibly be 
used as a back-up seal for the FDP's. 
Seal verifiable in situ are not yet part of the standard 
CIS measures. However, some devices are at an advanced stage 
-of development or testing so that their availability can 
be expected in a foreseeable period, such as e.g.: 
- fiber optic seal 
- electronic seal 
- weldment seal. 
In the case of the fiber-optic seals 1 the ends of a fiber-optic 
loop are joined at right angles or crossed over and enclosed 
by a casing. The arrangement of the individual fibers shows 
an unambiguous arrangement picture which can be photographed 
through a microscope and compared w~th earlier pictures or 
evaluated by an electronic interrogation unit. 
In the case of the electronic seal 1 a fiber-öptic loop is 
monitared with the aid of statistically· generated light pulses 
and an opening of the fiber-optic loop is recorded at the 
VACOSS instruments specifying date and time, The seal is 
interrogated via an adapter box or possibly via a remote 
interrogation installation. The electronic seals are reusable. 
In the case of weldments, there are differentiating features 
suitable for identity verification both in the melt configuration 
as well as in the side notch line of the weld. The weld can 
be verified in two different ways: 
by producing and measuring an impression (microscope), 
- photographically. 
However, the applicability of weldment seals still has to be 
practically tested. 
4.3.3.2 Optical Sensors 
Optical sensors are required to safeguard potential diversion 
paths for undeclared backflows of material. The following 
features should be observed: 
- Illumination 
An emergency power supply is not. envisaged for the under-
ground facilities. An independent emergency power 
supply must therefore be installed for the safeguards 
instrumentation. 
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In order to possibly be able to dispense with emergency 
illumination it should be considered whether low-light 
level or infrared cameras can be used. 
- Recording Intervals 
In order to be able to recognize a detection with 
single-frame operation, the image frequency would 
have to be greater than the minimum time required 
to pass through the camera's field of vision. Since 
this would have to be assumed in the range of a few 
minutes, a relatively high picture frequency would 
thus be required and a high recording capacity. The 
problern moreover results with this procedure that 
if only one, or very few, pictures are available to 
evaluate a process, then the process can often not 
be unambiguously interpreted. 
Since activities generally only occur sporadically in the 
visual range of the camera and are of relatively short duration 
(transport processes), the installation of motion detectors 
seems to be most appropriate. These motion detectors are 
electronic cameras which only take pictures if the content 
of the field of view changes. Since the transportation of 
an FDP will at any rate cause a large change in the image 
due to its dimensions, this should probably ensure the triggering 
of a visual record by FDP transports. 
A conceivable alternative would be permanent monitaring with 
TV cameras and monitors in a safeguards control room. This 
would however be considerably more expensive since the control 
room would require a permanent inspector (24 hrs.). 
Film cameras do not seem suitable for use in the geological 
repository since image recording triggered by movement is 
not possible here. The high image frequency required for 
single-frame processes would thus involve disproportionally 
great expenditure for image evaluation. 
Two optical safeguards systems are currently employed by 
the IAEA, twin Minolta cameras and psychotronic TV cameras. 
The twin Minolta units consist of two identical . , clne cameras 
accommodated in a casing taking single-frame pictures at 
an adjustable interval. These units are frequently used to 
safeguard wet storage pools in LWR facilities. 
The psychotronic TV cameras are only used in cases of special 
application since they display great reliability problems. 
However, a number of advanced TV camera safeguards systems 
are currently being developed or are at the trial stage so 
that it can also basically be assumed here that suitable 
instrumentswill be available in the foreseeable future. 
4.4 Diversion Analysis 
4.4.1. Operational Phase 
4.4.1.1 Model 1 (no inspector access to the underground 
facilities) 
The simplest opportunity for a diversion exists on the transport 
path from the conditioning facility to the final repository. 
However, it would also be easy to detect due to the measures 
discussed. If counting, identity and integrity verification 
are to be regarded as very reliable measures, then a diversion 
after this verification would have a higher probability of 
remaining undetected. The safeguards authority's strategy 
must be to implement these measures at the last possible 
moment in order to make a clandestine diversion more difficult 
for the operator. If the inspector has access under ground 
than he can undertake verification there, Verifications above 
ground serve to prevent any FDP's whose identity or integrity 
cannot be established beyond doubt from being transported 
under ground.at all. 
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It must be possible to undertake reliable identity and integrity 
verifications indicating tamper attempts. Otherwise the operator 
would have the opportunity of replacing the FDP's by dummies 
during transportation and if this was noticed by the inspector 
of declaring this as a failure of the seal. Since transportation 
back to the conditioning facility is necessary for verification, 
the operator could then replace the dummy by the original 
FDP during transport and thus conceal his diversion attempt. 
Diversion possibilities above ground before transporting the 
FDP's into the final repository consist in the following 
activities 
- the diversion of FDP's without their replacement 
- replacing FDP's by dummies (= FDP without nuclear 
material) 
- clandestine opening of FDP's, removal of nuclear material. 
These possibilities of diversion can be detected by: 
- counting the FDP's 
- identity verification of the FDP's and 
- integrity verification of the containers (lost shielding). 
These verifications assume that the lost shielding of the canisters 
is constructed in such a way that any darnage to the integrity 
becomes apparent by inspection. It should be possible to 
achieve this objective with the envisaged cast container. 
The container is designed to have two openings each safeguarded 
by a seal. If the container is opened at any other place then 
it will have to be welded tagether which would be detected 
in an optical inspection of the container walls. 
If the requirements of 
- tamper-resistant seals verifiable in situ for the 
lid and bottom openings of the container and 
- unambiguous integrity verification of the container 
walls by an optical inspection (it may also be 
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necessary to seal the protective neutron covering 
of the lost shielding) 
for the FDP's could be fulfilled then diversion above ground 
can be ruled out with great reliability. The FDP's are counted 
and verified before being transported to the shaft. During 
these safeguards the 
- missing FDP's 
- dummies and 
- clandestinely opened FDP's 
would have to become apparent. The FDP's remain under optical 
surveillance (human oder camera surveillance) untif they are 
transported under ground, 
The -diversion possibilities for FDP's transported under ground 
depend very largely upon the technical expenditure a potential 
divertor is prepared to invest in order to execute the diversion. 
Since there is no bot cell facility under ground which would 
be required to disassemble the FDP's and repack the nuclear 
material, in the case of a supposed diversion the nuclear 
material can only be transported above ground in units with 
at least the dimensions·of an FDP. If the hoisting equipment 
of the shafts were safeguarded by optical instruments the trans-
portation above ground of objects with these dimensions could 
be detected in any case. 
4.4.1.2 Model 2 (Limited Inspector Aceass to the Underground 
Facilities) 
Whereas in Model 1 the inspector does not have any opportunity 
of verifying the flow of final disposal packages under ground, 
strategic points are established in Model 2 in order to safeguard 
the flow of packages up to the emplacement location. Since under-
ground transport extends for several kilometers continuous mon-
itoring entails a good deal of expenditure. Those points are 
safeguarded at which the packages are reloaded from one means 
of transport to another since the possibility of substituting 
dummies for the FDP's would be most easily achieved here. These 
points are (cf. Fig. 4-2) 
- SP-A 
- SP-B 
- SP-C 
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strategic point pit bottarn at Shaft 2 (not 
in the Figure) 
junction of access gallery - emplacement connection 
drift 
junction of emplacement connection drift -
emplacement tunnel. 
A reverification of the FDP's at the emplacement location could 
be regarded as an alternative or a supplementary m~asure. This 
verification can either be undertaken personally, i.e. by 
the inspector, or by a tamper-resistant recording C/S instru-
mentation. 
The credibility of the safeguards concept can be significantly 
increased by underground optical safeguards instrumentation. 
These devices ensure that the existing transport paths cannot 
be used for a diversion. The cameras at point~ B are especially 
significant. They safeguard that the in-coming final disposal 
packages are actually reloaded onto the emplacement machine 
and transported to the emplacement connection drift. Furthermore, 
this camera can also monitor the sealing of the emplacement 
fields already backfilled. The cameras at points C in the 
emplacement connection drift ensure that no connection is 
made from the emplacement connection drift to the exploratory 
level above it into which the FDP's could then be brought, 
but rather that they are actually transported into the emplace-
ment tunnels. Surveillance of the emplacement tunnel itself 
seems to be less meaningful, firstly since at least two emplace-
ment tunnels are always in operation and secondly since a 
frequent repositioning of the camera would be necessary. 
Diversion from the emplacement tunnel without retransportation 
into the emplacement connection drift seems rather implausible 
since there is no connection from the emplacement tunnels 
to the exploratory floor. 
In this safeguards model it can be credibly demonstrated 
that the FDP's are actually transported to the emplacement 
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location, the emplacement tunnels are backfilled according 
to regulations and sealed and that the sealing of the tunnels 
and fields is not opened again. This requires a relocation 
of the monitaring cameras, at the latest ~hen emplacement 
operation is taken up in a new field. This relocation makes 
it necessary to reverify the instrumentation, 
4.4.1.3 Model 3 (Unrestricted Inspector Access to All Underground 
Facilities) 
Even if the inspector is granted limited access to strategic 
underground points, safeguards opportunities end when the FDP 
has been emplaced or the tunnel tamped, Opening up the dam 
again would probably be the easiest, but not the only, possi-
bility for the operator to implement a diversion. It would 
be possible for him to open up additional access to the material 
with the equipment available below ground and thus to by-pass 
the dam sealing the tunnels. 
If one does not rule out the possibility of the presence of an 
underground hot cell facility then the nuclear material from 
the FDP's could theoretically be repacked into any number 
of small innocent-looking containers and could be brought 
above ground e.g. disguised in the debris. The material could 
perhaps even be processed below ground so that only the strategic 
material itself without ballast need be brought above ground. 
The task of checking all transports of material and debris 
going above ground for concealed nuclear material must in the 
authors' opinion be regarded as unimplementable. If this 
diversion opportunity is to be regarded as realistic and thus 
to be included as a diversion strategy then appropriate safe-
guards should rather be applied in examining the facility 
design. A permanent verification of the facility design is 
from the present perspective the most comprehensive possi-
bility of excluding diversions under ground. However, this 
requires that the inspectors have access to all Underground 
facilities at all times. Apart from the FDP storage area, this 
also includes the infrastructure section (workshop, hopper, 
whole exploratory floor etc.) and the waste package storage 
area. The inspector must satisfy hirnself that these facilities 
are being used in accordance with regulations and not mis-
appropriated for a diversion, and that there are apparently 
no further undeclared facilities. 
4.4.2 Post-Operational Phase 
The essential aspect of safeguards in the post-aperational 
phase is firstly that the authority satisfies itself that 
the repository has been sealed according to regulations. 
This also means that the post-aperational phase only begins 
when both FDP emplacement as well as waste package emplacement 
has been completed. A diversion in the post-aperational phase 
could be effected by: 
1. sinking a purpose-built shaft directly to the 
enclosed FDP's with the aim of bringing individual 
or several FDP's above ground, or 
2. by clandestinely opening new access to the emplaced 
material from a considerable distance. 
The diversion possibility mentioned in 1 must be classified 
as at least technically very difficult. Suggested safeguards 
would be to monitor the site by inspections. 
The second possibility of uneavering new access from a con-
siderable distance would be by far the most expens~ve and 
time-consuming diversion possibility. It would involve new 
shafts being driven. The extent to which this could be imple-
mented in practice at all would still have to be examined. 
4.4.3 Evaluation of Effectiveness 
Model 1 proceeds from the following assumptions which are 
accepted as given facts for the safeguards model and not 
verified further: 
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- There are no hot cell facilities below ground. 
- There is no other connection from the Underground 
facilities to the surface except via the safeguarded 
shafts. 
- Misappropriation of nuclear material is ruled out 
within the underground facilities (internal diversion) 
since EURATOM has access. 
In a purely technical consideration, the weakness of this 
safeguards model is quite clearly to be found in the fact 
that the complex "clandestine facilities" is by definition 
not included. It must be remernbered that emplacement operation 
only represents a small fraction of the total handling activities 
in the final repository. New fields are continually being 
opened up parallel to emplacement both in the FDP storage 
area as well as in the waste package area. This necessarily 
involves extensive debris and material transports. The ·principle 
of transparency would not be applicable here either since 
the un~erground activities are not transpar~nt for the inspector 
who can only safeguard at the surface. Design verification 
before beginning emplacement operation also only provides 
limited evidence since the extension of the underground facili-
ties is permanently modified. 
However, in an overall evaluation of this safeguards model 
this technical deficit must be seen in relation to other 
parameters. These other parameters are e.g. quantity, re-
coverability and strategic value of the emplaced material. 
The attractiveness of this material for a potential divertor 
must be compared with the technical and organizational effort 
required to implement a clandestine diversion. The technical 
feasibility of a diversion with the aid of clandestine under-
ground facilities can undoubtedly not be basically ruled 
out. The chances of beingable to successfully implement 
a clandestine diversion in this way must, however, be regarded 
as extremely remote, especially with respect to the supranational 
character of national safeguards (EURATOM). 
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In comparison to Model 1, Model 2 does not provide any im-
provements in principle, but rather, even if to a considerable 
extent, only improvements in degree. The existence of clandestine 
facilities via which a diversion could take place cannot be 
reliably ruled out in this case either. In this model diversion 
would be possible by opening up access to the already emplaced 
FDP's from the workshop area or the waste store. 
In Model 3 the inspector is thus practically granted the pos-
sibility ·of design reverification at all times. In this case 
the danger of detection of undeclared facilities is considerably 
increased for a potential divertor but nevertheless this 
possibility is still not reliably ruled out. 
The technical feasibility of a diversion has been considered 
in safeguards models to date. In any case, underground facilities 
would .be required for a diversion in which the FDP's could 
be disassembled and the nuclear material repacked in unsuspicious 
packages which could then be brought to the surface disguised 
in the debris or in items of equipment. The establishment 
of an Underground reprocessing facility would involve con-
siderably more expenditure and an even greater risk of detection. 
As far as can be foreseen to date there are no technical 
safeguards which can rule out these diversion possibilities 
in principle, These diversion possibilities have to be classified 
as technically feasible, even if requiring immense expenditure. 
The diversion seenarios discussed for the post-aperational 
phase would in principle also be applicable in the operational 
phase. However, they involve greater expenditure and a higher 
detection risk. 
In order to sink a purpose-built borehole, the minimum time 
would first have to be determined required to sink the borehole, 
transport the FDP(s) to the surface and cover the traces. These 
time requirements determine the inspection interval for safeguards. 
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Site inspections are envisaged as safeguards, Since sinking an 
appropriate borehole would require extensive technical prep-
arations it is practically certain that these signs would 
be recognized during a site inspection. 
The clandestine sinking of new shafts to recover the emplaced 
material would probably require even more effort. A further 
difficulty is encountered in determining the area to be subjected 
to safeguards. If this diversion possibility is to be considered 
as realistic so that appropriate safeguards precautions would 
have to be taken then site inspections would also probably 
be a suitable measure in this case. 
In all models the question of how the effectiveness of con-
tainment safeguards in the operational phase or monitaring 
the site in the post operational phase can be quantified 
emerges as the principal difficulty. This problern cannot be 
solved by an exclusively technical approach since in the 
final repository every safeguards measure can in principle 
be evaded by increasing the diversion efforts. No safeguards 
measure can thus be classified as reliable from a technical 
aspect. 
4.5 Evaluation of the Effectiveness and Analysis of the 
Vulnerability of the Safeguards System 
4.5.1 Phase 1 - Aboveground Transport 
This phase begins as the FDP's leave the conditioning plant 
and terminates when these FDP's are transported via the shaft 
in the final repository. It therefore comprises the whole 
time the FDP's spend above ground. Possible diversion strategies 
during the aboveground. transport phase of the FDP's are: 
- diversion of the FDP without replacement 
- replacing the FDP by a dummy and 
- clandestine opening of the FDP and removal of nuclear 
material. 
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The envisaged safeguards (see Table: 4-3) for this phase 
are identical for all three safeguards models. They consist 
of counting the FDP's, verifying the identity and integrity. 
The identity is verified on the basis of tamper-proof differ-
entiation features on the outermost cladding of the FDP. 
This task is taken over by the sealing device with which 
the body, lid and bottarn of the lost shielding are sealed 
together. So that the seal can be verified immediately before 
transporting the FDP under ground it must be verifiable on 
site by inspection or interrogation without time-consuming 
evaluation processes. This task can for example be fulfilled 
by an electronic seal. 
All FDP's leaving the conditioning plant must pass through 
this verification procedure within a certain time limit. 
This ensures the completeness of safeguards in the transport 
phase at the surface. After verifying the seals, the FDP's 
are transported into the hoisting cage without further delay. 
Whether further safeguards against a potential exchange of 
the FDP's during this period will have to be undertaken depends 
on the concrete structural features of the surface facilities, 
these not being currently known. If e.g. it cannot be reliably 
ruled out that the FDP's could be transported back to the 
unloading facility without the inspector's knowledge and 
there replaced by dummies, then this period can be bridged 
by labelling the FDP's with paper seals. 
The envisaged safeguards (identity and integrity verification) 
should not raise any considerable problems with respect to 
their reliability and unambiguity since they can both be 
repeated as often as required. Only the seal could possibly 
be damaged during transport procedures. Diversified redundancy 
is envisaged as a supplementary procedure, i.e. for example 
a robust mechanical seal in parallel to an electronic seal. 
If in exceptional cases it is no langer possible to clearly 
identify the FDP's, e.g. due to transport darnage to the seal, 
then at this phase the possibility still remains of bringing 
these FDP's back to the conditioning plant and measuring 
them again. Retransport after transportation accidents would 
probably be necessary in any case. 
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If the completeness of the safeguards can be taken as given 
then the following parameters remain which could impair effec-
tiveness, namely tamper-resistance and the possibility of 
outwitting the safeguards. These parameters can, however, 
be influenced by the design of the outermost cladding of 
the FDP's and by the choice of seal(s). No significant diffi-
culties are envisaged on the basis of the current state of 
the art. Sufficient safeguards can thus be ensured, in the 
author's opinion, during the phase of transporting the FDP's 
above ground. 
4.5.2 Phase 2 - Transport Under Ground 
This phase begins with the transportation of the FDP's through 
the shaft and finishes when the tunnel section already occupied 
by FDP's are filled in. It thus comprises the whole period 
when the FDP is accessible for direct monitaring or verification 
of the identity or integrity of its cladding under ground. 
Two steps are required to divert nuclear material during this 
phase. First of all, the FDP's would have to be withdrawn 
from the normal operational sequence, i.e. smuggled out of 
the emplacement process and thus out of the reach of further 
safeguards. This can in principle be achieved with the same 
diversion strategies as during the aboveground transportation 
phase (see Table 4-4). 
The second step consists of subjecting the clandestinely 
removed FDP's to an undeclared application (see Table 4-5). 
This means that the FDP's must be further processed in a 
suitable facility. The decisive criterion for safeguards 
is whether the operator clandestinely modifies the plant 
design so that the FDP's can be transported to the further 
processing facility without being noticed or whether he under-
takes this diversion via the existing transport paths. In the 
case of a diversion without modifying the plant design, the 
FDP's will have to be retransported via Shaft 1 or Shaft 2. 
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If one assumes that it is also possible to modify the facility 
design in order to implement a diversion tben three alternatives 
would theoretically result: 
1. The establishment of a clandestin~ hot cell facility 
under ground to disassemble the FDP's and repack 
the nuclear material into small, innocent-looking 
Containers which can then be brought to the surface 
unnoticed in the material or debris transports. 
2. Construction of a clandestine Underground facility 
to separate the strategic material from the FDP's. 
3. Creation of an additional clandestine connection 
to the surface via which whole FDP's or repacked 
smaller quantities of material can be transported 
unnoticed, 
4.5.2.1 Model 
In Safeguards Model 1 it is assumed that clandestine design 
modifications can be ruled out. Since in this model the inspector 
has no underground access, no safeguards can be applied under-
ground either. The operator could thus implement the first 
step in a diversion, i.e. clandestinely removing the FDP's 
from the normal emplacement process, without being noticed. 
However, in order to complete the diversion the FDP's would 
have to be retransported to the surface via either Shaft 1 
or 2. Diversion strategies and safeguards are compiled in 
Tables 4-4 and 4-5. Optical monitaring of the transport facili-
ties is envisaged as a safeguard against retransport. Unloading 
objects from the transport facilities with at least the dimen-
sions of an FDP would be the anomaly to be observed indicating 
a diversion. However, for Shaft 2 it must be ensured that 
- the retransportation of objects of these dimensions 
actually means an anomaly, i.e. does not occur in 
the normal operating sequence and 
- this event can be optically unambiguously identified, 
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Apart from the dimensions, the weight of the object can also 
indicate an anomaly since in normal operation no retransportation 
is to be expected in the range of more than 25 t (based on the 
removal of debris or other normal operational transports to 
the surface). However, the direction and load of the hoisting 
equipment must be recorded in a tamper-proof manner which could 
be achieved via the consumption of electricity of the winding 
engine. 
This measure is not required for Shaft 1 since an FDP does not 
geometrically fit into the hoisting cage. Neither is there any 
device at Shaft 1 to balance the elongation of the rope of 
several meters /4-4/ which would occur if an FDP were attached 
to the hoisting cage. It can be assumed that this type of ex-
tensive action would be reliably optically detected by the 
safeguards devices. 
In order to be able to make concrete statements about the 
reliability and possibilities of outwitting the safeguards, 
concrete data about the structural form of the transport 
facilities and buildings are necessary in order to then be 
able to determine e.g. where the camera should be installed, 
the possibility of unintentionally impairing or blocking the 
field of vision, possibilities of deception by dazzling or 
turning off the illumination etc. 
However, in the authors' opinion this safeguards task should 
be categorized as capable of being satisfactorily solved. 
Roughly comparable tasks such as fuel element handling in 
LWR wet storage pools have already been satisfactorily solved 
for years in common practice by optical safeguarding. Providing 
that there is no need to consider an undeclared modification 
to the facility design, effective Safeguarding should be 
realizable with Model 1 in this phase. If this presumption 
cannot be made then Model 1 does not provide complete Safe-
guarding of all diversion possibilities and thus would be 
unacceptable to the safeguards authorities. 
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4.5.2.2 Model 2 
In Model 2 the inspector has access to strategic points below 
ground and is thus also in a position to monitor the nuclear 
material flow under ground. Over and above Model 1, Model 2 
attempts to detect the first step in a diversion, namely 
the clandestine removal of FDP's from the normal operational 
sequence. 
In the first place, optical monitaring of the reloading process 
is envisaged at all points where the continuous transport is 
interrupted due to reloading to a different means of transport, 
since at these points it would be easiest to divert the FDP 
without replacement or to substitute a dummy. ihe first of 
these points (strategic point A) is when unloading the plateau 
transporter from the hoisting cage at the filling station 
of Shaft 2. Safeguards will ensure that the FDP transported 
under ground is also actually unloaded into the emplacement 
floor. The secend safeguards point (strategic point B) is 
the reloading facility from the access gallery to the em-
placement connection drift. This camera observes the reloading 
of the FDP's from the plateau transporter to the emplacement 
machine. Further safeguards devices are envisaged in the emplace-
ment connection drift itself (strategic point C). It can thus 
be observed whether the FDP's are transported to the envisaged 
emplacement gallery by the emplacement machine and also remain 
there. See Fig. 4-2 for the position of strategic points B and C. 
Due to the long Underground transportation paths (several kilo-
meters), uninterrupted transportmonitaring would be unjusti-
fiably expensive. Since transportation only occurs sporadically 
and the FDP's can only be within the visual range of the indi-
vidual cameras for a very short period, these safeguards 
devices shuuld be equipped with motion detectors. All movements 
within the visual range of the camera can thus be completely 
recorded without having to envisage unnecessary frame storage 
capacity, and thus also frame verificatio0 expenditure, for 
the periods with no movement. If the date arid time of the event 
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are recorded with the movement then delays in transportation 
. 
which would be required to manipulate the FDP's or replace 
them in the zones not directly safeguarded could be detected. 
This thus provides a high degree of reliability to ensure that 
the FDP's transported below ground are brought into the envisaged 
emplacement tunnels without manipulation. 
As a supplementary or alternative measure a reverification of 
the FDP's deposited in the emplacement tunnel can be undertaken 
by the inspector. The cameras at the strategic points B and C 
furthermors ensure that the FDP's deposited in the emplacement 
tunnel are not subsequently removed again. This process would 
be recorded by the cameras. A technical problern still to be 
studied in detail is the tamper-proof transmission of the 
frames to a safeguards control room which could most appropri-
ately be situated above ground. 
Over and above the possibilities of Model 1, Model 2 can thus 
ensure that the envisaged oparational sequence is observed 
and no FDP's are clandestinely removed. The primary measure 
is optical safeguards at the strategic points A, B and C. 
FDP's deposited in the emplacement tunnel can be reverified 
by the inspector as a substitute measure in case of camera 
failure and on a random basis to reduce the residual risk 
of manipulating FDP's in the unsafeguarded intermediate areas. 
This should not cause delays in the oparational sequence 
since there is usually a shift lass by breaks between emplacement 
and backfilling. In this phase Model 2 should thus provide 
sufficient reliability that the first step in a diversion, 
clandestinely removing FDP's from the normal operating sequence, 
can be detected. 
With respect to the secend step necessary for a successful 
diversion, namely clandestine transportation of the FDP's to 
the further processing facilities, Model 2 is identical to 
Model 1 (see also Tables 4-4 and 4-5). This safeguard thus 
represents an additional barrier for a potential divertor. 
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4.5.2.3 Model 3 
Model 3 goes beyond Model 2 by envisaging a further barrier for 
the second step required in a diversion, transporting the FDP 
to the further processing facilities after clandestine removal. 
This barrier consists in the right granted to the inspectors 
of reverifying the plant design at all times. This measure 
is admittedly primarily aimed at the next phase but it already 
functions as an additional safeguard in Phase 2. It must be 
noted that the safeguards measures for Step and Step 2 are 
not to be regarded alternatively but rather cumulatively (see 
Tables 4-4 and 4-5). In addition to the safeguards outlined 
in Step 1, the safeguards in Step 2 must also be overcome for 
a successful diversion. 
4.5.3 Phase 3 Storage During the Operational Period of the 
Final Repository 
This phase comprises the period after packing the individual 
tunnel sections occupied by FDP's until backfilling of the 
final repository shafts, that is to say the period in which 
mining activities are being implemented in the vicinity of 
the emplaced FDP's. 
Two steps are also required at this stage for a successful 
diversion. Since the FDP's are already stowed at this phase, 
the first step consists of making the FDP's accessible by 
uneavering an entrance. The second step is identical to the 
second step of the previous phase. Strategies and measures 
for this phase are shown for all three safeguards models 
in Tables 4-6 and 4-7. The uneavered FDP's must be transported 
to the processing facilities. However, in cantrast to the 
second phase, here in the third phase the first diversion 
step is already possible by an undeclared design modification. 
The uneavering of an entrance to the already backfilled or 
tamped emplacement tunnels is e1ther possible directly by re-
versing the emplacement process, i.e. open1ng up tnese tuune.Ls 
s1..artJing from tr1e avai.Lab.Le galleries, or indir·ectly by creat-ing 
new clandestine entrances rrom non-safeguarded areas, e.g. hopper, 
workshop, exploratory level or even the waste storage area. 
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4.5.3.1 Model 1 
No new safeguards are envisaged in Model 1 for this phase. 
The same assumptions are valid as for the previous phase, i.e. 
that undeclared alterations to the facility design are ruled 
out. A diversion would be detected when retransporting the 
FDP via the shaft facilities, 
4.5.3.2 Model 2 
Model 2 already begins at the first step in a diversion, uneaver-
ing access to the FDP's. The range of effectiveness of the safe-
guards envisaged for Phase 2 is thus extended, The integrity 
of the tunnel closures and material recovery via this path 
can be monitared by the safeguards devices installed at the 
strategic points. Human verification of the tunnel closures 
by inspection is envisaged as a substitute measure in the case 
of camera failure and as supportive measure on a random basis, 
The diversion strategy for the first step required in a diversion 
can be detected by these safeguards. The uneavering of a clan-
destine access by by-passing the sealing devices cannot be 
detected by the safeguards envisaged in Model 2. Further 
safeguards are therefore discussed in Model 3 as a protection 
against this diversion strategy. 
4.5.3.3 Model 3 
Model 3 envisages permanent design reverification on a random 
basis for all Underground facilities. In order to conceal the 
uneavering of the FDP's a potential divertor will make this 
attempt from areas to which the inspector has no access. The 
most effective method of preventing this diversion strategy 
is thus to grant the inspectors unrestricted access to all 
facilities of the final geological repository. The inspectors 
must be able to satisfy themselves that there are no undeclared 
connections or facilities within the geological repository 
and that only emplacement activities are being implemented. 
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Permanent design reverification is a safeguard which applies 
to both the first and the second diversion step. In the authors' 
opinion it thus represents the most comprehensive safeguard 
against undeclared activities, nevertheless its effectiveness 
is difficult to quantify. 
4.5.4 Phase 4 - Post-Operational Phase of the Final Repository 
This phase begins with the closure of the geological repository 
by backfilling the shafts and lasts as long as the material is 
subject to safeguards. 
In this phase diversions can be implemented by: 
- sinking a purpose-built borehole or shaft to recover . 
one or a few FDP's or 
- reopening the repository, e.g. from a considerable 
distance, to divert larger quantities. 
Periodic inspections of the site to verify the integrity of 
the sealed geological repository are envisaged as safeguards. 
Drilling or sinking activities at the repository site could 
certainly be detected during the site inspections. The inspection 
intervals would therefore only have to be shorter than the 
necessary diversion period, i.e. the time required to sink 
the borehole or shaft, recover the FDP's and cover the traces. 
Whether reopening of the repository can be detected by site 
inspections depends on the distance from which it is reopened. 
Even if the effectiveness of this safeguard is difficult to 
quantify, site surveillance represents in the authors' opinion 
the most suitable safeguard for verifying the integrity of 
the shutdown repository. 
Phase 1 : Transport Above Ground 
. Conditioning Facility Exit --
Beginning of Shaft Transportation 
Diversion 
Strategy 
Diversion 
Model1 
Safeguards Measures 
Model2 Model3 
..,-
of Whole FDP' s I Counting the FDP' s 
Replacement by 
Dummy FDP 
Removal of NM 
from the FDP 
Seal Verification and FDP lntegrityVerification Upon Entering 
the MBA, Subsequent Optical Monitaring 
FDP lntegrityVerification Upon Entering the MBA, Subsequent 
Optical Monitaring 
Effectiveness : Acceptable 
Table 4-3: Safeguards in Phase 1 - Transport Above Ground 
~ 
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Phase 2: Transport Under Ground 
Beginning Shaft Transportalion - Backfilling on Site 
Diversion 
Strategy 
·1st Step: 
Clandestine Removal 
of FDP or NM from the 
Operational Sequence 
a) Diversion of 
Whole FDP's 
b) Replacement of 
FDP by Dummy 
c) Removal of NM 
from FDP 
..., 
" 
Safeguards Measures 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Counting the FDP' s 
Transport Monitaring with lV Camera 
at SP A, B and C 
andlor 
Random Seal Verification and FDP lntegrity 
Verification before Emplacement 
and 
Monitaring Potential Diversion Paths 
with lV Camera at SP's Band C 
Table 4-4 : Safeguards in Phase 2 - 1st Diversion Step 
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Phase 2: TransportUnderGround 
Beginning of Shaft Transportation -- Backfilling on Site 
Diversion 
Strategy 
2nd Step: . 
a) Retransportation of FDP's 
to the Surface Disguised 
as Debris or Material 
b) Underground HC Facility 
Repacking the NM in Un- "' 
suspicious Containers~ 
Retranspörtation through 
Existing Facility 
c) ·Underground RP Facility 
d) Clandestine Connection 
to the Surface ~ 
Safeguards Measures 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
TV Camera at 8oth Shafts, Tachograph 
and Load Recorder at the Winding Engine 
of Shaft 2 (25 t-Criterion) 
Permanent Design 
Reverification of all Un-
derground Facilities, 
Verification for 
Undeclared Design 
and Activity 
Alterations 
Effectiveness: Acceptable since FDP's Still Accessible 
Table 4-5: Safeguards in Phase 2 - 2nd Diversion Step 
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Phase 3: Storage During the Oparational Period 
Backfilling the FDP's - Closing the Geological Repository 
{Backfilling the Shafts) 
Diversion 
Strategy 
1st Step: 
Access to Emplaced FDP's 
a) Uneavering and 
Diverting FDP' s via 
Existing Transport 
Paths 
b) Glandestine Entrance by 
By-Passing Tunnel 
Sealing via Exploratory 
Floor, Waste Store etc. 
Safeguards Measures 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
rTV Gameras at SP B (funnel Glosure) 
and SP G (Emplacement Gonnection 
Drift) 
Random Verification of Tunnel Glasures 
by I nspectors 
Permanent Design Reverifi-
cation of All Underground 
Facilities 
Table 4- 6: Safeguards in Phase 3 - 1st Diversion Step 
.t:-
i 
0\ 
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Phase 3: Storage During the Operational Period 
Pneumatically Packing the FDP's- Closing_the Geological 
Repository {Backfilling th~ Shafts) 
Diversion 
Strategy 
2nd Step: 
a) Retransportation of FDP' s 
to the Surface Disguised 
as Debris or Material 
b) Underground HC Facility ~ 
Repacking the NM into Unsuspici-
ous Containers, Retransportation 
through Existing Shaft Facility 
c) Underground RP Facility 
d) Clandestine Connection to the 
Surface 
...J 
~ 
Safeguards Measures 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
lV Camera at 8oth Shafts, Tacho-
graph and Load Recorder at the 
Winding Engine of Shaft 2 
Permanent 
Design 
Reverification of 
all Underground 
Facilities 
Verification for 
Undeclared 
Design 
Modifications 
Effectiveness: Unsolved Problems 
and Changes in 
Facility Operation 
Table 4-7: Safeguards in Phase 3 - 2nd Diversion Step 
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Phase 4: Post-Oparational Phase 
after Backfilling the Shafts 
Diversion 
Strategy 
Purpose-Built Borehole or 
Sinking a Shaft to Recover 
Individual FDP's 
Reopening the Repository from 
a Considerable Distance to 
Recover a Number of FDP's 
Safeguards Measures 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Optical Survemance of the Site 
by Periodic lnspections 
Effectiveness: Open Problems 
Table 4-8: Safeguards During the Post-Operational Phase of the Final Repository 
-l> 
8 
()'\ 
-l> 
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4.6 Resulting Problem Definition 
The basic problern to be quantified in applying CIS measures is 
the probability with which a diversion can be detected by these 
safeguards. In cantrast to material accountancy, there is not 
yet any fully developed method in applying CIS safeguards for 
determining MUF values (Material Unaccounted For). In practice 
this problern is avoided by ensuring that materials safeguarded 
by CIS measures are also in principle directly accessible by 
measurements and the safeguards authorities reserve this option. 
Since this option is no longer avallable for the final repository, 
quantification of the effectiveness of CIS safeguards takes 
on particuiar significance. 
The weak point which has been identified in Safeguarding the 
final repository is the limited possibility of safeguarding 
the integrity of a backfilled and sealed tunnel against tamper 
attempts through clandestinely driven undeclared entrances. 
Containment safeguards satisfying the demands of completeness 
cannot be implemented for a tunnel. The emplaced material 
can therefore not be sufficiently safeguarded in the mathematical 
sense. No measures are currently known or envisaged which could 
ensure sufficient safeguarding. We are indeed convinced that 
with permanent design reverification a diversion by means of 
clandestine, undeclared entrances or facilities is practically 
impossible to implement, nevertheless this cannot be ruled out 
in the sense of a mathematically logical proof nor can its 
detection probability be determined. Precisely this is an 
indispensable requirement for the safeguards system. 
The major problern with respect to the safeguards concept for 
the final repository is that as soon as the material is emplaced 
safeguards can only be reinforced by CIS measures. The option 
of direct verification is no longer technically possible. 
Furthermore, the envisaged CIS measures cannot be objectively 
quantified with respect to their completeness and thus their 
effectiveness. Thus the requirements for an applicable safe-
guards concept required by the safeguards authorities cannot 
be fulfilled, judged by current practice. 
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5 SOLUTIONAL APPROACHES 
5.1 Modifications to the Existing IAEA Safeguards Philosophy 
5.1 .1 Relativizing Numerical Detection Goals 
The objective of the safeguards to be applied by the IAEA within 
the framework of the Verification Agreement is defined in 
Art. 28 VA: 
"The objective of the safeguards procedures set forth 
in this Agreement is the timely detection of the diversion 
of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful 
nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons 
or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes 
unknown and deterrence of such diversion by the risk 
of early detection." 
In order to create a planning and eva+uation basis for applying 
safeguards and in order to be able to make the declaration 
required in Article 30 VA on the technical conclusion of 
verifications, the IAEA considers it necessary to quantify 
these objectives. This is achieved by setting up numerical 
detection goals. These are: 
significant quantity 
detection time 
probability of detection and 
probability of false alarms. 
The values currently set up for these detection gbals fuave 
admittedly only been provisionally accepted, however they 
can de facto only be questioned if they can be replaced by 
better alternatives from the IAEA's point of view. 
The definition of quantitative goals 1 even if they are not 
to be mechanically applied but rather only as guidelines, 
leads inevitably to the measures envisaged in a safeguards 
concept having to be quantifiable with respect to the degree 
of achieving their objective or, (more or less subjectively) 
quantified. In this technically quantitative approach the 
planning and evaluation of safeguards is implemented under 
the aspect of the numerical contribution they could make 
to the definitions of the goals. 
The IAEA is admittedly aware that the quantified detection 
goals cannot be applied as rigid definitions and thus derives 
inspection goals from the detection goals where technical 
feasibility and facility-specific features are included in 
their determination, nevertheless the principle of a quantified 
safeguards model as such is not questioned, The measurable 
variable of detection probability is ~he central parameter 
for the IAEA to which safeguards planning, application of 
funds and evaluation of effectiveness are oriented. 
Since there is currently no procedure by means of which the 
detection probability in applying C/S measurea can be quantified 
safeguards models which are largely or, as in the final re-
pository, almost exclusively based on C/S measures cannot 
be objectively planned by this approach nor their effectiveness 
calculated. This leads to them being classified by the IAEA 
as unacceptable. This fact has also been identified as the 
basic problern for the safeguards concept of the final repository. 
This can be regarded as the starting point for a fundamental 
criticism. The basically plausible procedure of creating 
an objectifiable planning basis by numerical definition of 
goals cannot be rigorously realized in practice, As long 
as on the one hand C/S measures play, and indeed must play, 
an important role in safeguards practice, but on the other 
hand are not quantifiable or only by subjective evaluation, 
this will lead to a distortion of the planning data which 
then casts doubt upon the aim of an objectifiable planning 
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basis. The task would consist of upgrading the IAEA's safeguards 
philosophy by developing alternative planning and evaluation 
processes in such a way that attributes of eff~ctiveness 
and credibility could also be applied to safeguards concepts 
without objectively quantifiable detection probability. That 
this can be implemented, at least for individual cases, on 
the basis of a consensus is a prerequisite for the applicability 
of the suggested Safeguards Model 3. A consensus would have 
to be achieved with the IAEA concerning the evaluation of 
the envisaged possibility of permanent design reverification 
which apparently represents a considerable obstacle to diversion 
but whose effectiveness can in the last analysisnot be verified. 
5.1 .2 Safeguarding of the Fissionable Material FLow 
In signing the NP Treaty on November 28 1 1969 the Government 
of the Federal Republic of_Germany· declared that it 
assumed that the agreements described in Article III 
of the NP Treaty between the IAEA and the European 
Atomic Energy Community were concluded on the basis 
of the verification printiple and that verification 
would be implemented in such a manner that the 
political, scientific, economic and technical tasks 
of EURATOM would not be impaired (Item 13 of the 
Declaration), 
insisted that the safeguards only be applied to 
source and special fissionable material and in 
accordance with the principle of an effective safe-
guarding of the- flow of fissionable material at 
certain strategic points (Item 14 of the Declaration). 
It further declared that it only intended to ratify the NP 
Treaty if an agreement cor~esponding to Article III of the 
NP Treaty between EURATOM and IAEA were concluded fulfilling 
in form and content the requirements of the above mentioned 
Items in its Declaration (Item 17 of the Declaration). 
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These princ~ples drawn up jointly with other EURATOM states are 
laid down in the Verification Agreement and have determined 
the position of the Federal Government to date. 
Among the considerations for the Verification Agreement it 
is mentioned that 
"the Agency . . has the responsibility to assure the 
international community that effective safeguards are 
being applied under the Treaty", 
In Articles 1 and 3 of the VA 
the States of the Community undertake, in accordance 
with the terms of this Agreement, to accept safeguards 
on all source or special fissionable material for 
the purpose of verifying that no diversion has 
taken place (Article 1) and 
the Community undertakes to co-operate with the 
Agency, in accordance with the terms of this Agree-
ment, with a view to ascertaining that such source 
and special fissionable material is not diverted 
to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
In a strict interpretation of the Verification Agreement it 
could be argued that since safeguards only refer to the material 
and not to the facilities that the consideration of diversion 
seenarios requiring a clandestine alteration to the plant 
design, such as internal diversion or diversion via clandestine 
accesses, need not be taken into consideration. Sufficient 
safeguards could thus be ensured by Models 1 or 2. 
As long as there is at least in principle the possibility 
of satisfying oneself positively of the presence of the material 
by direct monitoring, the argument of safeguarding the flow 
of fissionable material at strategic points can be put forward. 
Since ·this flow monitaring is no longer possible in the final 
5-5 
repository - the FDP's and thus the fissionable material 
being no langer accessible after backfilling - there is 
no langer any basis for arguing that safeguards should be 
restricted to the material itself and diversion seenarios 
requiring clandestine alterations to the facility n~ed not 
be considered. 
However, effective safeguards on the basis of monitaring the 
flow of fissionable material at the strategic points can no 
langer be technically implemented in the final repository so 
that additional agreements could be made in order to grant 
the IAEA an equally effective safeguards possibility. However, 
this type of agreement, which would undoubtedly be compatible 
with the spirit of the Verification Agreement, would involve 
legal questions which would be difficult to solve, 
5.1.3 Releasing Fissionable Material from Safeguards 
The basis for terminating safeguards is laid down in Article 11 
of the VA: "Safeguards under this Agreement shall terminate 
upon determination by the Community and the Agency that the 
material has been consumed, or has been diluted in such a 
way that it is no langer usable for any nuclear activity 
relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or has become 
practically irrecoverable." 
These criteria are not fulfilled by the FDP's. The nuclear 
material in the FDP's is neither diluted nor consumed in 
such a manner that it is no langer usable for any nuclear 
activity. The only approach would be the argument that due 
to the type of emplacement the FDP's are practically irre-
coverable. If at all, this argumentation can only be applied 
to the post-aperational phase of the repository, i.e. when 
all tunnels and shafts have been backfilled and the transport 
facilities decommissioned. During the operational phase of 
the repository the emplaced material cannot be classified as 
irrecoverable since all the equipment necessary to recover 
the already emplaced FDP's from below ground is available there. 
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Even if the irrecoverability of the FDP's could be assumed for 
the post-aperational phase this would not improve the safe-
guardability of the repository during the operational phase, 
although due to the rise in rock temperature a diversion 
already becomes more difficult in the operational phase. 
Even in the post-aperational phase recoverability cannot be 
classified as technically impossible in principle. Recoverability 
must rather be regarded as a question of the technical expend-
iture to be employed, In view of the attractiveness of the 
emplaced material it cannot be assumed that the safeguards 
authority would be prepared to classify the material as irre~ 
coverable in the post-aperational phase and thus release 
it from safeguards. 
The criteria of Article 35 of the VA are rather to be applied . 
. Where the conditions set forth in Article 11 are not 
met, but the Community considers that the recovery of nuclear 
material subject to safeguards under this Agreement from 
residues is not for the time being practicable or desirable, 
the Agency and the Community shall consult on the appropriate 
safeguards measures to be applied, 
A Statement on what the IAEA regards as appropriate safeguards 
cannot be currently made. 
By way of summary it can be said that in all probability a final 
release of the material from safeguards will not be possible 
for the post-aperational phase either. The Agreement envisages 
a mutual agreement on suitable measures for this case. The 
attitude of the safeguards authorities to these measures still 
has to be sounded. 
5.1.4 Cohsiderations of Deterrence 
The aim of safeguards is laid down in Article 28 of the VA: 
"The objective . . is the timely detection of diversion 
of significant quantities of nuclear material . and 
deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early de-
tection." 
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The degree of deterrence is the result of weighing the con-
sequences of detection against the advantages of a diversion. 
The concept of risk can be defined as the product of the 
probability of an event occurring and the consequences of 
this event. Of these two variables only the probability of 
occurrence ( = probability of detecting a diversion) is con-
sidered by the IAEA due to their purely technical approach 
in which the probability of detecting a diversion is the 
central value. 
The second component of the risk concept, the consequences 
of a detected diversion, contains a large number of variables 
which cannot or only with difficulty, be quantified, No ap-
proaches are currently available which would make such a 
quantification possible. A starting point here would be granting 
a safeguards credit corresponding to a state's degree of vul-
nerability to sanctions, In the case of the Federal Republic 
of Germany for example, as a country poor in natural resources 
and strongly export-oriented, the vulnerability to sanctions 
and thus the extent of the consequences of detection would 
be very great. Taking these factors into consideration, even 
with a low technical probability of detection a high detection 
risk would result for the Federal Republic of Germany. However, 
it is extremely unlikely that the IAEA will accept this modi-
fication in attitude in the short term. 
5.2 Further and Possibly Re-Development of Safeguards Elements 
During the operational phase the problern consists of providing 
a quantifiable certainty by suitable measures on the part 
of the safeguards authority that the emplaced material is 
still present. This quantification is, strictly speaking, 
only possible for accountancy measures. No methods have yet 
been developed for numericallj determining the effectiveness 
of CIS measures. The errors involved in CIS verification 
cannot be precisely specified, This problern can generally 
be ameliorated in other facilities in that material verification 
is basically implemented by accountancy measures and CIS 
measures are only employed for sub-quantities of material 
and for limited periods as back-up measures, These rest~ictions 
(limitation to sub-quantities and limited periods) cannot 
apply to the final repository. Safeguards would only be possible 
with purely a CIS concept and, as already mentioned, there is 
no contractual or methodological basis for this. 
This means, even presuming that safeguards elements could be 
redeveloped or further refined and thus CIS-supported monitaring 
of the emplaced material were possible, it could only be 
included in the safeguards system as a supplementary measure. 
This alone does not represent a basic solution to the problern 
in hand. Even assuming that new safeguards elements were 
successfully developed, considerable efforts would still 
be required to further develop the theory on which the safeguards 
system is based in order to incorporate these new elements 
in the safeguards system as essential measures. The development 
of new safeguards elements would thus only be the first step 
in solving the safeguards problem. 
The backfitting problern must also be seen in this context. 
As long as there is a possibility of measuring the material 
in the fuel cycle again at successive intervals, the safeguards 
system can talerate the application of CIS measures whose 
effectiveness is not precisely quantifiable since this un-
certainty can at least be eliminated in retrospect in a measuring 
process. If there is no langer any possibility of subsequently 
eliminating CIS uncertainty by a measuring process then in 
order to maintain the effectiveness of the safeguards system 
very strict standards must be applied to the tolerable error 
range of CIS measures. 
This can be illustrated by an example. In the intermediate 
storage of fuel elements to be reprocessed at a later stage, 
a diversion from the storage phase will be detected at the 
latest in measuring the material at the reprocessing plant. 
The effectiveness of the CIS measures during the storage 
period can thus at least be verified in retrospect. The langer 
the period to be bridged by CIS measures between two measurements 
in the material cycle, the higher are the requirements which 
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must be made on the effectiveness of these CIS measures. If 
there is no langer any possibility of a final measurement then 
the CIS measures applied must provide the same reliability 
as a measuring process in order to be able to achieve the 
safeguards objective. 
Only a relatively inadequate measurement of spent FE's is 
possible without chemical dissolution. If there is no re-
processing involving this measuring possibility then it could 
be argued that the whole FE repository should be more extensively 
and rigorously safeguarded, In addition to the problems already 
mentioned, others still have to be solved e.g. the tamper-
proofness of the individual components in the CIS system. 
5.2.1 Application and Range of Effectiveness of Surveillance 
Measures (Inspector Presence and Optical Surveillance) 
Optical monitaring is employed as a material flow indicator 
above and below ground: above ground at the hoisting facilities 
of the shafts in order to be able to detect the retransportation 
of FDP's via these facilities, and below ground in order 
to monitor the emplacement process and safeguard the tunnels 
against recovery of the material. For a nurober of years the 
IAEA has already been gathering experience in employing TV 
cameras for safeguards purposes. The problems arising here 
mainly concern the quality of the pictures and the reliability 
of the instruments. TV cameras have an advantage over film 
cameras due to their greater flexibility with respect to 
adapting to different conditions of application, in this 
case application as a low light-level or infrared camera 
and the possibility of being connected to other equipment 
such as the motion detector and also fading-in date and time. 
The problern of reliability is not so decisive for the final 
repository since a permanent inspector presence at the repository 
is required anyway. By means of automatic operational status 
monitaring it is possible to detect instrument defects within 
minutes or hours. These failures would have to be regarded 
as uncritical with respect to the safeguards objective due 
to the redundant safeguards design. 
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Due to the large number of optical safeguards instrumentations 
envisaged it seems meaningful to install a safeguards control 
room in the final repository from which the operational status 
of safeguards instruments can be permanently monitared and 
which also houses a central facility for storing and visually 
verifying the recorded frames, Due to the dimensions of the 
facility distances of several kilometers must be bridged 
between the monitaring instruments on site and the control 
room. Extensions and new develo~ments are necessary to bridge 
these distances and to combine the individual instruments 
in one control room. The safeguards system envisaged for 
application in Candu reactors can be regarded as a comparable 
development, even if on a considerably smaller scale. This 
system is still currently at the development and trial stage 
and should be able to contribute valuable experience for 
deBigning camera safeguards in the final repository. 
5.2.2 Application of Novel Safeguards Techniques 
A number of possibilities for detecting diversion attempts 
can be conceived. In this context the application of microseismic 
instruments as sealing·and Containment surveillance devices 
for tunnels or fields already backfilled would have to be 
examined in detail. These instruments would have the task 
of indicating the application of mining equipment or drilling 
operations in tunnels and fields already backfilled. A further 
difficulty here is undoubtedly that tunnels are being backfilled 
and new tunnels simultaneously driven in relative proximity 
to each other so that considerable demands must be made on the 
spatial locating ability of the seismic instruments in order 
to be able to differentiate normal operational processes from 
potential diversion activities. It could possibly be of advantage 
here that emplacement is only envisaged in retreating working 
and thus the direction of a located source of Vibration could 
be used as a differentiating feature for permissible and 
impermissible activities. 
At any rate, the effectiveness of such detector messages would 
have to be investigated in detail since microseismic instruments 
have not yet been employed for safeguards purposes and thus 
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no experienee of any kind is available. Partieular attention 
would have to be paid to the false alarm rates to be expeeted 
and the neeessary subsequent operations, as well as possibilities 
of tampering and deeeption to eoneeal a diversion attempt. 
Sinee in eonventional applieations very mueh less importance 
generally has to be attaehed to these aspeets eonsiderable 
efforts will still have to be applied to determine these 
variables. 
5.2.3 Applieation of Faeility Safeguards 
The possibility of permanent design reverifieation has already 
been envisaged as an additional measure for Safeguards Model 3. 
However, ~his measure has a similar effeet to extensive facility 
safeguards and thus raises a large number of basie problems. 
The deelared objeetive of the Federal Republie of Germany 
and the other EURATOM states has so far been to restriet 
IAEA safeguards to the material itself and to only grant 
the IAEA inspeetors aeeess to the predetermined strategie 
points. Coneeding permanent design reverifieation represents 
a considerable deviation from this basie prineiple and should 
be examined in detail due to its possible trend-setting effect. 
In addition to the associated surrender of sovereign rights, 
this measure would ilso represent a considerable burden for 
the operator since the inspector would have to be accompanied 
by operating personnel during bis inspections. It can admittedly 
be assumed that no eommercial or industrial pro~esses or 
equipment requiring protection are used in the final repository 
which would necessitate strict aecess controls, nevertheless 
restrictions on the inspector's freedom of movement with 
respect to time and plaee could be necessary to maintain 
an unimpeded operational sequence. 
Extensive site surveillance eould be eonsidered in a similar 
or even .more intensified manner as a further safeguard against 
the uneavering of an additional clandestine entrance. Extensive 
mining activities would undoubtedly be detected by monitaring 
a delimited area, e.g. by helicopter, for the purpose of 
visual site surveillanee or aerial photographs. However, 
it must be considered whether the required losses of sovereignty 
are still aceeptable. 
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As in all indirect safeguards, the essential aspect in this 
case is that the detection of an anomaly cannot be equated 
with a diversion. If these safeguards indicate an anomaly 
then this can only be used as a reason for closer examination. 
The contribution made by indirect safeguards within the framework 
of a safeguards concept terminates when in examining an indicated 
anornaly no satisfactory explanation can be found for it. 
At this point at the latest, safeguards must then be employed 
which make it possible to provide information about the presence 
of the material with quantifiable reliability. 
5.3 Adaptation of the Reference Concept to Valid Safeguards 
Practice 
With respect to the safeguards system the problematic aspects 
of the reference concept consist of the fact that 
the material must continue to be safeguarded even 
after emplacement and 
due to the inaccessibility of the material, the 
demands made in valid safeguards practice cannot 
be fulfilled with respect to verification possi-
bilities. 
Starting points foradapting the reference concept thus result 
by: 
1. conditioning or storing the material in such a 
way that the criteria for terminating safeguards 
are fulfilled or 
2. storing the material in such a way that it remains 
accessible for verification measures. 
Conditioning the material in such a form that the criteria for 
termination could be regarded as fulfilled would require that 
the fuel be converted into a glass or ce.ramic product. This 
possibility has been considered in more detail by dissolving, 
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diluting and compacting spent nuclear fuel. This was based 
on the conditioning of fuel in the form of PAMELA moulds. 
The essential data for this method of treatment resulted 
in approx. 465,000 PAMELA moulds per year of vitrified nuclear 
fuel at an annual throughput of approx, 700 tons. In order 
to emplace these moulds, approx. 6 - 8 shafts per geological 
repository would be required; a salt dome of the size of 
Gorleben would be able to accommodate a maximum of 425,000 
moulds under the most favourable conditions /5-1/. This method 
can thus be ruled out as a realistic alternative. 
In our opinion there is no possibility of unequivocally ful-
filling termination criteria by the type of emplacement in 
the case of final disposal packages with undiluted nuclear 
material. Even in the case of borehole emplacement without 
lost shielding, envisaged as a back-up solution, recoverability 
of the material cannot be ruled out. All considerations of 
recoverability take the current state of mining engineering 
as a variable. Final release of the material from safeguards 
would require that the material should remain irrecoverable 
within the periods of time under consideration. Considering 
that even the inherent selfprotection of unshielded packages 
decreases with time and further progress in mining engineering 
must be presumed, the final classification of the material 
as irrecoverable will not be possible from the perspective 
of the safeguards authority, but this evaluation must rather 
be coupled to technological developments in mining engineering. 
This must be particularly considered in the light of high 
proliferation potential which the final repository represents 
for a state wishing to undertake a diversion. 
I.e. in the case of undiluted conditioning of the final disposal 
products it cannot be expected that the material will finally be 
released from safeguards with respect to the two emplacement 
alternatives which can be taken into consideration (tunnel 
emplacement with lost shielding or borehole emplacement without 
lost shielding). The prerequisites for applying Article 35 VA 
are however fulfilled for both types of emplacement, namely 
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that the recovery of nuclear material . . is currently not 
possible nor desirable . . In this case it is envisaged that 
the Agency and the Community should consult each other about 
the application of suitable safeguards. A statement on what 
the IAEA could regard as suitable safeguard~ is purely specu-
lative at this point in time since there is no applicable 
experience. A process of intensive discussions with and between 
the safeguards authorities is necessary to elucidate this 
problem~ 
Emplacement in such 'a manner that the material remains accessible 
for verification would, apart from the technical feasibility, 
not fulfill the essential objectives of the final repository 
concept, namely isolating the material from the biosphere 
and possibilities of further human access. Accessible emplacement 
under ground would probably raise so many problems for reasons 
of heat dissipation and rock stability that this could no 
langer be regarded as a modification of the reference concept 
but would .rather require a new concept to be compiled. 
Under these assumptions the advantages of underground storage 
in comparison to storage above ground do not become immediately 
apparent. From the safeguards aspect storage above ground would 
undoubtedly be preferable since e.g. a diversion by simulated 
accidents blocking the entrance can be ruled out. 
By way of summary it can be said that realistic possibilities 
of ensuring the safeguardability of the final repository 
according to current safeguards practice by modifying the 
reference concept cannot be envisaged at this time. Nevertheless, 
Art. 35 VA could represent a starting point for the discussion 
of a safeguards agreement deviating from current safeguards 
practice. Strictly speaking, the preceding considerations 
are only valid for the case of spent light-water reactor 
nuclear fuel. For fuels from special types of reactors, the 
criteria of Art. 11 of the VA could possibly make a termination 
of safeguards conceivable due to the different conditions in 
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this case with respect to burn-up of the fuel, its dilution or 
the lack of an industrially applicable reprocessing procedure. 
5.4 Possibilities of a Solution in the Institutional Sector 
The starting point for institutional solutions is the fact 
that in order to implement a diversion 1 apart from the necessary 
technical measures, a considerable degree of organizational work 
must be undertaken. In the organizational sector additional 
barriers could be set up by multinational forms of cooperation 
which would impede the organizational implementation of a diver-
sion and increase the risk of detection. A further aspect is 
possibly that the extension of international interconnections 
would increase vulnerability of the states to sanctions. 
In the case of a final repository in an EURATOM member state, 
the logical consequence of the proprietary conditions is first 
of all considering the inclusion of EURATOM in the management 
and operation of the repository. The establishment of a direct 
final repository under the sole national control of a EURATOM 
state would presume that the Community had renounced its 
proprietary rights to the emplaced material. In view of the 
long-term proliferation aspects of the final repository, 
EURATOM's renunciation of proprietary rights and thus possible 
associated extended safeguards does not appear compatible with 
the objectives of the Community. 
Pursuant to Art. 77 of the EURATOM Treaty, the Community under-
takes to ensure that the nuclear materials are not employed 
for any purposes other than those envisaged, By final re-
nunciation of its proprietary rights the Community would 
relinquish its otherwise derivable extended possibilities 
of Codetermination and safeguards and would thus curtail 
its safeguards function. The final disposal of EURATOM material 
under the sole national control of a member state must therefore 
be classified as difficult to reconcile with the spirit of the 
EURATOM Treaty. It must also be examined whether it is desirable 
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from anational point of view,to operate a direct final re-
pository under exclusive national control since a much greater 
obligation towards the international community can result 
from having to invalidate suspicious factors which could 
be interpreted as diversion attempts. 
A conceivable alternative solution would be that a member 
state could implement final disposal on behalf of the Community, 
whereby Community conditions would have to be observed, This 
variant would correspond most closely to the interests of 
the Federal Republic of Germany. The Community's proprietary 
and safeguards reservations would thus be ensured and inter-
nationally verifiable. This model can also be evaluated as 
advantageaus from the aspect of national acceptance. 
The model wi~h the highest institutional proliferation barrier 
would involve implementation of final disposal by the Community 
itself as a multinational undertaking where the member state 
would make available territory and infrastructure. Final 
disposal could thus ensue analogously to the deposition of 
nuclear material envisaged in Art. 80 of the EURATOM Treaty, 
However, from a national point of view this model raises 
significant acceptance problems·since it implies the possibility 
of the final disposal of foreign material from EURATOM states. 
In view of the geographical and political situation of the 
Federal Republic of Germany it remains to be examined whether 
the extensive loss of sovereignty on the part of the host 
nation associated with this solution would be desirable. 
The INFCE Conference provided essential impulses for considering 
institutional aspects and this is reflected in the IPS working 
group. It must, however, be remernbered that institutional 
aspects are regarded by the IAEA as complementary, i.e. supple-
mentary, measures and not as alternatives to stringent technical 
safeguards. 
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Due to" the associated proliferation barrier 1 institutional 
models with multinational Codetermination or cooperation 
undoubtedly represent an approach to the general NP problems 
of a final repository. However, they are not appropriate 
for solving the safeguards problem. In the first instance, 
institutionalization within the multinational EURATOM framework 
must be considered for a direct final repository in the EURATOM 
area as a consequence of the conditions of the EURATOM Treaty. 
From the point of view of the IAEA 1 this is hardly a drastic 
change in comparison to the current situation since the EURATOM 
area is already characterized by multinational safeguards. 
For the IAEA, institutional models would therefore have to 
go beyond the EURATOM framework and involve a form of inter-
national cooperation. Apart from the questions of the extent 
to which international cooperation can be implemented for 
a direct final repository and whether this is acceptable 
to the host country, the specific safeguards problern will 
not be solved by an international cooperation model either. 
Institutional models can thus be ruled out in the foreseeable 
future as an approach to solving the safeguards problems 
of a direct final repository. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
The development of an internationally acceptable safeguards 
concept for the direct final repository raises a large number 
of problems which require intensive discussion with the safe-
guards authorities and which cannot be clarified a priori 
with the current state of the art. 
Final Disposal Phase 
Phase 1 : Transport above ground, 
leaving the conditioning 
facility - beginning shaft 
transport 
Phase 2 : Transport below ground, 
beginning shaft transport -
backfilling on site 
Phase 3: Storage du ring the 
operational period, backfilling 
the FDP's- sealing the 
geological repository 
(backfilling the shafts) 
Phase 4: post-aperational phase, 
after backfilling the shafts 
Safeguards Effectiveness 
Model1 Model 2 Model 3 
----- acceptable -----
--- acceptable since FDP's ---
still accessible 
---- unsolved problems ----
---- unsolved problems ----
Table 6-1: Safeguards Effectiveness During the Various Oparational Phases of the Final Repository 
As far as the effectiveness of safeguards possible at the present 
state of the art is concerned during the various operational phases 
of the final repository (Table 6-1 ) 1 then the following can be 
ascertaine~: sufficient safeguards can be ensured both during 
the phase of transport above ground (Phase 1) as well as in the 
phase of underground transport of the final disposal packages 
until they are backfilled on site (Phase 2). 
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During the operational phase, the safeguards on the already 
emplaced final disposal packages (Phase 3) can consist of per-
manent design verification, although problems can be recognized 
in evaluating their effectiveness. The same is true of verifying 
the integrity of the shutdown repository in the post-aperational 
phase (Phase 4). 
An initial approach to solving the safeguards problern of a final 
repository (cf. Table 6-2) was envisaged in a modification of 
the existing IAEA safeguards philosophy. The IAEA would accord-
ingly have to accept a safeguards model based essentially, or 
in the post-aperational phase exclusively, on C/S measures. 
Since in this case the probability of detection, i.e. the 
essential parameter of IAEA safeguards, cannot be quantified 
at the present state of development, such an approach would 
be classified as unacceptable by the IAEA. If anomalies occur, 
e.g. in the case of a false alarm, the nuclear material cannot 
be verified. 
Even a second approach envisaging the further technical develop-
ment of safeguards elements cannot provide any basic solution 
to these inherent safeguards problems for the same reasons. 
A third approach consists in modifying the reference concept, 
for example by dissolving and diluting the fuel, to ensure 
the safeguardability of the final repository according to 
current safeguards practice. No realistic possibilities are 
in sight in this case either, since this would cast doubt 
upon many of the desired characteristics of a direct final 
repository. 
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Approach 
Alterations to the existing IAEA 
safeguards philosophy 
Further and possibly redevelopment 
of safeguards elements 
Adaptation of the reference concept 
to valid safeguards practice 
lnstitutional approaches 
Table 6-2: Assessment of the Solutional Approaches 
Model1 Model2 Model3 
IAEA would have to accept purely a 
CIS safeguards concept 
+ intensive per-
manent facility 
safeguards 
---- currently no solution ----
no basic solution to the safeguards 
problern -
-- no realistic possibility in sight --
additional proliferation barrier but not a 
solution to the safeguards problems 
Institutional models with multinational Codetermination or Co-
operation (fourth approach) undoubtedly represent a simplifi-
cation of the NP problems in the final repository due to their 
associated proliferation barriers. Apart from the resulting 
questions of political acceptance they are not appropriate 
for solving the safeguards problern either, In this context, 
the establishment of a direct final repository must pay special 
attention to the role of EURATOM resulting from its proprietary 
and safeguards functions. 
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Before a final resolution, it is interest~ng to compare the 
essential NP aspects of direct final disposal with reprocessing. 
Table 6-3 shows this comparison with respect to differences 
in the fields of facility technology, safeguards technology 
and NP policy. This brief summary makes the advantages for 
a backend strategy with reprocessing quite clear. 
On the basis of the facts and. analyses compiled here the con-
clusion becomes obvious that a back-end strategy with direct 
final disposal is problemat~cal from a safeguards aspect since 
doubt must be cast upon the technical realization of a safeguards 
concept. 
For certain types of fuel element where reprocessing is not 
envisaged nor economical, Art. 35 of the VA can provide a 
possible solution. In the case of the limited emplacement 
of spent fuel elements, internation~l safeguards could be 
negotiated pursuant to this Article. 
Reprocessing 
Technical Characteristics: 
Pu determination after fuel dissolution, 
precision + 1-2%; comparison with 
burn-up computations (destructive assay) 
Pu separation by processing into MOX 
fuel elements 
use of Pu in nuclear ·reactors 
sensitive RP technology required, 
expert control through international 
agreements 
Safeguards: 
Pu and U accountancy by analytical 
methods; complementary: 
near real time accountancy, possibly 
containment/ surveillance 
quantifiable IAEA guidelines with back-up 
measures 
NP Policy: 
Storage of excess separated Pu can be 
realized within a future IPS system 
in the EURATOM area unrestricted 
utilization and consumption right 
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Direct Final Disposal 
Plutonium Determination 
Pu determination planned 
by fuel element monitor, 
precision =::: + 5% 
( non-destructive assay) 
Whereabouts of the Plutonium 
accumulation of Pu in underground 
final repository ("plutonium mine") 
access to Pu increasingly easier 
due to decay of the fission products 
Technology 
conventionally available mining 
technology 
Measures 
item counting (operational phase) 
containment/ surveillance 
(after backfilling the tunnels) 
Evaluation 
no back-up solution in the case of 
anomalies 
worldwide application of direct final 
disposal on the basis of Iang-term 
perspectives (social and political 
stability) undesirable 
in the EURATOM area, politically 
undesirable consequenc:::es on the 
basis of proprietary rights to the 
nuclear material 
Table 6-3: NP AspeCts of Direct Final Disposal in Comparison to Reprocessing 
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SUMMARY 
On the basis of the reference concept evolved within the frame-
work of the research and development programme "Alternative 
Waste Management Techniques", safeguards concepts for a direct 
final repository are being compiled and evaluated, The safeguards 
under discussion begin with the arrival of the products for 
final disposal at the reception area of the geological repository 
and terminate with the measures envisaged for the post-apera-
tional phase of the repository. Safeguards for the conditioning 
facility or the transport of final disposal packages are not 
included in this study. 
First of all in Chapter 2, important aspects of the reference 
concept have been selected and compiled for safeguards applica-
tions. The considerations are based on a standard PWR fuel 
element of the Biblis B type with a burn-up of 40,000 MWd/t 
HM at an initial enrichment of 3.6 %. After a cooling-down 
period of at least 10 years, the spent fuel elements are 
transferred in flasks of 12 fuel elements each to a conditioning 
facility which need not necessarily be at the site of the final 
repository. Conditioning is implemented in two sub-steps, pre-
liminary conditioning and final conditioning. During preliminary 
conditioning three intact fuel elements are enclosed gas-tight. 
in a so-called dry storage bin. The resulting intermediate 
storage package is brought into the final conditioning sector 
in a final disposal canister. A facility capacity of 700 t 
of heavy metal per year requires that 6 - 9 fuel elements 
be conditioned per day. 2 - 3 final disposal packages per 
day thus result in the final conditioning sector. 
The geological repository is constructed in a vifgin salt 
dome, the reference concept envisaging emplacement in tunnels 
with lost shielding, Access to the repository is obtained via 
two shafts. The first shaft serves to transport the salt, 
material and personnel. The second shaft is envisaged for 
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emplacement and special transports. Air inflow is effected via 
Shaft 1; exhaust air flows out through Shaft 2. Exploration 
of the envisaged emplacement area is implemented by exploratory 
drillings and tunnels. The exploratory tunnels roughly demarcate 
the emplacement area and are later to be used as Ventilation 
galleriss for exhaust air from the emplacement fields. After 
completing underground exploration, the position and size of 
the emplacement fields is determined, The emplacement floor 
will probably be 30 m below the explorat'ory floor at a depth 
of between 700 m and 900 m, Access to the emplacement area is 
obtained by driving twQ parallel access galleriss joined by 
connection drifts at intervals of 200 m, Starting from the 
connection drifts, the emplacement galleriss are driven parallel 
to the access galleries, Before beginning emplacement, emplace-
ment galleriss will only be driven starting from the emplacement 
connection drift furthast from the shaft, Emplacement galleriss 
are driven from the next connection drift at the same time as 
emplacement is implemented in the first sector of the emplacement 
field, 
The final disposal package is transported under ground on a 
rail-bound plateau transporter via Shaft 2. Underground transport 
to the emplacement connection drift is rail-bound; whereas tran-
spart through the emplacement connection drift to the emplacement 
gallery is railless. This is effected by an emplacement vehicle. 
After emplacing the package, the gallery section with the 
package is backfilled (mechanical or pneumatic stowing). When 
all the galleriss of an emplacement sector are occupied by 
packages and filled-in the emplacement connection drift and 
ventilationgalleriss arealso backfilled, After terminating 
emplacement operation - 40 weeks' operation per year, 11 FDP's 
per week - all the galleriss and cavities are backfilled, 
in the same way as the shafts. It is intended to oparate 
the mine for 50 years at an emplacement rate of 437 FDP's 
per year. 
The NP aspects of a direct final repository are dealt with 
in Chapter 3. The accumulation of plutonium in a direct final 
repository is regarded as especially dubious with respect to 
non~proliferation ("plutonium mine") 1 since in principle later 
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access by a nation to the very large quantities of plutonium· 
can never be ruled out. Due to the large quantities of stored 
plutonium and the long operational period of such a repository, 
it must finally also be remernbered that notice to or termination 
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty cannot be ruled out in various 
countries. 
In this connection, the results and considerations of the 
INFCE Conference are of special importance. INFCE Group 7 
WASTE MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL concerned themselves with the 
problems of safeguards in final repositories for spent fuel 
elements. INFCE considered it possible in principle to safeguard 
such a repository during the operational phase with safeguards 
techniques currently available, However, in the long term 
INFCE doubts the effectiveness of safeguards since the post-
aperational phase lasting for centuries will be determined 
by numerous unforeseeable technical, political and social 
factors. 
In addition to the political and technical boundary conditions, 
three safeguards models are presented in Chapter 4 intended 
to ensure the Safeguarding of a final repository. The models 
are differentiated by the degree of authorized access for 
IAEA inspectors. Thus in Model 1 access is restricted to 
aboveground facilities, Model 2 envisages limited access 
to the underground facilities and Model 3 unrestricted access 
to all underground facilities. 
In Model 1 the inspector's access is limited to strategic points 
above ground, These strategic points are the key measurement 
points, the reloading facility above ground as well as the 
bank eyes of the mine shafts, The essential element of this 
model is that, after the material has been takenunder ground, 
recovery or an internal diversion within the mine is ruled 
out. By transferring the material under ground, it is thus 
released from safeguards monitaring and written off. Since 
according to its definition there is no longer any material 
subject to safeguards present in this model after emplacement 
activities have been completed, neither is there any need 
for safeguards during the post-aperational phase. 
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Before the material can be released from safeguards, proof 
of non-recoverability must be presented. If this cannot be 
presumed then routine inspections of the site will be required 
during the post-aperational phase in order to monitor activities 
which could indicate a. reopening of the mine or other measures 
for recovering the material. 
The basic prerequisite for Model 1 is that the final repository 
itself can be regarded as a sufficient barrier so that measures 
can be dispensed with for ensuring that there is no undeclared 
containment opening through which the material could be recovered 
and that a diversion of material within a Containment (repro-
cessing under ground) can be ruled out. 
Model 2 comprises Model 1 and the following additional Under-
ground stra~egic points: pit bottarn of both shafts, intersections 
of the access galleries with the emplacement connection drifts 
and the junctions of the emplacement galleries with the re-
spective connection drift. These underground strategic points 
enable the inspector to safeguard the underground nuclear 
material flow at various stages of intensity. Largely the 
same restrictions as for Model 1 apply to this model. A ter-
mination of safeguards with backfilling of the gallery would 
have to be possible, or the geological repository itself 
would have to be regarded as a sufficiently safe barrier. 
The access of inspectors to strategic underground points 
would indeed present a serious oQstruction to a diversion 
in the geological repository, but it cannot be ruled out 
with sufficient certainty. 
Model 3 comprises Model 2 and moreover as an additionl measure 
the access of inspectors to all underground facilities and 
installations. Measures for Containment and/or surveillance 
are thus suggested in all the aboveground and underground 
facilities and installations of the final repository, including 
the waste storage area. 
Based upon these three safeguards models, a diversion and abuse 
analysis has been compiled as well as an evaluation of effective-
ness leading to the following results: sufficient safeguards 
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can be ensured both in the phase of aboveground transport 
(Phase 1) as well as in the phase of transporting the final 
disposal package under ground until it is filled-in on site 
(Phase 2). During the operational phase safeguards on final 
disposal packages already backfilled (Phase 3) can consist 
of permanent design reverification (Safeguards Model 3); 
however, unsolved problems can be seen in evaluating their 
effectiveness. The same is true of verifying the integrity 
of the shut-down geological repository in the post-aperational 
phase (Phase 4). 
In Chapter 5 approaches are suggested and discussed for solving 
the safeguards problem, An initial approach is perceived in 
altering the existing IAEA safeguards philosophy. The IAEA 
considers it necessary to quantify objective variables by 
oompiling numerical detection objectives (significant quantity, 
detection time, probability of detection, probability of false 
alarms). The probability of detection is the essentiai variable 
in the. IAEA safeguards towards which the planning of safeguards, 
employment of resources and evaluation of effectiveness are 
oriented, Since there is currently no procedure for quantifying 
the probability of detection in applying containment and sur-
veillance measures, safeguards models which are largely or, 
as required in the case of the final repository, almost ex-
clusively based on C/S measures, cannot be objectively planned 
in this model nor is their effectiveness computable, This 
leads to them being classified as unacceptable by the IAEA. 
A second approach is seen in the further development, and 
possibly redevelopment, of safeguards elements, In the opera-
tional phase of the final repository the problern consists 
in communicating a quantifiable certainty to the safeguards 
authority by suitable measures that the emplaced material 
is still present, Strictly speaking this quantification is 
only possible for accountancy measures, No methodology has 
yet been developed for numerically determining the information 
content of CIS measures; the error associated with C/S veri-
fication cannot be precisely specified, This problern can 
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generally be mitigated in other facilities by implementing 
material verification in principle by accountancy measures 
and by only employing CIS measures for subsidiary quantities 
of material and for limited periods as a supportive measure. 
These restrictions (limitation to subsidiary quaritities and 
defined periods) must be dispensed with in the case of the 
final repository. Safeguards would thus only be possible 
with purely a CIS concept and there is no contractual nor 
methodological basis for this. I.e., even presuming that 
safeguards elements were to be redeveloped or further developed, 
thus enabling CIS-supported monitaring of the emplaced material, 
its inclusion in the safeguards system would only be possible 
as a supplementary measure, On their own they do not represent 
a basic solut~on to the problern under consideration. 
Adaptation of the reference concept to the currently valid 
safeguard~ practice is discussed as the third approach. The 
starting points for this discussion are conditioning the 
material in such a way (dissolution and dilution) that the 
termination criteria for safeguards monitaring are fulfilled, 
or emplacing the material in such a way (recoverable) that 
it remains accessible for verification measures. Both methods 
of treatment are unacceptable as realistic alternatives. 
By dissolving the fuel and conditioning in the form of PAMELA 
ingots the capacity e,g. of the Gorleben salt dome would 
not even be sufficient for a single annual throughput of 
700 t of nuclear fuel. By emplacement in such a way that 
the material would remain accessible for further verification, 
apart from the technical feasibility, the essential objectives 
of the final repository concept would not be fulfilled, namely 
isolating the material from the biosphere and from possible 
further human access. Accessible underground emplacement 
would probably raise so many problems for reasons of heat 
removal and reck stability that this could no langer be regarded 
as a modification to the reference concept but would rather 
require compiling a new concept. 
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As a fourth approach, possibilities for solutions in the 
institutional sector are discussed, The starting point for 
institutional approaches is the fact that in order to implement 
a diversion a considerable amount of organizational work 
must also be undertaken in addition to the necessary technical 
measupes. By forms of multinational cooperation, additional 
barriers could be erected in the organizational sector which 
would make a diversion more difficult and would increase 
the risk of detection. A further aspect is that by extending 
international involvements, the states would probably be 
more vulnerable to sanctions. 
Consideration of institutional aspects received essential 
impulses through the INFCE Conference and is reflected in 
the IPS Working Group. It must, however, be remernbered that 
institutional aspects are regarded by the IAEA as supplementary 
measures and not as an alternative to stringent technical 
monitoring. Institutional models with multinational Codeter-
mination or cooperation undoubtedly represent an approach 
to general NP problems of a final repository due to the asso-
ciated proliferation barrier. However, they are not appropriate 
for solving the safeguards problem. In this connection the 
special role of EURATOM will be discussed, which has proprietary 
rights to nuclear material and special rights in the storage 
of nuclear material on the basis of contractual boundary 
conditions. 
An evaluation of the approaches mentioned above is undertaken 
in Chapter 6. The first approach to the safeguards problems 
of a final repository was seen in modifying the existing 
IAEA safeguards philosophy. According to this the IAEA would 
have to accept a safeguards model based largely - or in 
the post-aperational phase exclusively- on CIS measures, 
Since in this case the probability of detection, i.e, the 
essential objective of IAEA safeguards, cannot be quantified 
at the present state of the art, such an approach would be 
regarded as unacceptable by the IAEA. It is not possible 
to verify the nuclear material in the case of anomalies, 
e.g. false alarms. 
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For the same reasons the secend approach, envisaging the 
further technical development of safeguards elements, cannot 
be presented as a basic solution to these inherent safeguards 
problems either. 
The third approach consists in ensuring the safeguardability 
of the final repository according to current safeguards practice 
by altering the reference concept (e.g, by dissolving and 
diluting the nuclear fuel). No realistic possibilities are 
in sight in this case either, since doubt is thus cast on many 
of the des i red cha'rac ter ist i es o f a di rec t fina 1 re po s i tory. 
Institutional models with multinational participation and co-
operation (fourth approach) undoubtedly represent a simpli-
fication of the NP problems of the final repository due to 
the associated proliferation barriers. But in addition to 
the resulting problems of political acceptance they are not 
suitable for solving the safeguards problern either, In this 
context the role of EURATOM, resulting from its safeguards 
functions and its proprietary rights to all special fissionable 
materials, must be taken into particular consideration in 
establishing a direct final repository. 
Before a concluding resolution, it will be of interest to 
compare the essential NP aspects of direct final emplacement 
with reprocessing. This comparison clearly reveals the advantages 
of a waste disposal strategy with reprocessing. 
On the basis of the facts and analyses compiled, the conclusion 
becomes apparent that the waste management strategy with 
a direct final repository is problematic from safeguards 
aspects since doubt is cast on the technical realization 
of a safeguards concept. 
For certain types of fuel element where reprocessing is not 
envisaged and not worthwhile, Art. 35 VA can offer a possibility 
of a solution, In this case of the limited emplacement of spent 
fuel elements it could be possible to negotiate international 
safeguards according to this Article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The possibility of the direct final disposal of spent fuel ele-
ments is considered a.s an alternative to the commercial re-
processing of fuel elements. Final disposal aims at isolating 
radioactive material from the biosphere and from possibilities 
of accidental human access without any time limit. The safety 
concept is designed to ensure the integrity of the repository 
without requiring human maintenance or monitaring after the 
final closure of the repository. Final disposal is conceived 
of as irreversible disposal. 
Within the framework of the research and development programme 
"Alternative Waste Management Techniques" the emplacement of 
spent fuel elements in a salt dome is being studied. Several 
concepts have been compiled for conditioning 1 for the final 
disposal canister and emplacement techniques for this direct 
final disposal of spent fuel elements. One concept which best 
fulfills the criteria of safety engineering 1 technical feasi-
bility1 availability of raw materials, and also approaches to 
economic efficiency and nuclear materials safeguards 1 was 
selected as a reference in each case. Back-up solutions for 
each component were also determined over and above estab-
lishing the reference concepts. 
A nuclear materials safeguards concept is to be developed by 
the KFA-TUG on the basis of the reference concept. This safe-
guards concept for Alternative Waste Management comprises· Safe-
guarding the products for final disposal from their arrival at 
the geological repository. Individual aspects important for 
applying international safeguards measures have been selected 
and compiled in Chap. 2 from the large volume of information 
required for this concept and from detailed technical problems 
already known. 
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The reference concept is based on a pressurized water reactor 
standard fuel element of the Biblis B typi with a burn-up 
of 40 1 000 MWd/tHM at an initial enrichment of 3,6 %. 
After a cooling-down period of at least 10 years the spent 
fuel elements are transported in flasks of 12 fuel elements 
each to a conditioning facility. Conditioning is effected 
in two steps, preliminary conditioning and final conditioning. 
In order to ensure that its c~pacity is continuously exploited 
the facility has a reception store for approx. 20 flasks. 
The spent fuel elements are enclosed in a final disposal 
package (FDP) in the conditioning plant. An FDP consists 
of three containers: the dry storage bin (DSB) as a gas-tight 
barrier, the final disposal canister (FDC) primarily designed 
according to the criteria of corrosion protection and stability, 
and the lost shielding (LS) which serves as a protection 
against neutron and gamma radiation during handling and transport. 
The finished FDP's are transported from the conditioning 
facility to the geological repository in special flasks on 
special freight cars owned by the Deutsche Bundesbahn (Federal 
German Rai~ways). The FDP's are taken out of flasks andin-
dividually loaded onto plateau transporters at the reloading 
plant of the geological repository for transport under ground. 
A reception buffer store serves to accommodate FDP's in the 
case of disturbances in emplacement operation, During normal 
operation the FDP's delivered are taken directly under ground 
and there emplaced according to regulations. 
With respect to nuclear materials safeguards, no experience 
is yet available for direct final disposal. From the point 
of view of proliferation, a final repository for spent fuel 
elements containing strategic material r'epresents an increasingly 
attractive object for a potential diverter and thus requires 
effective safeguards for which new techniques and concepts 
must be developed due to the special problems involved. 
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Safeguards instrumentation currently available is based on 
material accountancy and independent material verification 
which in the case of a final repository with the purpose 
of isolating material from the biosphere and preventing further 
possibilities of access can no longer be directly applied, 
In the following the direct final emplacement of spent fuel 
elements, an interesting possibility also for other states, 
is therefore investigated from safeguards aspects with respect 
to the Federal Republic of Germany which, in cantrast to other 
signatory states of the NP Treaty, does not have a national 
safeguards system, Whether and to what extent available safe-
guards elements can be.combined into an effective safeguards 
concept is analyzed under the boundary conditions given for 
the final repository, or which modifications may possibly 
be necessary. 
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2 TECHNICAL REFERENCE CONCEPT 
WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO SAFEGUARDS 
2.1 Conditioning the Products for Final Disposal 
2.1.1 Pre~iminary Conditioning 
In the preliminary conditioning functional area 3 intact fuel 
elements are each enclosed gas-tight in a so-called dry storage 
bin (DSB). The individual process steps are distributed between 
3 separate cells connected to each other by a DSB transport 
vehicle coupled to the cell openings in a ventilatively tight 
manner. The preconditioning sequence proceeds as follows: 
The flasks taken from the reception buffer store are docked 
onto the opening in the floor of the fuel element unloading 
cell. After removing the fuel elements (FE), they are examined 
and deposited in the FE buffer store. 
After docking the DSB onto the opening in the floor of the fuel 
element buffer cell, the lid of the opening is opened and the 
fuel elements placed in the DSB, The fuel elements are trans~ 
ported suspended on a cell crane when removing them from the 
fuel element buffer stor~. The trap door in the bin-loading 
cell is then closed again and the loaded DSB proceeds to the 
next cell, the welding cell. 
In the welding cell the screw cap is inserted in the DSB and 
welded on. Helium is then f~d in for the subsequent leak test 
and the filling hole is closed by welding, 
The transport vehicle then proceeds to the opening in the 
floor of the testing cell and is coupled to the cell opening. 
In the testing cell the dry storage bin is taken over by the 
cell crane, The DSB transport vehicle is uncoupled and proceeds 
to the material transfer room where it is loaded with an empty 
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dry storage bin. The welded DSB is taken to the decontamination 
device in the testing cell and after a wipe test is decontami-
nated if necessary. The DSB is subsequently subjected to 
an integral helium leak test in a pressure container and 
then after passing the test is transferred out of the cell 
and placed in a buffer store, 
The dry storage bin used during preliminary conditioning 
can accommodate three intact fuel elements. It consists of 
a tube, bottom, cap and internals. On the lid there is a 
device for suspending it from a crane. The tube length of 
the DSB is 5.14 m, the tube diameter is 66.5 cm and the walls 
are 8 mm thick. 
As a parallel approach to the preliminary conditioning described 
above, the method of "Fuel Elements Separated Into Fuel Rads" 
is currently being investigated. This will not be discussed 
in detail here since those components of the final disposal 
package relevant to safeguards in the final repository are 
practically unaltered by this alternative method of treatment. 
2. 1 . 2 Final Conditioning 
The process steps in final conditioning begin by taking over 
the dry storage package (DSP), that is to say the loaded 
DSB, from the buffer store in preliminary conditioning and 
are terminated by passing on the final disposal package. 
In order to take over the DSB, an empty FDC is driven on 
a railway truck under the outward transfer room of the pre-
liminary conditioning. The dry storage package coming from 
the buffer store is placed in the final disposal canister 
by the crane. The railway truck then transports the loaded 
FDC under the inward transfer room of final conditioning. 
The final disposal canister is first raised here by means 
of lifting tackle on the railway truck and the lid is placed 
in position by the cell crane and then screwed on. The crane 
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then picks up the FDC and deposits it at the welding facility. 
Automatie welding equipment applies the seal weld of the 
second lid at several positions. The weld seam is then visually 
inspected and a helium leak test then follows for liquid-
tightness. 
The tested final disposal canister is then inserted in the 
lost shielding by the cell crane located in the output transfer 
room. The lost shielding is closed by means of a screw cap. 
The final disposal package in a Type B flask then proceeds 
to the geological repository on a special Federal Railways truck. 
The final disposal canister is intended to ensure the safe 
containment of the radioactive material for a period of about 
500 years. Due to the geometry of the intact fuel elements, 
a maximum length for the final disposal package of 6.2 m 
would seem to be appropriate. This weighs approx. 50 t, it 
is designed for a heat output of 2.4 kW. 
Nine fuel elements must be conditioned per day in order to 
achieve an annual capacity of 700 t heavy metal; the preliminary 
conditioning functional area is therefore designed in two 
legs. 2 - 3 final disposal packages therefore reach the final 
conditioning functional area per day. 
2.2 The Geological Repository 
2.2.1 Specifications 
The geological repository will be constructed in a virgin 
salt dome. The reference concept envisages emplacing FDP's 
with lost shielding in tunnels. The emplacement level is 
to be at a depth of approx. 730 m. The repository is to be 
operated for 50 years at an emplacement rate of 437 final 
disposal packages per year. With 40 operating weeks per year 
two final disposal packages must be emplaced on four·days 
of the week and three final disposal packages on one day, 
i.e. 11 final disposal packages per week. Only one emplacement 
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level is envisaged. A maximum temperature of 200°C is presumed 
for the salt in the emplacement area 1 as in the HAW concept. 
It is hoped to achieve a temperature of 150°C at the salt-
canister interface. Before beginning emplacement the rock 
temperature at a depth of 730 m is approx. 37°C, 
Number of Shafts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
Interna! Diameter of the Shafts ....... . 7.50 m 
Shaft lntervals ...................... . approx. 400 m 
Warking Load Shaft I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 t 
Warking LoadShaft II . ................. . approx. 60 t 
Table 2-1: Shaft Data 
The shaft transport equipment for emplacement operation 
is to be designed for a working load of approx. 60 t. At 
the same time as emplacing fuel element packages from fuel 
conditioning, secondary waste is emplaced via the same shaft 
but in a separate emplacement field. 
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Operational Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 a 
Depth of the Emplacement Level . . . . 
Emplacement Rate for FE Packages . . . . . . . . . . . 
Admissible Temperature of the Salt in the 
· Emplacement Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Temperature at the Salt-Canister Interface ......... . 
RockT emperature Before Beginning Emplacement . . .. 
Warking Load of the Shaft Transport Equipment for 
Emplacement Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Products for Final Disposal .................. . 
Cross Section of the Tunnels in the Emplacement Floor . . . 
Table 2-2: Specifications for the Geological Repository 
approx. 730 m 
2 or 3 per day 
max. 2000C 
approx. 1500C 
370C 
approx. 60 t 
Spent LWR-FE's, 
waste from the 
conditioning facility, 
nuclear power 
stations, regional 
collecting depots, 
research 
establishments etc. 
approx. 22 m2 
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Cross Section of the Exploratory Tunnels . 
Connection Drift lntervals . 
Distance of the Emplacement 
Floor from the Exploratory Floor . 
Access Gallery lntervals ......... . 
Dimensions of the Emplacement Fields . . . . . . . . . . 
Cross Section of the Access Galleries 
and Connection Drifts .. · ....... . 
Cross Section of the Emplacement Tunnels . 
Thickness of the Pillars from the End of the 
Emplacement Gallery to the Next Connection Drift . 
Ascending Gradient of the Connection Galleries . . . . . 
approx. 15 m2 
(without vaulting) 
200m 
30m 
500 m - 1800 m 
500 x 200m2 
to 1800 x 200m2 
7 x 4m2 
?m 
10 - 12 % 
Table 2-3: Data on the Position and Dimensions of Tunnelsand Fields 
2.2.2 Developing the Geological Repository 
A final evaluation on the suitability of the salt dome requires 
underground exploration by mining development. This mining 
development will not be conventional 1 i,e, largely without 
blasting. Access to the repository will be obtained via two 
shafts each 7.5 m in diameterat a distance of approx. 
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400 m. The first shaft serves for removing salt 1 transporting 
the material, man-riding and the incoming air. The working 
load of the transport facility is approx. 25 t. The second 
shaft, where the transport facility has a working load of 
approx. 60 t, serves for emplacement transport and the exhaust 
air. 
Exploration in the envisaged emplacement area is undertaken 
by exploratory drillings and tunnels. The exploratory tunnels 
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will have a cross section of 5 x 3 m without vaulting. They 
roughly delineate (deviation of up to 25 m) the emplacement 
field and will later be used as ventilation galleries for 
the exhaust air from the emplacement fields. 
The underground infrastructure area will be constructed between 
the two shafts. This includes the pit bottom, hopper, crushing 
and dust-removing facilities, as well as workshops for the 
assembly and maintenance of the machines, facilities and 
motor vehicles used under ground. The planned dimensions 
of the mechanical workshop are given in Table 2-4. The workshop 
is equipped with lifting platforms. A travelling crane with 
a load of 25 t is envisaged. 
Dimensions of the Workshop 
Length. 85 m 
Width 15m 
Height 6- 8 m 
Load of the Travelling Grane in the Workshop . max. 25 t 
Table 2-4: Data on the Workshop 
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The position of the emplacement fields will be determined after 
completing underground exploration. The emplacement floor will 
be 30 m below the exploratory floor. 
Access to the emplacement area will be obtained by driving two 
parallel access galleries up to the boundaries of the field. 
The access galleries are joined by connection drifts at intervals 
of 200 m. The emplacement galleries are driven parallel to the 
access galleries starting from the connection drifts. The 
emplacement tunnels are not driven right through so that 
a pillar of 7 m remains between the end of the tunnel and 
the next connection drift. The access galleries and connection 
drifts have a cross section of 25 m2 , the emplacement tunnels 
2 18 m . The distance between the two access galleries depends 
on geological conditions in the salt dome and may be between 
500 m and 1800 m. The individual emplacement fields correspond-
ingly have dimensions of 500 m x 200 m to 1800 m x 200 m. 
In the final disposal package emplacement field 1 18 connection 
drifts with 50 emplacement tunnels each and connection drift 
with 40 emplacement tunnels are planned. Only the emplacement 
tunnels of the connection drift furthest from the shaft will 
be driven before beginning emplacement. The emplacement tunnels 
in the next emplacement connection drift ·are driven at the 
same time as emplacement is effected in the adjacent emplacement 
connection drift. 
The emplacement floor is connected to the infrastructure area 
on the exploratory floor in the form of sloping tunnels as 
belt and chute raises with an ascending gradient of 10 - 12 %. 
2.2.3 Emplacement Operation 
Emplacement is effected by retreating working, i.e. from 
the most remote boundaries of the underground excavations 
towards the shafts. Before beginning emplacement, all emplacement 
tunnels are first driven in the field furthest from the shaft. 
A pillar of 15 m remains between the first emplacement tunnel 
and the access gallery. The width of the pillars between the 
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emplacement tunnels is 10 m. After the first emplacement 
connection drift has been completely driven, emplacement 
operationwill begin in it. Tunnelling the second connection 
drift proceeds parallel to emplacement. 
The final disposal package is transported below ground on a 
rail-bound plateau transporter via the shaft envisaged for 
emplacement operation (cf. the sequence diagram in Fig. 2-1). 
The plateau transporter does not have any driving mechanism 
of its own and no brakes, and has to be propelled by a loco-
motive. The technical specifications are given in Table 2-5. 
Plateau Transporter 
Length. 
Width . 
Weight . .................... . 
Axle Load . .................. . 
Track Gauge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Table 2- 5: Plateau Transporter Data 
approx. 6.0 m 
approx. 2.5 m 
approx. 8 t 
approx. 35 t 
1.435 m 
(Federal Railway gauge) 
The plateau transporter with the final disposal package is 
driven into the hoisting cage of the shaft winding equipment, 
is secured and transported through the shaft to the emplacement 
floor. A locomotive then takes over the transportation and 
drives the plateau transporter on rails along the access 
gallery solely designed for package transport to the emplacement 
connection drift. The gaugealso corresponds to Federal Railway 
standards. Still on the access gallery, the emplacement machine 
takes over the package from the plateau transporter at the inter-
section of the connection drift and tunnel, and transports it 
without rails through the emplacement connection drift to the 
emplacement tunnel. After placing the package at the location 
of emplacement, the emplacement machine returns to the access 
gallery where the plateau transporter has in the meantime 
been driven back to the shaft and then taken to the surface. 
The section of the tunnel with the FDP is then filled in 
with crushed salt for a distance of 7.5 m, Mechanical or 
pneumatic stowing is used as the filling process. The filling 
vehicle is a railless vehicle with sliding sides on which 
a mechanical stowing machine is mounted, The emplacement 
sequence is shown in Fig, 2-1. 
The stowing material is fed to the stowing machine via a con-
veyor system from the advanced working or a hopper, Aggregates 
in the form of MgO concrete can be added, The stowing machine 
drives to the emplacement location and mechanically fills 
the section of the tunnel to be closed. This method achieves 
a 98 % degree tunnel filling. 
The distance between adjacent emplacement connection drifts 
is 200 m. Since 7 m remains as the end pillar and 13 m is 
required for barricading the filled-in section, 180 m can 
be used for emplacing the packages. With a package length 
of 6.2 m and a distance between the packages of approx. m, 
a tunnel can accommodate 24 packages. 
If all the tunnels of an emplacement connection drift are 
occupied by packages and filled in, then the emplacement 
connection drift, the parallel and flanking galleries, as 
well as the ventilation galleries (if they are no langer 
required) are filled in and closed by dams. Table 2-6 shows 
the most important data of an emplacement field, 
At the same time as emplacement is being effected, the next 
sector of the emplacement field relative to the shaft area 
is opened up. The galleries are driven by a cutting tunnelling 
machine. The debris is either removed by direct belt feed 
and transportation via the conveyor system as stowing material 
to the emplacement location, a hopper area or the pit bottarn 
at Shaft I. Or alternatively 
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Delivery by the Federal Railway * 
I 
Unloading and Placing the FDP in Storage 
Positions of the Butter Store 
-' 
Loading the Plateau Transporter with 1 FDP perTruck 
-' 
Transport to the Shaft* 
J 
Placing the Plateau Transporter in the Hoisting Cage 
I 
Transport Below Ground * 
I 
Coupling the Truck to the Underground Locomotive 
I 
Transport to the Emplacement _Qonnectign Drift* 
I 
FDP Taken Over by the Emplacement Machine 
I 
Transport to the Emplacement Tunnel 
I 
Placing the FDP in the Emplacement Tunnel 
I 
Filling in the Tunnel Sections 
* Raii-Bound Transport 
Figure 2-1 : Diagram of the Emplacement Sequence 
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a shovel loader takes over the debris from the tunnelling 
machine and transports it to the belt feed. All transportation 
of debris in the emplacement sector is railless and is effected 
without exception through the connection drifts to the access 
gallery not used for emplacement transport. The maximum distance 
covered by the shovel loader to the belt feed is approx. 300 m. 
The hopper area is a maximum of 2 km from the emplacement loca-
tion on the access gallery. 
Width of the Pillar Between the Access Gallery and the 
First Emplacement Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Width of Pillars Between the Emplacement Tunnels . 
End Pillar Between the Em'placement Tunnel 
and Next Connection Drift . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Length of the Glasure Plug of an Emplacement Tunnel . . . . . 
Effective Length of the Emplacement Tunnel . ..... . 
Package Length . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Distance Between Two Packages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Number of Packages Per Tunnel ................. . 
Table 2·6: Dimensions in the Emplacement Field 
15m 
10m 
?m 
13m 
180m 
6.2 m 
approx. 1 m 
24 
After terminating emplacement operation, all the tunnels and 
cavities are filled in and closed by plugs and dams. The 
shafts are also filled, whereby the natural geological structures 
are largely taken into consideration. Barriers of concrete and 
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asphalt are also incorporated, Although the walls of the shaft 
are not removed, it will be impossible to use the shafts 
again. 
2.2.4 Machines and Vehicles 
The following machines and vehicles are available in the geo-
logical repository for developing the mine and filling in 
the tunnels after emplacement: 
cutting tunnelling machine 
shovel loader 
mechanical stowing machine. 
These machines and vehicles are partly diesel-driven or they 
have electric engines and are railless, As self-propelled 
vehicles they can be equipped with a tachograph to record 
the distance covered, driving time and speed, The cutting 
tunnelling machine .weighs approx. 80 t and can be equipped 
with an air-conditioned cab. However, this is not envisaged 
at the prevailing work temperature of 37°C, The shovel loader 
weighs approx, 25 - 30 t and is not suitable for transporting 
final disposal packages. The machines and vehicles described 
here can be used both in the FDP store as well as in the 
waste store. In addition to the vehicles mentioned, vehicles 
for inspection, transporting crews and material, clearing, 
loading and special purposes are used both in the mining 
and emplacement sector. The following are envisaged for em-
placement operation: 
plateau transporter 
locomotive 
emplacement machines, 
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The plateau transporter is rail-bound and is not self-propelled, 
It weighs 8 t and carries a working load of 55 t. It is moved 
by a diesel- or battery-driven locomotive. However, a further 
plateau transporter is available with a lower load of 25 - 30 t 
for emplacing waste. 
The only railless machine capable of picking up a package 
and transporting it independently is the emplacement machine. 
For reasons of redundancy, two emplacement machines are avail-
able. Their motor and brakes are designed for transporting 
packages over ascending and descending gradients of up to 
1 %. The emplacement machines are not able to transport packages 
over sloping tunnels with a gradient of 10 - 12 %. The final 
design of the emplacement machines has not yet been decided. 
Two concepts are being discussed, on the one band an articulated 
shovel loader with fork, also known as the Kiruna truck, 
and alternatively a portal lift truck on four stilts as e.g. 
used for container transport. 
2.2.5 Ventilating the Geological Repository 
Fresh air is brought in via the debris transport shaft to 
the emplacement floor and is then fed into the emplacement 
and advance working operations via the access gallery, The 
emplacement tunnels receive special ventilation via air ducts 
during advance working and emplacement. Outgoing air is fed 
directly to the former exploratory floor via Ventilation 
chutes at the ends of the connection drifts and is then directed 
to the emplacement shaft where it escapes. Package transport 
on the emplacement level also takes place in the fresh air 
flow. A monitaring of the exhaust air for radioactivity is 
envisaged at least for the exhaust shaft, 
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3 NP ASPECTS OF DIRECT FINAL DISPOSAL 
3.1 Direct Final Disposal in Comparison to Waste Management 
by Reprocessing 
3.1 .1 Consequences of a Direct Final Repository as a Model 
for Third Countries 
From the proliferation point of view there are two areas 
in the nuclear fuel cycle requiring special protection: 
On the one hand there are the two sensitive steps of enrichment 
and reprocessing whose technologies can in principle be used 
to separate strategic nuclear material, and on the other 
hand the accumulation of sensitive nuclear material for example 
in storing separated plutonium or spent fuel elements. 
The protection and control of sensitive technology is the 
subject of the London Guidelines in which the individual 
components to be protected are listed in detail. A possible 
abuse of the facilities themselves is covered by the various 
international safeguards agreements with the IAEA within 
the framework of the NP Treaty or bilateral agreements. 
An accumulation of spent plutonium can result in a fuel cycle 
with reprocessing for example by delaying the expansion of 
nuclear energy programmes, e.g. for breeder reactors. Insti-
tutional models have already been developed based on Article XII AS 
of the IAEA Statute envisaging an international plutonium 
storage system for excess separated plutonium. Amongst other 
aspects, storage of excess plutonium is envisaged as well 
as a reduction in the storage capacities at fuel element 
factories for reactor fuels containing plutonium. 
The accumulation of plutonium in the intermediate storage 
of spent fuel elements has also been identified as a sensitive 
point in the nuclear fuel cycle. The ISFM Group, meeting 
within the framework of the IAEA, has suggested appropriate 
countermeasures /3-1/. 
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The accumulation of plutonium in direct final disposal is re-
garded as especially disturbing in many quarters with respect 
to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, In this connection 
the concept of a "plutonium mine" has been introduced /3-2/. 
Particularly on the part of the Europeans and Japanese, the 
inherent proliferation danger at such final repositories 
was pointed out at the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evalua-
tion Conference (INFCE) since in principle later access by 
a state to the very large quantities of plutonium which would 
be present in a geological repository with spent fuel elements 
can never be ruled out. This is of special significance because 
access to the plutonium will become easier in the long term 
due to the decreasing radioactivity of the spent fuel elements 
and thus the strategic value of the material will increase.· 
In connection with the large quantities of stored plutonium 
and the long operational l~fe of such a repository of approx. 
50 years, it must be pointed out that notice to or termination 
of the NP Treaty cannot be ruled out in various countries. 
In this case the state thus has the legal possibility of 
excavating spent fuel elements from the direct final repository 
and separating the plutonium for atomic weapons. It can be 
assumed that notice to the NP Treaty by the Federal Republic 
of Germany is out of the question, 
Furthermore, it is not possible to waive the application 
of safeguards for a certain quantity of nuclear material 
on the basis of bilateral agreements. On the basis of these 
bilateral agreements it could rather result that the contracting 
parties would be able to participate in formulating safeguards 
application in the long term, which could lead to a tightening 
of safeguards (prior consent). On the basis of these overriding 
proliferation aspects it seems difficult to discuss the estab-
lishment of such repositories as a model for worldwide applica-
tion since other states without the appropriate contractual 
conditions for controlling non-proliferation (non-proliferation 
credentials) would be in a position to obtain long-term access 
to sensitive plutonium.· 
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In examining the question of the extent to which a non-re-
coverability concept would hinder later access 'to sensitive 
plutonium it must generally be presumed that in principle 
there will always be technical possibilities of bringing 
an emplaced fuel element back into the light of day. The 
technical difficulties depend, amongst other aspects, on 
the final disposal medium and they are probably greater for 
disposal in salt than for other media. It must be remernbered 
that not all countries have this storage medium available 
and thus different proliferation profiles would result in 
the corresponding countries. The unusually large quantities 
of plutonium would make it possible to create large nuclear 
programmes for atomic weapons. 
3.1.2 Possibility of Terminating Safeguards 
The criteria for terminating IAEA safeguards are laid down 
in Paragraphs 26(C) of INFCIRC/66 and 11 öf INFCIRC/153 cor-
responding to Art. 11, Verification Agreement (VA):" ... uponde-
termination by the Community and the Agency that the material has been con-
sumed, or has been diluted in such a way that it is no langer usable for any 
nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, 
or has become practically irrecoverable" /3-3, 3-4/. 
The conditions of Paragraph 11, INFCIRC/153 are thus not 
applicable to spent nuclear fuel, The INFCE Warking Group 7 
established in their concluding report /3-5/ that waste from 
the LWR fuel cycle (recycled and non-recycled) is relatively 
unattractive for weapons production. Depleted uranium must 
either be enriched or irradiated and reprocessed, Pu waste 
is difficult to recover because of the great dilution in 
glass or cement. In the opinion of the INFCE, both types 
of waste probably correspon~ to IAEA criteria for terminating 
safeguards~ 
Since it becomes easier to handle spent FE's from the LWR 
cycle without recycling due to decreasing fission product 
activity, this is the type of waste in th~ LWR fuel cycle 
3-4 
which, according to INFCE, is more attractive with respect 
to diversion. The easier recovery of fissionable material 
by reprocessing is in cantrast to the fact that in a final 
repository in salt recovery of the final disposal package 
in the course of time will not be made easier in the foreseeable 
future due to the high temperatures occurring in the lang term. 
T~e extent to which future technologies will alter this assess-
ment does not only depend on the development of highly sophisti-
cated technologies for the enrichment and recovery of recycled 
nuclear material but also on technical progress in mining 
engineering. At this moment in time, the question of long-term 
safeguardability arises in connection with the direct final 
disposal of spent nuclear fuels in a suitable geological 
formation. The essential aspects for terminating safeguards, 
as well as for long-term safeguarding, are listed in Table 3-1. 
Termination of Safeguards 
Non-Recoverability 
(not fulfilled without further provision) 
Degree of Dilution of the Fissionable 
Material 
Solution Pursuant to INFCIRC/153, 
Paragraph 35 or VA, Art. 35 
Conceivable for Such Types of FE 
Not Envisaged and Not Economic for 
Reprocessing 
Long-Term Safeguards 
Novel Problem 
Cancellation of Membership in the 
NP Treaty 
Duration of the NP Treaty until 1995 
NP Credibility 
Model Character of the Direct Final 
Repository 
Table 3·1: Termination of Safeguards Measures and Long-Term Safeguards: 
Essential Aspects 
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3.1 .3 Considerations on a Final Repository for HAW and Spent 
Fuel Elements 
For certain kinds of spent fuel elements (e,g, AVR 1 THTR 
or special types of light~water reactors) reprocessing is 
either not envisaged or not economical. For such fuel elements 
direct final disposal is therefore necessary. The question 
thus arises whether a termination of safeguards can be possible 
for such nuclear material. If the quantities of spent fuel 
elements were to be small in relation to highly active waste, 
which would also be taken into the final repository, then 
although the conditions of Paragraph 11 arenot fulfilled -
Paragraph 35 of INFCIRC/153 or Art. 35 VA could come into 
effect, which says: 
"·· .Where the conditions ofthat paragrapharenot met, 
but the State considers that the recovery of safeguarded 
nuclear material from residues is not for the time being 
practicable or desirable the Agency and the State shall 
consult on the appropriate safeguards measures to be 
applied. It should further be provided that safeguards 
shall terminate on nuclear material subject to safeguards 
under the Agreement under the conditions set forth in 
paragraph 13 above, provided that the State and the 
Agency agree that such nuclear materil is practicably 
irrecoverable." 
A termination of safeguards is therefore not impossible in 
principle, an application of simplified safeguards is conceivable 
at any rate. 
3.1 .4 Extrapolation of IAEA Discussions on Sensitive Facilities 
to a Direct Final Repository 
Recent discussions at the IAEA in connection w~th the implementa-
tion of safeguards concepts for sensitive facilities in repro-
cessing and enrichment have indicated that concepts making 
intensive use of containment/surveillance systems are not 
3-6 
acceptable /3-6/. Since precisely this conception with intensive 
CIS could be of essential significance in the case of a direct 
final repository, a conflict can be expected here. The IAEA 
would have to make considerable cuts and reorientations in 
their previous safeguards philosphy if this problern is to 
be solved, Only a few problems can be mentioned here such 
as design verification, availability and reliability of instru-
ments, verification of nuclear material in the case of instru-
mentation failure, internal diversion etc. 
In spite of all these difficulties it must be seen that pursuant 
to the safeguards agreement, e.g. INFCIRC/153, all nuclear 
facilities, such as a direct final repository for spent fuel 
elements, would in principle have tobe internationally safe-
guardable, However, in this case, considerable cuts would 
have to be made for such a safeguards concept in the "effective-
ness" demands as currently discussed at the IAEA. 
3.2 Results of NP Discussions in INFCE 
S~nce about 60 nations and various international organizations, 
such as the IAEA, participated in INFCE the results and con-
siderations of this conference are of particular significance 
for further approaches, This is especially true since the 
numerous previous discussions were combined and extended 
at INFCE, Thus INFCE Group 7 "WASTE MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL" 
concerned itself with the problems of safeguards in final 
repositories for spent fuel elements, the salient points 
of which will be given in the following. 
Only waste containing U-235, U-233 and plutonium is of signif-
icance from a safeguards point of view. Other transuranic 
elements, such as neptunium and americium could also be of 
significance in future, Depending on their content of nuclear 
material the following categories of waste are differentiated 
in the INFCE considerations: 
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(I) Waste in the form of depleted uranium 1 natural uranium 
or low enriched uranium ( < 20% U-235) 1 so-called non-HEU 
waste, 
(II) Highly active waste containing plutonium (or U-233 
in the thorium cycle) and U-235. 
(III) Waste with a low plutonium content and low content 
of high-enriched uranium, so-called HEU waste. 
Spent LWR fuel elements thus fall into waste category (II). 
The flow of nuclear material in the fuel cycle can be quantified 
from the safeguards aspect with the aid of the concept of 
the "significant quantity". In the case of uranium waste' 
in category (I), the significant quantity is 75 kg of U-235. 
In the case of plutonium and HEU waste the significant quantities 
are 8 kg for plutonium and U-233, and 25 kg for U-235. ~ 20 %) . 
These values also correspond to the guidelines for target 
quantities suggested by the IAEA. If one finally also considers 
that the waste is generally not present in the form of an 
open flow but rather packed in containers then the concept 
can be meaningfully characterized as "target batch". This 
is taken as the number of waste containers which together 
contain a significant quantity of nuclear material. In the 
case of LWR fuel, two spent fuel elements form a target batch. 
The most attractive target for a diversion of nuclear material 
is represented by the spent fuel from the light-water reactor 
once-through cycle in the waste categories under consideration. 
The high radioactivity of the fission products initially 
functions as a self-protection for the fuel, thus making 
handling of the material more difficult. Moreover, reprocessing 
technology is required to separate the fission products and 
actinides, as well as toseparate uranium and plutonium. 
However, after a correspondingly long storage period the 
radioactivitiy is significantly reduced and access to the 
plutonium after recovery becomes easier. Nevertheless, if 
the spent fuel elements are at that time enclosed in suitable 
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containers in a final repository deep in the geological sub-
stratum at a salt temperature of 120°C then this makes re-
coverability and thus access to plutonium more difficult. 
The remaining types of waste in category (II) 1 as well as 
the waste in categories (I) and (III) do not represent attractive 
diversion targets in the view of INFCE. Safeguards measures 
for spent nuclear fuel. in a final repository consist of account-
ancy and verification from the time of unloading from the 
reactor until emplacement in the salt dome or a different 
geological formation. The monitaring of loading and unloading 
activities by inspectors ahd/or television units is currently 
state of the art of IAEA safeguards. The automatic Safeguarding 
of fuel movements in a repository is currently being developed, 
in the same way as non-destructive analysis (NDA) for determining 
the fuel burn-up or plutonium content. 
All processes from storing spent fuel until emplacement in 
the final underground repository are safeguards-relevant. 
According to the INFCE discussions, the following demands 
must be made: 
(1) Surveillance of final disposal canister loading, 
item counting of the fuel elements changing to 
item counting of the final disposal packages. A 
tamper-resistant seal on the FDP would be able 
to detect attempts at breaching the integrity of 
the package; 
(2) counting the fuel elements or final disposal packages 
before and after each transport step; 
(3) containment/surveillance and verification of the 
FDP from receiving the package until emplacing 
it in the final repository; 
(4) containment/surveillance in order to ensure that 
there is no material retransport (possibly supported 
by monitors to detect the movements of radioactive 
material); 
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(5) inspections to verify the plant design in order 
to rule out the existence of clandestine transport 
paths 1 stores or equipment. 
Three phases can be differentiated in safeguards measures 
with respect to a direct final repository: 
During the .first, or active 1 phase of the geological repository, 
item counting, inventory verification and surveillance are 
applied. 
The second, or ·passive phase begins when individual areas 
of the repository are filled in again after emplacing the 
final disposal packages. Since during this phase recovery 
of waste becomes increasingly more difficult due to the filling 
in and the associated enlargement ~f the containment, the 
safeguards activities would be shifted from item counting 
to containment/surveillance after agreement between the IAEA 
and the operator. 
The third 1 or post-aperational phase, begins with the closure 
of the geological repository. It must be established by sur-
veillance measures and periodic inspections of the area in 
question that no attempts at recovery have been undertaken. 
After deactivating the final repository the degree of safeguards 
measures will be able to be reduced according to the concluding 
report of INCFE Werking Group 7 1 pages 101 and 102 1 namely 
for the following reasons. Assuming there was an incentive 
to recover nuclear material from the shut-down repository 
if a considerable fraction of the emplaced nuclear fuel were 
to be recovered then this would practically mean reactivating 
the geological repository, associated with considerable efforts: 
drillings, shaft construction, Ventilation, transport of 
excavated material, canister transport etc. In this case 
it would take 12 - 18 months before nuclear material would 
begin to emerge from the final repository. Such an undertaking 
would thus be easily observable. On the other hand 1 analyses 
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have indicated that the recovery of a few final disposal 
canisters would be possible within a brief period (8 - 10 
weeks). However since even for this undertaking, whose costs 
would amount to roughly $ 25 million, several large drilling 
facilities would be required which could hardly be concealed, 
This is, however, not directly transferable to the reference 
concept since in the analysis quoted in the INFCE report studies 
were undertaken for a final disposal canister 35 cm in diameter. 
Several of these canisters would therefore be required fÖr 
a significant quantity of nuclear material. 
In the long term the effectiveness of safeguards measures 
is questioned by INFCE (Concluding Report Group 7, page 101) 
since the post-aperational phase lasting for centuries will 
be determined by numerous, hardly foreseeable factors such 
as: 
alterations in the institutional and social system, 
large inventory of fissionable material in repositories 
for spent FE's, 
decrease in radioactivity and thus better possibilities 
of recovering the fissionable material, 
development of new technical safeguards measures 
(i.e. processes and equipment), 
possible technological developments to accelerate 
the recovery of very diluted waste, 
degree of integrity of canisters with spent FE's 
in shut-down geological repositories and possibilities 
of recovery, 
later incentives for recovering the fissionable 
material from spent fuel for energy generation 
purposes. 
No detailed predictions can be made about most of these factors. 
It is therefore not possible from current perspectives to make 
a decision on the possibility of monitaring a direct final 
repository in the post-aperational phase or terminating safeguards. 
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4 APPLICATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS REGULATIONS TO THE 
REFERENCE CONCEPT 
4.1 Political and Technical Boundary Conditions 
4,1. 1 Legal Bases for Safeguards 
In the Federal Republic of Germany the tasks of international 
nuclear material safeguards - conditioned by the commitment 
to the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NP Treaty) - are undertaken by 
two institutions: 
the Commission of the European Communities and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
4. 1. 1.1 The EURATOM Treaty 
The obj~ctive of the treaty establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community is a common market in the sector of the peace-
ful uses of nuclear energy; the major aspects being of equal 
priority in the assured supply of ores and nuclear fuels, 
promotion of research and the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, The following boundary conditions can be derived 
from the EURATOM Treaty /4-1/ for direct final disposal: 
The material in the final disposal packages is 
special fissionable material and property of the 
European Atomic Energy Community. 
The Commission of the Community is obliged to safeguard 
the material with the aim of convincing themselves 
that it is being used for no other purposes than 
those specified by the users. 
The Commission inspectors shall have access to 
all locations, documents and persans related to 
the use or storage of nuclear material at all times. 
A purely national solution to the problern of the 
direct final disposal of spent fuel elements cannot 
be derived from the articles of the EURATOM Treaty 
quoted in detail in the following, 
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The aims and procedures of nuclear material ~afeguarding by 
the Commission of the European Communities are specified in 
detail in Chapter VII of the EURATOM Treaty. Safeguards are 
accordingly based on nuclear material accountancy 1 reports 
to EURATOM and the unimpeded access of EURATOM's inspectors 
to all nuclear facilities, 
Pursuant to Art. 79 it is incumbent upon the operator of a 
nuclear facility to keep and present records of operational 
processes in the utilization or generation of materials subject 
to safeguards, thus enabling account to be kept of these 
materials. This is also valid for transportation of these 
materials. Whoever shall erect or operate a nuclear facility 
must inform the Commission of the plant design, insofar as 
this is necessary for the Commission to fulfill its tasks 
(Art. 78). The tasks of the.Commission arise in part from 
Art. 77. Pursuant to this 1 it must ensure by appropriate 
safeguards: 
that the nuclear materials are not used for any 
purposes other than those envisaged; 
that the regulations concerning supply and all 
special safeguards Obligations (prior consent) 
undertaken by the Community are observed. 
The safeguards comprise ores 1 source materials and special 
fissionable materials. Pursuant to Art. 81 the Commission 
inspectors shall have access to all places and data and to 
all persans professionally concerned with materials 1 articles 
of equipment or facilities subject to safeguards at all times. 
Article 86 says: 
Special fissile materials shall be the property of the Community. 
The CommunityJs right of ownership shall extend to all special 
fissile materials which are produced or imported by a Member 
State, apersonor an undertaking and 
safeguards, 
. are subject to 
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Whereas the proprietary rights of ,the Community to all special 
fissionable materials are laid down in Chapter VIII (Art. 86), 
Chapter VI regulates ·the supply of the member states with 
' orBs, source materials and special fissionable materials: 
In order to ensure a common supply policy according 
to the principle of equal access to the sources 
of supply, an agency was established to direct 
rights to the materials mentioned above generated 
on the territory of the member states. It has the 
exclusive right to conclude contracts on the supply 
of these materials from countries within and without 
the Community. (Art. 52). 
Pursuant to Art. 57, the rights of the EURATOM 
Supply· Agency comprise the acquisition of 
a) rights to the utilization and consumption 
of special fissionable materials and 
b) proprietary rights in all other cases. 
Pursuant to Art. 62, Subsection 1, the Agency ex-
ercises its rights to the special fissionable materials 
generated in the member states in order to: 
a) cover consumer demand 
b) store these materials itself or 
c) export them. 
In Art. 62, Subsection 2 the possibility is conceded of leaving 
these materials and the residues suitable for reprocessing with 
the producer so that they can be stored with the consent of 
the Agency. Furthermore, attention should be drawn here to 
Art. 80 of Chapter VII (Safeguards) according to which the 
Commission may demand that all excess special fissionable 
materials be deposited at the Agency or in other repositories 
subject to safeguards. 
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4.1. 1. 2 Effects of the NP Treaty 
In order to fulfill the Obligations of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty the non-nuclear-weapons states of the European Atomic 
Energy Community concluded an agreement (Verification Agreement) 
with the IAEA and EURATOM in 1973. This agreement (VA) essen-
tially corresponds to the IAEA standard agreement INFCIRC/153. 
The basis for safeguards in the sector of the peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy is created for the nuclear weapons states 
of the Community by corresponding agreements. 
Subsidiary Arrangements are appended to the Verification 
Agreement in which, amongst other aspects, inspection activities 
and efforts are determined on a model basis. The Verification 
Agreement and the Subsidiary Arrangements have the character 
of treaties concluded between the states, EURATOM and the 
IAEA, in which EURATOM and its member states undertake Obliga-
tions to the IAEA. In order to be able to fulfill these obliga-
tions EURATOM adapted its safeguards system to the new re-
quirements. This was implemented by directive no, 3227/76 
/4-2/ replacing the old directives no. 7 and no. 8. 
The Subsidiary Arrangements comprise the Facility Attachments 
separately compiled by EURATOM and the IAEA for each nuclear 
facility. These Facility Attachments (FA) are the basis of 
the special safeguards provisions determined by EURATOM for 
each facility. 
4.1. 1. 3 Safeguarding by IAEA and EURATOM 
EURATOM undertakes safeguards in the nuclear facilities of 
the Community pursuant to the EURATOM Treaty and EURATOM 
directive no. 3227/76. IAEA safeguards are based on the NP 
Treaty and the Verification Agreement. Details of this imple-
mentation are determined in the Subsidiary Arrangements and 
the Facility Attachments (FA). The EURATOMspecial safeguards 
provisions transfer safeguards based upon the FA to the EURATOM 
level, insofar as these measures are not already determined 
by the EURATOM directive. 
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EURATOM and IAEA cooperate in detecting possible diversions 
of nuclear material for nuclear explosive devices. To this end 
in discussing the FA, EURATOM communicates the 
facility data provided by the facility operators 
to the IAEA with the exception of information to 
be commercially protected, 
EURATOM communicates to the IAEA in a modified 
form the reports on nuclear material it has received 
from the operators of the nuclear facility, 
the IAEA obtains the right to monitor part of EURATOM's 
inspections. 
The IAEA verifies the results of EURATOM's safeguards insofar 
as these are implemented on the basis of the Verification 
Agreement and the FA's. The following principles are valid 
for the IAEA verification activity (see also Table 4-1 ): 
1. The concept of preventing diversion used in the 
NP Treaty is restricted to the timely detection 
of a diversion and the deterrent effect. 
2. Restrietion of safeguards to nuclear material, 
i.e. the facilities themselves arenot monitored. 
3. Principle of applying safeguards only at certain 
strategic points in the flow of fissionable material. 
4. Restricting the IAEA to verifying the results of 
the EURATOM safegu~rds system. 
5. Aßplication of safeguards in such a way that the 
economic and technical development in a state or 
international cooperation in the field of nuclear 
energy is not impeded, 
6. In certain cases substantiated by the IAEA, it shall 
obtain the right to undertake its own independent 
special inspections, 
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Preventing diversion by a deterrent effect (timely detection) 
Nuclear material safeguards (not: facility safeguards) 
by measurements as weil as containment/surveillance 
Strategie points principle 
Verification of EURATOM results (reports) 
No impediment to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
Right to own independent inspections 
Table 4~1: Principle of IAEA Safeguards Pursuant to the Verification Agreement 
4.1 .2 Boundary Conditions for Implementing Safeguards 
On the basis of the principles described above, the following 
problern areas result as boundary conditions for the development 
of the safeguards concept: 
4.1.2.1 By EURATOM 
1. Clarification of the question of the extent to which 
the unrestricted utilization and consumption rights 
of a member state exercised on the basis of possessive 
rights to nuclear material (Art. 87) are restricted 
by the proprietary rights of the Community. It must 
be assumed that in the case of final disposal conceived 
of as non-recoverable this decision on disposition must 
be regarded as irreversible and thus requiring at least 
the consent of the Community as the owner of the material. 
Various models are conceivable in which the owner and 
the possessor share responsibility for and implementation 
of final disposal, e,g.: 
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- The Community declares that it does not regard 
its proprietary rights as impaired by the non-
recoverable final disposal of the material and 
cedes responsibility for and implementation of 
final disposal to the member state. 
- The member state implements national final disposal 
on behalf of the Community, whereby conditions must 
be expected to be imposed by the Communiiy. 
Final disposal is carried out as a multinational 
undertaking by the Community itself 1 the member 
state making territory and infrastructure available 
(cf. Art. 80 1 Deposition). 
Variant 1 underestimates the long-term proliferation 
aspects of a direct final repository. In this case 
the interest of the Community does not concentrate 
on proprietary rights but rather on effective safe-
guards. 
Variant 2 corresponds most closely to the interests 
of the Federal Republic 'of Germany. Retention of 
ownership and safeguards is ensured on the part 
of the Community and is internationally verifiable. 
A national final repository is also more advantageaus 
from the point of view of acceptance than 
Variant 3. This includes the possibility of a final 
disposal of foreign final disposal products from 
EURATOM states and thus presents significant acceptance 
problems. In view of the geographical and political 
situation of the Federal Republic of Germany, Variant 3 
cannot be desirable. 
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2. EURATOM requirements with respect to nuclear material 
accountancy and the report system are largely in 
agreement with IAEA demands. 
3. With respect to regulations for inspection act~vities, 
EURATOM's inspection rights are comprehensively de-
termined in the EURATOM Treaty Art. 81. 
4. 1 . 2. 2 By IAEA 
The position with respect to IAEA safeguards must be considered 
in much more detail. The following problems are to be discussed 
and clarified on the basis· of the Verification Agreement: 
1. Quantification of timeliness of detection and signif-
icance of nuclear material quantities. 
2. Determination of strategic points with clarification 
of access rights for IAEA inspectors. 
3. Clarification of the problern of the extent to which 
the IAEA can implement safeguards independently 
of EURATOM. 
4. Clarification of the question of the extent to 
which safeguards can be terminated if proof of 
non-recoverability of the material is furnished. 
These points will in part only be finally determined in the 
Facility Attachments, however they must be considered in 
the safeguards concept of the facility. 
Re 1 Quantification of timeliness of detection and signif-
icance of nuclear material quantities. 
The IAEA detection goals are described by 
the following parametersstill tobe quantified: 
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- significant quantity 
- timeliness of detection 
- detection probability of a diversion 
- probability of false alarms. 
The quantification of these variables, as well as the 
total inventory and its strategic significance, serve 
the IAEA as a basis for developing its safeguards model 
for the facility to be safeguarded. In implementing the 
model for a specific facility, the inspection goals 
aimed at for the facility in question will be derived 
from these detection goals. 
The detection goals depend greatly on the type and com-
position of the material tobe safeguarded. If one bases 
the products for final disposal on LWR fuel elements 
of the Biblis type then the data listed in Table 4-2 
result for the irradiated FE's. 
Annuallncrement Totallnventory of 
Fissionable Materials FE FDP ofthe the Final Repository 
Final Repository atter 50 Y ears 
U-235 4.1 kg 12.3 kg 5.4 t 268 t 
Pu-239 3.1 kg 9.3 kg 4.0 t 201 t 
Pu-241 0.4 kg 1.2 kg 0.6 t 11 t 
Total 7.6 kg 22.8 kg 10.0 t 480 t 
Uranium 506.0 kg 1518.0 kg 663.0 t 33,140 t 
Plutonium 5.3 kg 15.9 kg 7.0 t > 212 t 
Fission Products 22.0 kg 66.0 kg 28.8 t 
Table 4~2: Final Repository lnventory of Spent FE's /4-3/ 
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The variables currently set as guidelines by the IAEA 
for significant quantities (SQ) are 8 kg for plutonium 
and 75 kg for low enriched uranium U-235; that means 
that each final disposal package contains more than 
the significant quantity of plutonium. 
Bulk handling facilities (BHF) are classified by the 
IAEA according to a nuclear material index (NMI). This 
is based on the facility throughput or the facility 
inventory, expressed in weighted significant quantities 
(WSQ). The inspection and verification activities of 
the IAEA are concentrated on facilities with a high 
nuclear material index. In the Safeguards Implementation 
Report (SIR) for 1981 the following statistical maximum 
values are given for the safeguarded BHF's in order 
to characterize the spread: 
max. plutonium inventory (in significant quantities) 137 
max. annual plutonium throughput (in significant 
quantities) 
In the case of·a direct final repository these values would 
already be considerably exceded in the first year of 
operation, as can be seen from the following summary 
of significant quantities: 
Pu U 
2 0.16 
875 71 
> 26,500 3573 
Final Disposal Package 
Annual Increment of the 
Final Repository 
Total Inventory of the Final 
Repository after 50 Years 
Simply from the quantity of material to be safeguarded, the 
final repository represents a new dimension for safeguarded 
facilities, 
1 6 7 
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The IAEA does not specify any fixed value for detection 
time, It is aimed to achieve a timeliness goal of three 
months in the case of storage ponds for spent fuel elements 
in LWR facilities containing the same kind of fuel elements. 
It would have to be possible to take over this value 
for the final repository, 
With respect to the probability of detection, a value 
between 90 and 95 % is usually aimed at, the probability 
of false alarm being assumed as smaller than or equal 
to 5 %. 
However, a probability of false alarms of approx. 5 % 
is not acceptable for the final repository. On a compu-
tational basis this would mean 10 false alarms during 
the operating time with an inspection period of three 
months and a repository operating life of 50 years. 
It must be assumed that in the case of a final repository 
the clarification of a false alarm, i.e. the reopening 
of tunnels already filled in, is impossible or only 
possible with unjustifiably high expenditure. The fact 
that the material is no longer accessible to direct 
verification, or only with excessively great efforts, 
requires that a safeguards system for the facility be 
a) resistant to failure and 
b) resistant to false alarms. 
This can probably only be achieved by an appropriate 
redundancy in safeguards measures. 
Other materials which could be considered for direct 
final disposal are e,g. fuel elements from thorium high-
temperature reactors. Reprocessing of these fuel elements 
is not currently envisaged or economical, A reference 
concept is currently being developed for the disposal 
of these fuel elements. 
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Re 2: Determination of strategic points with clarification of 
access rights for IAEA inspectors. 
In accordance with the concept of the Verification 
Agreement, nuclear material safeguards are based on 
the principle of material accountancy and material 
balancing 1 as well as auditing and material verification: 
the facility operator keeps account of the changes 
in reserves and the reserves of nuclear material 
in his facility and prepares a balance sheet at 
at least annual interNals. 
Inspectors from the safeguards organizations examine 
the balance sheet and verify the data recorded 
in it. 
The locations where data are verified and the locations 
where containment and surveillance measures are implemented 
are termed strategic points. It is a basic principle 
of nuclear material safeguards pursuant to the Verification 
Agreement that the activities of the IAEA inspectors 
and their rights of access are normally limited to 
the strategic points in the facilities, With respect 
to the inventory and verification of reserves, the 
safeguards model is based on assumptions of significance 
for practical implementation. The most important is: 
During inventory taking all batches of nuclear material 
are to be presented at the key measurement points determined 
for the inventory 1 irrespective of the quantity of 
nuclear material they contain so that they can be verified 
by the safeguards organization. The verification is 
generally restricted to identification and visual checking 
of all batches and random measurement of individual 
batches. 
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Verification can either be direct, i.e. by verifying 
the values specified by the operator by means of measure-
ments, or indirect, e.g. by examining attached seals 
and verifying the containment. 
This basic safeguards model can only be technically applied 
to a very limited degree in the final repository. As soon 
as the final disposal canister is packed in or the tunnel 
is filled, a direct verification can no langer be tech-
nically implemented so that this basic model meets with 
considerable restrictions when applied to the direct 
final repository. Inventory taking is therefore only 
possible indirectly, for example according to the following 
pattern: 
If there are no indications that the material is no langer 
there, then it can be concluded that it is still present 
and the results of the last verifications are therefore 
still valid, 
This form of indirect material verification can only 
be acceptable for the safeguards authority if they can 
assume that all conceivable diversion pathways are safe-
guardable with sufficient reliability. To this end addi-
tional strategic points will have to be defined, 
According to the definition of the Verification Agreement 
(Art. 98) strategic point means a location selected in 
assessing facility data where under normal conditions 
and in conjunction with information from all the strategic 
points necessary and sufficient information for implementing 
safeguards is accessible and can be verified; a strategic 
point may be a location where key measurements for material 
accountancy are implemented and where measures for Con-
tainment and surveillance are undertaken. 
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Emplacing spent fuel elements only represents a small 
fraction of the handling processes in the final repository. 
Apart from the emplacement of fuel elements, it is envisaged 
that radioactive waste will also be deposited in the geo-
logical repository. Waste emplacement is in all cases 
independent of FDP emplacement, although the facilities 
above ground and the shaft equipment is used for both 
emplacement materials. Waste materials are delivered 
in barrels of 200 or 400 l with concrete shielding. 
It is envisaged that approx, 27 1 500 packages will be 
emplaced per year. Waste packages will be emplaced simul-
taneously with the FDP's. The same mining machines will 
be used for developing the waste emplacement field, 
There is no difference in the machines for the two fields, 
Waste packages are no langer subject to safeguards, 
Their emplacement need not be safeguarded. 
However, the simultaneaus and adjacent emplacement of 
radioactive waste must be regarded as an interference 
factor from the safeguards aspect, Due to waste emplacement, 
non-safeguarded activities not subject to disclosure 
are implemented above and below ground which could make 
detection of a diversion more difficult or facilitate 
concealment of a diversion. In order to develop a safeguards 
concept and determine the strategic points and the IAEA 
inspectors' rights of access it is therefore essential 
that all activities in the geological repository can 
be clearly differentiated by the safeguards authority, 
Due to the necessity of having to verify the material 
indirectly the completeness of their information with 
respect to all activities regarding material is of paramount 
importance for the safeguards authority, The safeguards 
authority can only state that they have no indications 
that the material to be safeguarded is no langer present 
if no activities requiring explanation or open to misinter-
pretation have been recorded in the vicinity of final 
disposal package emplacement. This can possibly lead to 
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surveillance and access rights having to be granted 
to IAEA inspectors for processes, facilities and locations 
of waste emplacement in order to make all relevant activ-
ities at the geological repository transparent to them, 
Re 3: Clarification of the question of the extent to which 
the IAEA may implement safeguards independently of EURATOM. 
The Verification Agreement determines that EURATOM and 
IAEA shall avoid any unnecessary duplication of work 
in implementing safeguards. The IAEA implements safeguards 
activities in such a way that, insofar as it can achieve 
the objectives of its inspections, it monitors the activ-
ities of the EURATOM inspectors and verifies EURATOM's 
assessments. Apart from other aspects, the IAEA's verifi-
cations include independent measuremBnts and surveillance. 
Considering the order of magnitude of the safeguards 
problern it is to be assumed that the IAEA will strive 
for the greatest possible independence from EURATOM's 
safeguards activity. This could mean e.g. that C/S measures 
would be applied redundantly for EURATOM and IAEA, or 
jointly evaluated, as is currently the case e,g, in 
camera monitaring in LWR facilities. 
Re 4: Clarification of the question of the extent to which safe-
guards may be terminated if proof of non-recoverability 
of the material is furnished. 
The criteria for releasing material from safeguards are 
described in Art. 11 of the Verification Agreement: 
"Safeguards under this Agreement shall terminate on nuclear 
material upon determination by the Community and the Agency 
that the material has been consumed, or has been diluted 
in such a way that it is no longer usable for any nuclear 
activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, 
or has become practically irrecoverable." 
With respect to evaluating non-recoverability, the type 
of emplacement is undoubtedly of decisive significance, and 
the emplacement envisaged in the reference concept with 
lost shielding makes it considerably more difficult 
to classify the material as "non-recoverable". 
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The operational phases of the repository must also be 
considered in evaluating recoverability, In view of 
the envisaged emplacement with lost shielding it will 
probably be very difficult to provide evidence that 
the material is already non-recoverable in the operational 
phase of the final repository, i.e. after the individual 
emplacement tunnels have been filled in. 
Evaluation of recoverability in the post-aperational 
phase of the repository, i.e. after the shafts have 
been filled in, must undoubtedly be regarded in a different 
light. If the material were still to be classified as 
subject to safeguards even in the post-aperational phase 
of the repository then this would require safeguards 
for an unforeseeable length of time, This also represents 
a completely new dimension for international safeguards 
which in the case of conventional facilities can generally 
be terminated with removal of the inventory or at the 
latest with closure or decommissioning of the facility. 
Safeguards ad infinitum would probably also require 
new safeguards techniques which still have to be developed. 
4.1 .3 Current Discussion 
It is generally accepted that a safeguards concept on the 
basis of INFCIRC/153 requires further development, at least 
for certain types of facility. An extended safeguards concept 
has been compiled by the IAEA which, over and above the existing 
model, envisages additional strategic points in the material 
balance areas at which operational records will be kept by 
the operator and measurements on nuclear material implemented 
by the inspector, as well as Observations of operational 
processes in progress. The implementation of safeguards according 
to this model which has been included in some facility attach-
ments for nuclear facilities in the Federal Republic has 
only been accepted on the part of the Federal Republic on 
a trial basis and for a limited period. This is especially 
true of the IAEA demands for: 
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establishment of additional strategic points to deter-
mine the flow of nuclear material within material 
balance areas 
access to operational records concerning the flow of 
nuclear material at the additonal strategic points 
execution of verification activities at the additional 
strategic points 
implementation of safeguards basically independent 
of EURATOM. 
There is no statutory basis in the Verification Agreement for 
these safeguards activities accepted as a trial for a limited 
period of time. 
4.2 Safeguards Ooncept 
The total nuclear material inventory of the final repository is 
contained in individual identifiable items, the final disposal 
packages. The IAEA safeguards concepts for such facilities are 
based on item accountancy. Since in the case of final disposal 
packages there is no possibility of djrect verification, e.g. 
by non-destructive assay methods (NDA), the following methods 
remain as applicable measures within the framework of nuclear 
material accountancy: 
item counting, 
item identification, 
verification of the integrity of the item. 
It is assumed for the safeguards concept of the final repository 
that the contents of the final disposal package have been veri-
fied in the conditioning facility before being placed in the 
bin. The final disposal package is subsequently sealed in the 
conditioning facility in such a manner that the validity of 
the final measurement can be extended for an unlimited period 
by verifying the integrity of the item. The data from this 
measurement are retained for the item as long as it is still 
subject to safeguards. After leaving the conditioning facility 
the material contained in the item is only verified by identity 
and integrity verification. 
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4.2.1 Final Disposal Canister 
The final disposal package for the reference concept (three 
intact FE's per FDP) consists of four concentric shells: 
dry disposal bin 
canister body 
corrosion protection 
lost shielding. 
The canister body and corrosion protection form the final disposal 
canister which is cast en bloc in a special process. The floor 
and lid of the FDC are screwed in and welded. The main aspect 
as far as safeguards are concerned is the external cladding, 
i.e. in the case of final disposal with lost shielding the 
subsidiary shielding of the FDP or in the case of borehole 
disposal the corrosion protection of the FDC. 
A cast cylindrical body is used as the lost shielding, the 
bottarn and lid of which are screwed in in cantrast to the pro-
cedure in the case of the shells it encloses. Mounting points 
are envisaged in such a way that it is possible to seal the 
floor and lid openings. If electronic seals are to be applied 
then for their protection cavities or recesses are envisaged 
in which the seals can be mounted. As a back-up system for 
the sealing of the lost shielding a weldment verification 
of the corrosion protection (next shell underneath) can be 
envisaged. In the further considerations it is first assumed 
that the cast canister envisaged as the subsidiary shielding 
(the lost shielding) representing the external containment 
of a final disposal package, can be verified with respect 
to its integrity by visual checks and that the containment 
openings are protected by one or more seals verifiable in 
situ. 
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4.2.2 Nuclear Material Flow 
The final disposal packages are transported via the public 
railway network of the Federal Railway. They are delivered 
in a type B flask designed for transport on public routes 
pursuant to the regulations. The incoming trucks are first 
parked in the buffer zone. Buffer capacity is designed for 
three working days, i.e. nine final disposal packages. The 
final disposal packages themseLves are not yet accessible 
in the buffer zone since they are still in the transport 
flasks. 
The trucks are driven from the buffer zone to the reloading 
area and the final disposal packages are drawn out of the 
flasks and loaded onto the rail-bound internal transport 
trucks (plateau transporter). The final disposal packages 
are transferred by means of a crane facility. The subsequent 
reception control procedure takes the form of a dose rate 
measurement, a wipe test, a visual check and registration. 
The integrity of the containment and seal of the lost shielding 
could also be verified. The plateau transporter is then driven 
to the shaft, loaded into the hoisting cage and transported 
to the emplacement level. At the emplacement level the plateau 
transporter is removed from the hoisting cage and driven to 
the emplacement tunnel. Underground rail-bound transport 
is terminated at the junction of the access gallery and the 
emplacement connection drift. 
The final disposal package is then transferred from the plateau 
transporter to the emplacement machine, or taken up by the 
latter and (not rail-bound) driven to the emplacement tunnel. 
The canister is deposited by the emplacement machine at the 
emplacement location. After the filling material has been 
pneumatically packed the canister is no longer accessible. 
The material flow is shown diagrammatically in Fig. 4-1. 
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4.2.3 Preliminary Considerations on the Safeguards Concept 
On the basis of the material flow sketched above, the following 
considerations can be established: 
The individual final disposal packages can only be identified 
and verified after removal from the flask. This takes place 
after leaving the buffer store at the beginning of the emplace-
ment process, immediately before reception control. It therefore 
does not seem to be meaningful to divide the facility into 
several material balance areas (MBA) (e.g, according to the 
criterion above gr~und/under ground), The material only resides 
above ground (buffer store) for a maximum of a few days and 
the establishment of a separate MBA for the area above ground 
would require additional identification and accountancy efforts 
without improving the safeguards possibilities. After reception 
checks, the emplacement of the final disposal packages is 
implemented as a continuous process without further intermediate 
buffering. 
Delivery via 
Public Railway 1 .. 1 Buffer Store 
Network 
1 Aboveground 
Reloading fDP 
Removing fDP from 
flask, 
Reception Control 
Plateau Transporter 
Shaft 
Hoisting 
1-l _..,Jill4ot-~l Cage 
-~-Undergroun-d- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- ~laceme~v~ -- , __ 
Emplace-
ment, 
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Emplace-n Plateau me~t Transpor-11 II Hoisting 
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figure 4-1 : Material flow Diagram 
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The last opportunity of identifying a final disposal" package 
is after it has been deposited in the emplacement tunnel by 
the emplacement machine, After this the filling process begins 
and this part of the'tunnel becomes inaccessible. It should 
be examined whether this last step (packing·the canister) 
can be coupled to an acknowledgement signal for the function-
ality of the safeguards devices in order to increase the 
system's resistance to failure. 
As lang as the emplacement process 1 including packing the 
final disposal package thus rendering it inaccessible, proceeds 
as a continuous process continuous safeguards are also required 
to verify the material flow. The objective of Safeguarding 
the material flow is to verify whether the declared material 
has been emplaced at the declared location, The possibility 
of verifying the identity and integrity of final disposal 
packages already deposited in the emplacement tunnel and of 
only filling th~ tunnel under Observation after all emplace-
ment processes have been terminated could make an essential 
contribution to simplifying safeguards, In this case continuous 
Safeguarding of the emplacement work could be replaced by 
batch-oriented verification (one or more complete tunnels) 
of the outcome of the work. However, it is technically more 
difficult to backfill the tunnel after completing all emplacement 
processes and leads to a considerably higher dose rate for 
the operating personnel due to direct radiation. 
With respect to nuclear material safeguards, the first subtask 
will be to ensure that the material flow proceeds in the 
declared manner; i.e. that the declared material is transferred 
to the declared location. This can largely be achieved by 
applying surveillance measures (camera and/or human surveil-
lance). 
The next subtask consists of ensuring that the emplaced material 
remains at the emplacement location until its final containment 
(sealing the emplacement tunnel or tamping the access gallery 
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for fields already backfilled). Surveillance measures could 
also be employed to prevent recovery of the material via 
declared paths. 
Special measures are necessary f.or the final safeguards subtask, 
namely of ensuring that no further clandestine entrances can 
be created to the tunnels already backfilled and tamped via 
which the material could be diverted, or that the material 
could be subjected to clandestine further processing within 
the geological repository after the tunnels have been backfilled. 
This form of diversion would admittedly involve great technical 
efforts, however it cannot be reliably ruled out. Since no 
indicators are currently available or known for reliably 
indicating such a diversion, the strategy for this safeguards 
subtask must consist in increasing the technical efforts 
required for clandest~ne diversion via these paths by appropriate 
measures to such an extent that this diversion risk can be 
reduced to an acceptable residual risk. Suitable measures 
could for example be comprehensive access concessions to 
all aboveground and underground facilities for inspectors. 
4.2.4 Safeguards Concepts for Different Access Models 
Three models are to be considered in the following differentiated 
by different access rights for the IAEA inspectors. In Model 
access is restricted to the aboveground facilities, Model 2 
comprises limited access to the Underground facilities and 
Model 3 unrestricted access to all underground facilities. 
4.2.4.1 Access Model 1 
Version 1 
In this model th~ inspector's access is restricted to strategic 
points above ground. Strategie points (SP) are the key measure-
ment points (KMP), the aboveground unloading facility and 
both shafts to the geological repository. 
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The essential element in this model is that after transferring 
the material underground recovery or an internal diversion 
within the repository is ruled out. By transferring the material 
underground it is thus released from safeguards and written off 
via KMP 2 (exemption from compulsory registration). Since 
according to this model there is by definition no langer any 
material subject to safeguards present after terminating 
emplacement activities, no safeguards are required for the 
post-opera~ional phase either. The essential elements of 
this model are: 
material balance areas 
- the facility forms one material balance area 
strategic points, being key measurement points 
- for determining the flow uf nuclear material 
KMP 1 - entry 1 intake, cancellation of exemption 
(för rework material) 
KMP 2 - exemption from compulsory registration 
- for physical inventory taking 
KMP A - buffer store 
records system 
- accounting for inventory changes 
- entry, intake at the time of entry 
- exemption from the compulsory registration at the 
time of transfer underground 
- operating records contain the following data 
- place and time of emplacement for each FDP 
- type, place and time of backfilling/sealing measures 
installations and installed devices 
- seals on FDP's 
- optical surveillance of FDP unloading aboveground 
- optical surveillance/detectors at the entrances to 
the two shafts 
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strategic points for Containment and surveillance measures 
- FDP unloading aboveground 
- entrance shaft 
- entrance shaft 2 
recording the physical inventory 
- counting and identifying the items at key measurement 
point A 
Safeguards applied: 
- pre-operational phase 
- design verification before startup (only above 
ground) 
- operational phase 
- identity and integrity verification of the final 
disposal package by the inspector at the entrance 
(reception control) 
- camera monitaring at the aboveground unloading 
facility to prevent undeclared unloading processes 
(replacement with dummies) 
- CIS measures (camera, detectors) at the strategic 
points shaft 1 and shaft 2 to prevent undeclared 
material flow (backflow) 
- post-aperational phase 
- no safeguards 
Version 2 
Version 2 of this model is only differentiated by the fact that 
the material under ground cannot be released from compulsory 
registration. KMP B thus takes the place of KMP 2 for inac-
cessible material below ground. The inventory is taken at this 
key measurement point by establishing on the basis of observations 
at the strategic points Shaft 1 and Shaft 2 that no material 
backflow has taken place, The material brought into the repository 
must therefore still be present there. Safeguards in the post-
aperational phase depend on whether requirements for releasing 
the material from safeguards have been able to be fulfilled 
at the closure of the geological repository. The essential 
elements of this version of the model are: 
material balance areas 
- the facility forms one material balance area 
strategic points being key measurement points 
- for determining the flow of nuclear material 
KMP 1 - entry, intake 
- for taking the physical inventory 
KMP A - buffer store 
KMP B - all underground facilities, material inaccessible 
records system 
- recording inventory changes 
- entry, intake at the time of entry 
- exemption from compulsory registration at the 
time of closing the geological repository if 
termination envisaged on the part of the IAEA 
- operating records contain the following data 
- place and time of emplacement for each FDP 
- type, place and time of filling in/sealing measures 
installations and installed devices 
- seals on FDP's 
- optical surveillance of FDP unloading above ground 
- optical surveillance/detectors at the entrances to 
the two shafts 
strategic points for containment and surveillance measures 
- FDP unloading above ground 
- access Shaft 
- access Shaft 2 
taking the physical inventory 
- counting and identifying items at key measurement point A 
- establishing that no return flows have occurred via 
the SP's Shaft 1 and Shaft 2; concluding that the 
material brought in must still be present. 
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Safeguards applied: 
- pre-operational phase 
- design verification before startup (above and 
below ground) 
- operational phase 
- identity and integrity verification of the final 
disposal packages by the inspector at entry (re-
ception control) 
- camera monitaring at the aboveground unloading 
facility to prevent undeclared unloading processes 
(replacement by dummies) 
- CIS measures (camera, detectors) at the strategic 
points at the two shafts to prevent an undeclared 
material flow (backflow) 
- post-aperational phase 
- termination of safeguards after backfilling all 
shafts, decommissioning of the aboveground facilities 
as well as demonstration of non-recoverability 
(if acknowledged to be impossible by means of 
mining technology) 
- routine examination of the site by visual inspections 
to safeguard against activities which could indicate 
a reopening of the geological repository or other 
measures for recovering the material, 
The two versions of this model assume that the final geological 
repository itself can be regarded as a sufficient barrier so 
that measures ensuring 
- that there are no undeclared containment openings 
through which the material could be recovered and 
- a diversion of the material within the containment 
(reprocessing below ground) can be ruled out, 
can be dispensed with, 
4.2.4.2 Aeeess Model 2 
This model eomprises Model 1 and additional strategie points 
below ground. The strategie points below ground enable the 
inspeetor to safeguard the underground flow of material, 
Safeguarding the flow of nuelear material below ground ean 
be undertaken at various levels of intensity: 
- safeguarding the underground flow of nuelear material 
by eamera monitaring and possibly reeording instruments 
at the hoisting and transport installations with the 
possibility of human surveillanee in the ease of 
instrument failure, 
- additional random human surveillanee of emplaeement 
proeesses, 
- every final disposal paekage to be· personally aeeompanied 
by the inspeetor from transport to the shaft until 
emplaeement in the tunnel and baekfilling of the tunnel 
seetion. 
The same restrietions are largely applied. to this model as 
to Model 1. It would have tobe possible to terminate safeguards 
after baekfilling the tunnel, or the final geologieal repository 
itself would have to be regarded as a suffieiently reliable 
barrier. 
Aeeess of the inspeetor to strategie points underground would 
admittedly eonsiderably hinder a diversion in the final geo-
logieal repository or out of the repository, however, it 
eannot be ruled out with suffieient reliability. 
The essential elements of Model 2 are: 
material balanee areas 
- the faeility forms one material balanee area 
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strategic points being key measurement points 
- for determining the flow of nuclear material 
- KMP - entry, intake 
- KMP 2 - exemption from compulsory registration 
if safeguards termination envisaged on the part 
of the IAEA 
- for taking the physical inventory 
- KMP A - buffer store 
- KMP B - tunnels not yet backfilled, underground 
- KMP C- backfilled tunnels, underground 
records system 
- recording inventory changes 
- entry, intake at the time of entry 
- exemption from compulsory registration at closure 
of the geological repository, if termination of 
safeguards possible 
- operating records contain the following data 
- place and time of emplacement for each FDP 
- type, place and time of backfilling/sealing measures 
installations and installed equipment 
- seals on FDP 
- optical surveillance of FDP unloading above ground 
- optical surveillance/detectors at the entrances to 
the two shafts 
- optical surveillance of FDP unloading below ground 
(pit bottom - access gallery, access gallery - emplacement 
connection drift and entrance to the emplacement tunnel) 
- recording instruments I tachograph for the hoisting 
engine, plateau transporter (tractor) and emplacement 
machine (if available and necessary). 
4-30 
Strategie points for Containment and surveillance measures 
- ~DP unloading above ground 
- access Shaft 
- access Shaft 2 
- FDP unloading below ground (hoisting cage - access 
gallery and access gallery - emplacement connection drift) 
- entrance to emplacement tunnel 
taking the physical inventory 
- counting and identifying items at the key measurement 
points A and B, if not yet backfilled 
- integrity verification of the ends of the tunnels 
at key measurement point C by visual inspection; con-
~luding that the emplaced material must still be present. 
Safeguards applied: 
- pre-operational phase 
- design verification before startup (aboveground 
and underground) 
- oparational phase 
- design reverification after driving a new tunnel 
- identity and integrity verification of the final 
disposal packages by the inspector at entry (re-
ception control) 
- camera monitaring at the unloading facility above 
ground to prevent undselared unloading processes 
(replacement by a dummy) 
-CIS measures (camera, detectors) at the strategic 
points at the two shafts to prevent undselared 
material flow (backflow) 
- camera monitaring at the underground unloading 
points (from the hoisting cage on rails along 
the access gallery; from the plateau transporter 
on an emplacement machine without rails) to prevent 
replacement by a dummy 
- camera monitaring at the entrance to the emplacement 
tunnel to observe the emplacement process and 
prevent recovery until the tunnel has been sealed 
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recording the duration and speed of run in the 
case of the hoisting engine, plateau transporter 
(tractor) and emplacement machine as back-up 
measures for camera surveillance (if available 
and necessary) 
- inspector access to the strategic points underground 
either on a random basis or at any time. 
- Post-aperational phase 
- termination of safeguards after backfilling all 
shafts, decommission of the aboveground facilities 
as well as demonstration of non-recoverability 
(if recognized as impossible by means of mining 
technology) 
- routine examination of the site by visual inspection 
for safeguarding against activities which could 
indicate a reopening of the repository or other 
measures for recovering the material. 
In the case of Model 2, the diversion possibility also remains 
as a residual risk e.g. of opening clandestine access to already 
backfilled tunnels or fields of the fuel element emplacement 
section from the waste emplacement area, diverting final disposal 
packages with a supplementary emplacement machine from the FE 
disposal area into the waste disposal area and either disguising 
them here as MAW, required for rework, for transport above ground, 
or further processing them in the waste section. Abuse of the 
waste disposal area for a diversion from the FE disposal area 
can be made considerably more difficult by permitting IAEA 
inspectors unhindered access to all facilities in the geological 
repository. This possibility is envisaged in Model 3. 
4.2.4.3 Access Model 3 
Model 3 comprises Model 2 and moreover also all underground 
facilities and installations as supplementary strategic points: 
Strategie points for containment and surveillance measures 
- all facilities and installations of the final geological 
repository, above and below ground, including the 
waste disposal area. 
Safeguards applied (in addition to Model 2): 
operational phase 
- inspector access to all underground facilities 
(including the waste disposal area) on a random 
basis or 
- unrestricted inspector access to all underground 
facilities (including waste disposal area). 
4.3 Safeguards Elements 
4.3.1 Requirements 
The final repository is a purely conventionally equipped disposal 
facility. Only conventional hoisting and transport installations 
are envisaged. All the nuclear material is contained in canisters 
in such a manner as to be handled conventionally, Facilities 
for handling, investigating or otherwise treating open irradiated 
material, such as e.g. hot cells, radiochemistry etc., are 
not envisaged, It is not technically possible to verify the 
contents of the FDP's in the final repository since all necessary 
preconditions are lacking, Reception eontrol procedures of the 
package consist of recording, measufing the dose rate and 
a wipe test. All verifications over and above this with respect 
to form, quantity and composition of the nuclear material 
in the FDP, required on the basis of national and international 
safeguards regulations, must therefore be implemented before 
the FDP's are delivered to the final repository, i,e, in 
the conditioning facility. 
A decisive element in designing the safeguards system is the 
fact that the FDP's neither change their form nor their com-
position nor their external appearance in the final repository. 
Solely changes in location of the nuclear material are imple-
mented, in accordance with the precisely predetermined sequence 
model. The objective of safeguards is thus to ensure that 
the declared FDP is transported in the declared form {i,e, 
unaffected integrity) to the declared location and then remains 
there. 
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The following requirements are the starting point for the 
safeguards system: 
1. The period between the last verification of an FDP in 
the condiiioning facility and emplacement of this FDP 
in the final geological repository is less than the 
detection time required for the material so that an 
intermediate inventory verification is not required 
from the safeguards aspect. 
2. A positive verification of the identity of the FDP and 
the integrity of its external cladding, i.e, the lost 
shielding, is a sufficient condition for the verification 
of the nuclear material contained in the FDP. 
3. Continuous monitaring of the flow of packages can be 
dispensed with as long as the FDP remains accessible 
for this verification, or the inspector has access to 
the individual FDP's. 
4. If the FDP itself is no longer accessible, or it is 
in areas to which the inspector does not have access, 
and verification by examining the identity and integrity 
is thus not possible, then Safeguarding potential diversion 
paths is sufficient in order to be able to make a statement 
about the inventory of enclosed nuclear material. 
Requirement 1 implies that the time required for transporting 
the FDP from the conditioning facility to the final repository 
and for emplacing the FDP is less than the detection period 
required for diverting the FDP material. No further verifications 
are thus required for reasons of timeliness of detection 
between the time of leaving the conditioning facility and 
the emplacement process. Transport monitaring possibly required 
for reasons of physical protection is not included in the 
safeguards concept. 
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Requirement 2 implies that all nuclear material data with 
respect to type, quantity, composition etc. required for 
the safeguards system have already been determined before 
transportation to the final repository. Verification of the 
nuclear material in the final repository is restricted to 
establishing that these previously determined data are still 
valid since there are no indications for a presumption to 
the contrary. These data are merely carried forward in the 
accountancy of the final repository. 
According to Requirement 2, examination of the identity and 
integrity is sufficient to verify the nuclear material as 
far as safeguards are concerned. In the case of a positive 
result, the safeguar~s authority can conclude that no changes 
have arisen since the last verification of the material and 
thus that the data from the last verification are still valid. 
The continuity of knowledge for the period between these 
verifications is thus established for the safeguards authority. 
As lang as Requirement 3 is still valid there is no need 
for permanent safeguards on the flow of nuclear material 
to maintain the continuity of the safeguards authority's 
knowledge. 
The principle of the safeguards system is based on the exami-
nation of the accounting data and independent verification 
of the material. At no time is a direct independent verification 
possible in the final repository. As lang as the FDP's are 
still accessible an indirect verification can be effected 
in accordance with Requirement 2. However, as soon as the 
FDP's have been emplaced and the tunnel sections backfilled 
a verification in this form can no langer be implemented 
either. The outermost covering then consists of the packing 
material, the surrounding salt rocks and the ends of the 
tunnel. Verification can now only be implemented indirectly 
in that the integrity of this covering is verified (Requirement 4). 
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The problern is how can the integrity of a backfi~led or tamped 
tunnel, and in the post-aperational phase the integrity of 
the whole repository, be rendered verifiable for the safeguards 
authority. The safeguards system requires that the safeguards 
authority can make a statement with a quantifiable error 
tolerance about the quantity of nuclear material present. 
The safeguards authority can only make this statement by 
establishing the quantities of material which have been emplaced 
and subsequently determining the probability with which the 
quantities of material could be diverted without their knowledge 
or subjected to an unforeseen application. This means on 
the one hand that the safeguards authority must monitor the 
potential diversion paths known to them for material backflows 
and on the other hand make sure that there are no further 
undisclosed accesses to the emplaced material, or that the 
material is not being used for an undeclared purpose. 
Requirement 4 implies that Safeguarding the potential diversion 
paths the requirements have basically been fulfilled for the 
safeguards authority to be able to make the statement necessary 
for the safeguards system concerning the inventory of enclosed 
nuclear material. This is basically a question of quantifying 
the completeness and effectiveness of these measures in the 
safeguards sense. 
4.3.2 Material Accountancy 
Material accountancy is pure item accountancy. Each FDP is 
both item and batch. The shipper data from the 
conditioning facility are taken over unaltered as data on 
the quantity and composition of material, Since measurements 
cannot be made in the case of the final disposal packages, 
these data are not subject to any further alterations. Apart 
from the possibility of exempting nuclear material from safe-
guards and apart from material being retransported for rework 
requirements, the inventory changes to be recorded only consist 
of additions, The emplacement process is documented by Operating 
records. 
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The final repository does not display any special features with 
respect to material accountancy. Only the form and content 
of the operating records documenting the emplacement process 
are to be coordinated with the safeguards authority. 
4.3.3 Containment and Surveillance Measures 
4.3.3.1 Seal Devices 
The emplacement process is envisaged as a continuous process. 
As a rule, the incoming FDP's are transported below ground 
without delay. If a continuous emplacement process is also 
to be ensured in applying safeguards measures then this requires 
that the ~dentity and integrity of the FDP's be verifiable 
in situ without expending much time. This requirement must 
be considered in designing the outermost shell of the FDP, 
the lost shielding. 
Design criteria for the lost shielding are e,g,: 
homogeneaus container with only one opening if possible, 
- container made of one material so that it is not possible 
to open a~d resear the containment without leaving 
visible traces, 
- container without a protective coating of paint so 
that it is possible to directly verify the container 
walls. 
Appropriate devices should be envisaged on the container 
so that the body and lid can be sealed together. Protective 
devices agpinst mechanical stress during transport should 
be envisaged for the seal mechanism. 
In any case the seal should be designed in a redundant manner 
since otherwise in case of doubt about the identity or integrity 
of the seal it would be necessary to retransport the package 
to the conditioning facility and open the FDP to reverify 
the material content. This redundant seal measure should be 
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very robust with respect to all conceivable interferences. 
For this purpose it would be conceivable to distribute weldment 
sections along the perimeter across the lid seam of the con~· 
tainer. Whereas for the primary seal, the major design criterion 
is the possibility of verification in situ, this criterion 
must possibly take second place to robustness in the back-up 
measure. If back-up sealing requires more time for verification 
then this must be considered in designing the capacity of 
the aboveground buffer store. 
Two types of seals, paper and metal, are currently in use at 
the IAEA. The paper seals consist of gummed seal paper and 
have slits making it more difficult and time-consuming to 
peel off and reapply the seal without destroying it. They 
are designed for short-term use. Disadvantages are, however, 
that they are difficult to handle and are especially easily 
damaged during transportation of the sealed packages. Appli-
cation in the final repository is possible for short-term tasks. 
Metal seals (type E) consist of two metallic semi-shells 
which lock tagether under pressure in such a way that they 
are practically impossible to open without destroying the 
seal. A special seal wire is passed through two holes in 
one semi-shell and knotted inside the shell. By placing the 
second semi-shell in position the knot becomes inaccessible 
and the seal is thus closed. This metal seal has the advantage 
of being easy to handle but it can only be verified in the 
IAEA laboratory. Verification of the seal is thus generally 
delayed by several weeks. The metal seal can possibly be 
used as a back-up seal for the FDP's. 
Seal verifiable in situ are not yet part of the standard 
CIS measures. However, some devices are at an advanced stage 
-of development or testing so that their availability can 
be expected in a foreseeable period, such as e.g.: 
- fiber optic seal 
- electronic seal 
- weldment seal. 
In the case of the fiber-optic seals 1 the ends of a fiber-optic 
loop are joined at right angles or crossed over and enclosed 
by a casing. The arrangement of the individual fibers shows 
an unambiguous arrangement picture which can be photographed 
through a microscope and compared w~th earlier pictures or 
evaluated by an electronic interrogation unit. 
In the case of the electronic seal, a fiber-öptic loop is 
monitared with the aid of statistically· generated light pulses 
and an opening of the fiber-optic loop is recorded at the 
VACOSS instruments specifying date and time, The seal is 
interrogated via an adapter box or possibly via a remote 
interrogation installation. The electronic seals are reusable. 
In the case of weldments, there are differentiating features 
suitable for identity verification both in the melt configuration 
as well as in the side notch line of the weld. The weld can 
be verified in two different ways: 
by producing and measuring an impression (microscope), 
- photographically. 
However, the applicability of weldment seals still has to be 
practically tested. 
4.3,3.2 Optical Sensors 
Optical sensors are required to safeguard potential diversion 
paths for undeclared backflows of material. The following 
features should be observed: 
- Illumination 
An emergency power supply is not. envisaged for the under-
ground facilities. An independent emergency power 
supply must therefore be installed for the safeguards 
instrumentation. 
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In order to possibly be able to dispense with emergency 
illumination it should be considered whether low-light 
level or infrared cameras can be used, 
- Recording Intervals 
In order to be able to recognize a detection with 
single-frame operation, the image frequency would 
have to be greater than the minimum time required 
to pass through the camera's field of vision. Since 
this would have to be assumed in the range of a few 
minutes, a relatively high picture frequency would 
thus be required and a high recording capacity. The 
problern moreover results with this procedure that 
if only one, or very few, pictures are available to 
evaluate a process, then the process can often not 
be unambiguously interpreted. 
Since activities generally only occur sporadically in the 
visual range of the camera and are of relatively short duration 
(transport processes), the installation of motion detectors 
seems to be most appropriate. These motion detectors are 
electronic cameras which only take pictures if the content 
of the field of view changes. Since the transportation of 
an FDP will at any rate cause a large change in the image 
due to its dimensions, this should probably ensure the triggering 
of a visual record by FDP transports. 
A conceivable alternative would be permanent monitaring with 
TV cameras and monitors in a safeguards control room. This 
would however be considerably more expensive since the control 
room would require a permanent inspector (24 hrs.). 
Film cameras do not seem suitable for use in the geological 
repository since image recording triggered by movement is 
not possible here. The high image frequency required for 
single-frame processes would thus involve disproportionally 
great expenditure for image evaluation. 
Two optical safeguards systems are currently employed by 
the IAEA, twin Minolta cameras and psychotronic TV cameras. 
The twin Minolta units consist of two identical eine cameras 
accommodated in a casing taking single-frame pictures at 
an adjustable interval. These units are frequently used to 
safeguard wet storage pools in LWR facilities, 
The psychotronic TV cameras are only used in cases of special 
application since they display great reliability problems. 
However, a number of advanced TV camera safeguards systems 
are currently being developed or are at the trial stage so 
that it can also basically be assumed here that suitable 
instrumentswill be available in the foreseeable future. 
4.4 Diversion Analysis 
4 . 4 . 1 . Operational Phase 
4.4.1.1 Model 1 (no inspector access to the underground 
facilities) 
The simplest opportunity for a diversion exists on the transport 
path from the conditioning facility to the final repository. 
However, it would also be easy to detect due to the measures 
discussed. If counting, identity and integrity verification 
are to be regarded as very reliable measures, then a diversion 
after this verification would have a higher probability of 
remaining undetected. The safeguards authority's strategy 
must be to implement these measures at the last possible 
moment in order to make a clandestine diversion more difficult 
for the operator. If the inspector has access under ground 
than he can undertake verification there, Verifications above 
ground serve to prevent any FDP's whose identity or integrity 
cannot be established beyond doubt from being transported 
under ground.at all. 
4-41 
It must be possible to undertake reliable identity and integrity 
verifications indicating tamper attempts. Otherwise the operator 
would have the opportunity of replacing the FDP's by dummies 
during transportation and if this was noticed by the inspector 
of declaring this as a failure of the seal. Since transportation 
back to the conditioning facility is necessary for verification, 
the operator could then replace the dummy by the original 
FDP during transport and thus conceal his diversion attempt. 
Diversion possibilities above ground before transporting the 
FDP's into the final repository consist in the following 
activities 
- the diversion of FDP's without their replacement 
- replacing FDP's by dummies (= FDP without nuclear 
material) 
clandestine opening of FDP's, removal of nuclear material. 
These possibilities of diversion can be detected by: 
- counting the FDP's 
- identity verification of the FDP's and 
- integrity verification of the containers (lost shielding). 
These verifications assume that the lost shielding of the canisters 
is constructed in such a way that any darnage to the integrity 
becomes apparent by inspection. It should be possible to 
achieve this objective with the envisaged cast container. 
The container is designed to have two openings each safeguarded 
by a seal. If the container is opened at any other place then 
it will have to be welded tagether which would be detected 
in an optical inspection of the container walls. 
If the requirements of 
- tamper-resistant seals verifiable in situ for the 
lid and bottom openings of the container and 
- unambiguous integrity verification of the container 
walls by an optical inspection (it may also be 
4-42 
necessary to seal the protective neutron covering 
of the lost shielding) 
for the FDP's could be fulfilled then diversion above ground 
can be ruled out with great reliability, The FDP's are counted 
and verified before being transported to the shaft. During 
these safeguards the 
- missing FDP's 
- dummies and 
- clandestinely opened FDP's 
would have to become apparent. The FDP's remain under optical 
surveillance (human oder camera surveillance) unti1 they are 
transported under ground, 
The -diversion possibilities for FDP's transported under ground 
depend very largely upon the technical expenditure a potential 
divertor is prepared to invest in order to execute the diversion. 
Since there is no hat cell facility under ground which would 
be required to disassemble the FDP's and repack the nuclear 
material, in the case of a supposed diversion the nuclear 
material can only be transported above ground in units with 
at least the dimensions·of an FDP, If the hoisting equipment 
of the shafts were safeguarded by optical instruments the trans-
portation above ground of objects with these dimensions could 
be detected in any case, 
4.4.1.2 Model 2 (Limited Inspector Access to the Underground 
Facilities) 
Whereas in Model 1 the inspector does not have any opportunity 
of verifying the flow of final disposal packages under ground, 
strategic points are established in Model 2 in order to safeguard 
the flow of packages up to the emplacement location. Since under-
ground transport extends for several kilometers continuous mon-
itoring entails a good deal of expenditure, These points are 
safeguarded at which the packages are reloaded from one means 
of transport to another since the possibility of substituting 
dummies for the FDP's would be most easily achieved here. These 
points are ( cf. Fig. 4-2) 
- SP-A 
- SP-B 
- SP-C 
4-43 
strategic point pit bottarn at Shaft 2 (not 
in the Figure) 
junction of access gallery - emplacement connection 
drift 
junction of emplacement connection drift -
emplacement tunnel. 
A reverification of the FDP's at the emplacement location could 
be regarded as an alternative or a supplementary m~asure. This 
verification can either be undertaken personally, i.e. by 
the inspector, or by a tamper-resistant recording CIS instru-
mentation. 
The credibility of the safeguards concept can be significantly 
increased by underground optical safeguards instrumentation. 
These devices ensure that the existing transport paths cannot 
be used for a diversion. The cameras at points B are especially 
significant. They safeguard that the in-coming final disposal 
packages are actually reloaded onto the emplacement machine 
and transported to the emplacement connection drift. Furthermore, 
this camera can also monitor the sealing of the emplacement 
fields already backfilled. The cameras at points C in the 
emplacement connection drift ensure that no connection is 
made from the emplacement connection drift to the exploratory 
level above it into which the FDP's could then be brought, 
but rather that they are actually transported into the emplace-
ment tunnels. Surveillance of the emplacement tunnel itself 
seems to be less meaningful, firstly since at least two emplace-
ment tunnels are always in operation and secondly since a 
frequent repositioning of the camera would be necessary. 
Diversion from the emplacement tunnel without retransportation 
into the emplacement connection drift seems rather implausible 
since there is no connection from the emplacement tunnels 
to the exploratory floor. 
In this safeguards mactel it can be credibly demonstrated 
that the FDP's are actually transported to the emplacement 
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location, the emplacement tunnels are backfilled according 
to regulations and sealed and that the sealing of the tunnels 
and fields is not opened again. This requires a relocation 
of the monitaring cameras, at the latest ~hen emplacement 
operation is taken up in a new field. This relocation makes 
it necessary to reverify the instrumentation, 
4.4.1 .3 Model 3 (Unrestricted Inspector Access to All Underground 
Facilities) 
Even if the inspector is granted limited access to strategic 
underground points, safeguards opportunities end when the FDP 
has been emplaced or the tunnel tamped, Opening up the dam 
again would probably be the easiest, but not the only, possi-
bility for the operator to implement a diversion. It would 
be possible for him to open up additional access to the material 
with the equipment available below ground and thus to by-pass 
the dam sealing the tunnels. 
If one does not rule out the possibility of the presence of an 
underground hot cell facility then the nuclear material from 
the FDP's could theoretically be repacked into any number 
of small innocent-looking containers and could be brought 
above ground e.g. disguised in the debris. The material could 
perhaps even be processed below ground so that only the strategic 
material itself without ballast need be brought above ground. 
The task of checking all transports of material and debris 
going above ground for concealed nuclear material must in the 
authors' opinion be regarded as unimplementable. If this 
diversion opportunity is to be regarded as realistic and thus 
to be included as a diversion strategy then appropriate safe-
guards should rather be applied in examining the facility 
design. A permanent verification of the facility design is 
from the present perspective the most comprehensive possi-
bility of excluding diversions under ground. However, this 
requires that the inspectors have access to all underground 
facilities at all times. Apart from the FDP storage area, this 
also includes the infrastructure section (workshop, hopper, 
whole exploratory floor etc,) and the waste package storage 
area. The inspector must satisfy hirnself that these facilities 
are being used in accordance with regulations and not mis-
appropriated for a diversion, and that there are apparently 
no further undeclared facilities. 
4.4.2 Post-Operational Phase 
The essential aspect of safeguards in the post-aperational 
phase is firstly that the authority satisfies itself that 
the repository has been sealed according to regulations. 
This also means that the post-aperational phase only begins 
when both FDP emplacement as well as waste package emplacement 
has been completed, A diversion in the post-aperational phase 
could be effected by: 
1. sinking a purpose-built shaft directly to the 
enclosed FDP's with the aim of bringing individual 
or several FDP's above ground, or 
2. by clandestinely opening new access to the emplaced 
material from a considerable distance. 
The diversion possibility mentioned in 1 must be classified 
as at least technically very difficult. Suggested safeguards 
would be to monitor the site by inspections. 
The second possibility of uneavering new access from a con-
siderable distance would be by far the most expens~ve and 
time-consuming diversion possibility. It would involve new 
shafts being driven. The extent to which this could be imple-
mented in practice at all would still have to be examined. 
4.4.3 Evaluation of Effectiveness 
Model 1 proceeds from the following assumptions which are 
accepted as given facts for the safeguards model and not 
verified further: 
4-47 
- There are no hot cell facilities below ground. 
- There is no other connection from the underground 
facilities to the surface except via the safeguarded 
shafts. 
Misappropriation of nuclear material is ruled out 
within the Underground facilities (internal diversion) 
since EURATOM has access. 
In a purely technical consideration, the weakness of this 
safeguards model is quite clearly to be found in the fact 
that the complex "clandestine facilities" is by definition 
not included. It must be remernbered that emplacement operation 
only represents a small fraction of the total handling activities 
in the final repository, New fields are continually being 
opened up parallel to emplacement both in the FDP storage 
area as well as in the waste package area. This necessarily 
involves extensive debris and material transports. The ·principle 
of transparency would not be applicable here either since 
the un~erground activities are not transpar~nt for the inspector 
who can only safeguard at the surface. Design verification 
before beginning emplacement operation also only provides 
limited evidence since the extension of the Underground facili-
ties is permanently modified, 
However, in an overall evaluation of this safeguards model 
this technical deficit must be seen in relation to other 
parameters. These other parameters are e.g. quantity, re-
coverability and strategic value of the emplaced material. 
The attractiveness of this material for a potential divertor 
must be compared with the technical and organizational effort 
required to implement a clandestine diversion. The technical 
feasibility of a diversion with the aid of clandestine under-
ground facilities can undoubtedly not be basically ruled 
out. The chances of beingable to successfully implement 
a clandestine diversion in this way must, however, be regarded 
as extremely remote, especially with respect to the supranational 
character of national safeguards (EURATOM). 
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In comparison to Model 1, Model 2 does not provide any im-
provements in principle, but rather, even if to a considerable 
extent, only improvements in degree. The existence of clandestine 
facilities via which a diversion could take place cannot be 
reliably ruled out in this case either. In this model diversion 
would be possible by opening up access to the already emplaced 
FDP's from the workshop area or the waste store. 
In Model 3 the inspector is thus practically granted the pos-
sibility ·of design reverification at all times. In this case 
the danger of detection of undeclared facilities is considerably 
increased for a potential divertor but nevertheless this 
possibility is still not reliably ruled out. 
The technical feasibility of a diversion has been considered 
in safeguards models to date. In any case, underground facilities 
would .be required for a diversion in which the FDP's could 
be disassembled and the nuclear material repacked in unsuspicious 
packages which could then be brought to the surface disguised 
in the debris or in items of equipment. The establishment 
of an underground reprocessing facility would involve con-
siderably more expenditure and an even greater risk of detection. 
As far as can be foreseen to date there are no technical 
safeguards which can rule out these diversion possibilities 
in principle, These diversion possibilities have to be classified 
as technically feasible, even if requiring immense expenditure. 
The diversion seenarios discussed for the post-aperational 
phase would in principle also be applicable in the operational 
phase. However, they involve greater expenditure and a higher 
detection risk. 
In order to sink a purpose-built borehole, the minimum time 
would first have to be determined required to sink the borehole, 
transport the FDP(s) to the surface and cover the traces. These 
time requirements determine the inspection interval for safeguards. 
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Site inspections are envisaged as safeguards, Since sinking an 
appropriate borehole would require extensive technical prep-
arations it is practically certain that these signs would 
be recognized during a site inspection. 
The clandestine sinking of new shafts to recover the emplaced 
material would probably require even more effort. A further 
difficulty is encountered in determining the area to be subjected 
to safeguards. If this diversion possibility is to be considered 
as realistic so that appropriate safeguards precautions would 
have to be taken then site inspections would also probably 
be a suitable measure in this case. 
In all models the question or how the effectiveness of Con-
tainment safeguards in the operational phase or monitaring 
the site in the post operational phase can be quantified 
emerges as the principal difficulty. This problern cannot be 
solved by an exclusively technical approach since in the 
final repository every safeguards measure can in principle 
be evaded by increasing the diversion efforts. No safeguards 
measure can thus be classified as reliable from a technical 
aspect. 
4.5 Evaluation of the Effectiveness and Analysis of the 
Vulnerability of the Safeguards System 
4.5.1 Phase 1 - Aboveground Transport 
This phase begins as the FDP's leave the conditioning plant 
and terminates when these FDP's are transported via the shaft 
in the final repository. It therefore comprises the whole 
time the FDP's spend above ground. Possible diversion strategies 
during the aboveground. transport phase of the FDP's are: 
- diversion of the FDP without replacement 
- replacing the FDP by a dummy and 
- clandestine opening of the FDP and removal of nuclear 
material. 
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The envisaged safeguards (see Table: 4-3) for this phase 
are identical for all three safeguards models, They consist 
of counting the FDP's, verifying the identity and integrity. 
The identity is verified on the basis of tamper-proof differ-
entiation features on the outermost cladding of the FDP. 
This task is taken over by the sealing device with which 
the body, lid and bottarn of the lost shielding are sealed 
together. So that the seal can be verified immediately before 
transporting the FDP under ground it must be verifiable on 
site by inspection or interrogation without time-consuming 
evaluation processes. This task can for example be fulfilled 
by an electronic seal. 
All FDP's leaving the conditioning plant must pass through 
this verification procedure within a certain time limit. 
This ensures the completeness of safeguards in the transport 
phase at the surface. After verifying the seals, the FDP's 
are transported into the hoisting cage without further delay. 
Whether further safeguards against a potential exchange of 
the FDP's during this period will have to be undertaken depends 
on the concrete structural features of the surface facilities, 
these not being currently known. If e.g. it cannot be reliably 
ruled out that the FDP's could be transported back to the 
unloading facility without the inspector's knowledge and 
there replaced by dummies, then this period can be bridged 
by labelling the FDP's with paper seals. 
The envisaged safeguards (identity and integrity verification) 
should not raise any considerable problems with respect to 
their reliability and unambiguity since they can both be 
repeated as often as required. Only the seal could possibly 
be damaged during transport procedures. Diversified redundancy 
is envisaged as a supplementary procedure, i,e, for example 
a robust mechanical seal in parallel to an electronic seal. 
If in exceptional cases it is no langer possible to clearly 
identify the FDP's, e.g. due to transport darnage to the seal, 
then at this phase the possibility still remains of bringing 
these FDP's back to the conditioning plant and measuring 
them again. Retransport after transportation accidents would 
probably be necessary in any case. 
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If the completeness of the safeguards can be taken as given 
then the following parameters remain which could impair effec-
tiveness, namely tamper-resistance and the possibility of 
outwitting the safeguards. These parameters can, however, 
be influenced by the design of the outermost cladding of 
the FDP's and by the choice of seal(s). No significant diffi-
culties are envisaged on the basis of the current state of 
the art. Sufficient safeguards can thus be ensured, in the 
author's opinion, during the phase of transporting the FDP's 
above ground. 
4.5.2 Phase 2 - Transport Under Ground 
This phase begins with the transportation of the FDP's through 
the shaft and finishes when the tunnel section already occupied 
by FDP's are filled in. It thus comprises the whole period 
when the FDP is accessible for direct monitaring or verification 
of the identity or integrity of its cladding under ground. 
Two steps are required to divert nuclear material during this 
phase. First of all, the FDP's would have to be withdrawn 
from the normal operational sequence, i.e. smuggled out of 
the emplacement process and thus out of the reach of further 
safeguards. This can in principle be achieved with the same 
diversion strategies as during the aboveground transportation 
phase (see Table 4-4). 
The second step consists of subjecting the clandestinely 
removed FDP's to an undeclared application (see Table 4-5) 
This means that the FDP's must be further processed in a 
suitable facility. The decisive criterion for safeguards 
is whether the operator clandestinely modifies the plant 
design so that the FDP's can be transported to the further 
processing facility without being noticed or whether he under-
takes this diversion via the existing transport paths. In the 
case of a diversion without modifying the plant design, the 
FDP's will have to be retransported via Shaft or Shaft 2. 
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If one assumes that it is also possible to modify the facility 
design in order to implement a diversion tben three alternatives 
would theoretically result: 
1. The establishment of a clandestin~ hot cell facility 
under ground to disassemble the FDP's and repack 
the nuclear material into small, innocent-looking 
containers which can then be brought to the surface 
unnoticed in the material or debris transports. 
2. Construction of a Clandestine underground facility 
to separate the strategic material from the FDP's. 
3. Creation of an additional clandestine connection 
to the surface via which whole FDP's or repacked 
smaller quantities of material can be transported 
unnoticed, 
4.5.2.1 Model 
In Safeguards Model 1 it is assumed that clandestine design 
modifications can be ruled out. Since in this model the inspector 
has no underground access, no safeguards can be applied Under-
ground either. The operator could thus implement the first 
step in a diversion, i.e. clandestinely removing the FDP's 
from the normal emplacement process, without being noticed. 
However, in order to complete the diversion the FDP's would 
have to be retransported to the surface via either Shaft 1 
or 2. Diversion strategies and safeguards are compiled in 
Tables 4-4 and 4-5. Optical monitaring of the transport facili-
ties is envisaged as a safeguard against retransport. Unloading 
objects from the transport facilities with at least the dimen-
sions of an FDP would be the anomaly to be observed indicating 
a diversion. However, for Shaft 2 it must be ensured that 
- the retransportation of objects of these dimensions 
actually means an anomaly, i.e. does not occur in 
the normal operating sequence and 
- this event can be optically unambiguously identified, 
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Apart from the dimensions, the weight of the object can also 
indicate an anomaly since in normal operation no retransportation 
is to be expected in the range of more than 25 t (based on the 
removal of debris or other normal operational transports to 
the surface). However, the direction and load of the hoisting 
equipment must be recorded in a tamper-proof manner which could 
be achieved via the consumption of electricity of the winding 
engine. 
This measure is not required for Shaft 1 since an FDP does not 
geometrically fit into the hoisting cage. Neither is there any 
device at Shaft 1 to balance the elongation of the rope of 
several meters /4-4/ which would occur if an FDP were attached 
to the hoisting cage. It can be assumed that this type of ex-
tensive action would be reliably optically detected by the 
safeguards devices. 
In order to be able to make concrete statements about the 
reliability and possibilities of outwitting the safeguards, 
concrete data about the structural form of the transport 
facilities and buildings are necessary in order to then be 
able to determine e.g. where the camera should be installed, 
the possibility of unintentionally impairing or blocking the 
field of vision, possibilities of deception by dazzling or 
turning off the illumination etc. 
However, in the authors' opinion this safeguards task should 
be categorized as capable of being satisfactorily solved. 
Roughly comparable tasks such as fuel element handling in 
LWR wet storage pools have already been satisfactorily solved 
for years in common practice by optical safeguarding. Providing 
that there is no need to consider an undeclared modification 
to the facility design, effective Safeguarding should be 
realizable with Model 1 in this phase. If this presumption 
cannot be made then Model 1 does not provide complete Safe-
guarding of all diversion possibilities and thus would be 
unacceptable to the safeguards authorities. 
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4.5.2.2 Model 2 
In Model 2 the inspeetor has aeeess to strategie points below 
ground and is thus also in a position to monitor the nuelear 
material flow under ground, Over and above Model 1, Model 2 
attempts to deteet the first step in a diversion, namely 
the elandestine removal of FDP's from the normal operational 
sequenee. 
In the first plaee, optieal monitaring of the reloading proeess 
is envisaged at all points where the eontinuous transport is 
interrupted due to reloading to a different means of transport, 
sinee at these points it would be easiest to divert the FDP 
without replaeement or to substitute a dummy. ihe first of 
these points (strategie point A) is when unloading the plateau 
transporter from the hoisting eage at the filling station 
of Shaft 2. Safeguards will ensure that the FDP transported 
under ground is also aetually unloaded into the emplaeement 
floor. The seeond safeguards point (strategie point B) is 
the reloading faeility from the aecess gallery to the em-
plaeement eonneetion drift. This eamera observes the reloading 
of the FDP's from the plateau transporter to the emplaeement 
maehine. Further safeguards deviees are envisaged in the emplaee-
ment eonneetion drift itself (strategie point C}, It ean thus 
be observed whether the FDP's are transported to the envisaged 
emplaeement gallery by the emplaeement maehine and also remain 
there. See Fig. 4-2 for the position of strategie points Band C. 
Due to the long Underground transportation paths (several kilo-
meters), uninterrupted transportmonitaring would be unjusti-
fiably expensive. Sinee transportation only oeeurs sporadieally 
and the FDP's ean only be within the visual range of the indi-
vidual eameras for a very short period, these safeguards 
deviees shuuld be equipped with motion deteetors. All movements 
within the visual range of the eamera ean thus be eompletely 
reeorded without having to envisage unneeessary frame storage 
eapaeity, and thus also frame verifieatio0 expenditure, for 
the periods with no movement. If the date and time of the event 
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are recorded with the movement then delays in transportation 
which would be required to manipulate the FDP's or replace 
them in the zones not directly safeguarded could be detected. 
This thus provides a high degree of reliability to ensure that 
the FDP's transported below ground are brought into the envisaged 
emplacement tunnels without manipulation. 
As a supplementary or alternative measure a reverification of 
the FDP's deposited in the emplacement tunnel can be undertaken 
by the inspector. The cameras at the strategic points B and C 
furthermors ensure that the FDP's deposited in the emplacement 
tunnel are not subsequently removed again. This process would 
be recorded by the cameras. A technical problern still to be 
studied in detail is the tamper-proof transmission of the 
frames to a safeguards control room which could most appropri-
ately be situated above ground. 
Over and above the possibilities of Model 1, Model 2 can thus 
ensure that the envisaged oparational sequence is observed 
and no FDP's are clandestinely removed. The primary measure 
is optical safeguards at the strategic points A, B and C. 
FDP's deposited in the emplacement tunnel can be reverified 
by the inspector as a substitute measure in case of camera 
failure and on a random basis to reduce the residual risk 
of manipulating FDP's in the unsafeguarded intermediate areas. 
This should not cause delays in the oparational sequence 
since there is usually a shift lass by breaks between emplacement 
and backfilling. In this phase Model 2 should thus provide 
sufficient reliability that the first step in a diversion, 
clandestinely removing FDP's from the normal operating sequence, 
can be detected. 
With respect to the secend step necessary for a successful 
diversion, namely clandestine transportation of the FDP's to 
the further processing facilities, Model 2 is identical to 
Model 1 (see also Tables 4-4 and 4-5). This safeguard thus 
represents an additional barrier for a potential divertor. 
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4.5.2.3 Model 3 
Model 3 goes beyond Model 2 by envisaging a further barrier for 
the second step required in a diversion, transporting the FDP 
to the further processing facilities after clandestine removal. 
This barrier consists in the right granted to the inspectors 
of reverifying the plant design at all times. This measure 
is admittedly primarily aimed at the next phase but it already 
functions as an additional safeguard in Phase 2. It must be 
noted that the safeguards measures for Step and Step 2 are 
not to be regarded alternatively but rather cumulatively (see 
Tables 4-4 and 4-5). In addition to the safeguards outlined 
in Step 1, the safeguards in Step 2 must also be overcome for 
a successful diversion. 
4.5.3 Phase 3 Storage During the Operational Period of the 
Final Repository 
This phase comprises the period after packing the individual 
tunnel sections occupied by FDP's until backfilling of the 
final repository shafts, that is to say the period in which 
mining activities are being implemented in the vicinity of 
the emplaced FDP's. 
Two steps are also required at this stage for a successful 
diversion. Since the FDP's are already stowed at this phase, 
the first step consists of making the FDP's accessible by 
uneavering an entrance. The second step is identical to the 
second step of the previous phase. Strategies and measures 
for this phase are shown for all three safeguards models 
in Tables 4-6 and 4-7. The uneavered FDP's must be transported 
to the processing facilities. However, in cantrast to the 
second phase, here in the third phase the first diversion 
step is already possible by an undeclared design modification. 
The uneavering of an entrance to the already backfilled or 
tamped emplacement tunnels is elther possible directly by re-
versing the emplacement process, i.e. openlng up tnese tuune~s 
s1..art...ing from tr1e avai.Lab.Le galleries, or indir·ectly by creat-ing 
new clandestine entrances rrom non-safeguarded areas, e.g. hopper, 
worKshop, exploratory level or even the waste storage area. 
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4.5.3.1 Model 1 
No new safeguards are envisaged in Model 1 for this phase. 
The same assumptions are valid as for the previous phase, i.e. 
that undeclared alterations to the facility design are ruled 
out. A diversion would be detected when retransporting the 
FDP via the shaft facilities, 
4.5.3.2 Model 2 
Model 2 already begins at the first step in a diversion, uneaver-
ing access to the FDP's. The range of effectiveness of the safe-
guards envisaged for Phase 2 is thus extended, The integrity 
of the tunnel closures and material recovery via this path 
can be monitared by the safeguards devices installed at the 
strategic points. Human verification of the tunnel closures 
by inspection is envisaged as a substitute measure in the case 
of camera failure and as supportive measure on a random basis, 
The diversion strategy for the first step required in a diversion 
can be detected by these safeguards. The uneavering of a clan-
destine access by by-passing the sealing devices cannot be 
detected by the safeguards envisaged in Model 2. Further 
safeguards are therefore discussed in Model 3 as a protection 
against this diversion strategy. 
4.5.3.3 Model 3 
Model 3 envisages permanent design reverification on a random 
basis for all Underground facilities. In order to conceal the 
uneavering of the FDP's a potential divertor will make this 
attempt from areas to which the inspector has no access. The 
most effective method of preventing this diversion strategy 
is thus to grant the inspectors unrestricted access to all 
facilities of the final geological repository. The inspectors 
must be able to satisfy themselves that there are no undeclared 
connections or facilities within the geological repository 
and that only emplacement activities are being implemented. 
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Permanent design reverification is a safeguard which applies 
to both the first and the second diversion step. In the authors' 
opinion it thus represents the most comprehensive safeguard 
against undeclared activities, nevertheless its effectiveness 
is difficult to quantify. 
4.5.4 Phase 4 - Post-Operational Phase of the Final Repository 
This phase begins with the closure of the geological repository 
by backfilling the shafts and lasts as long as the material is 
subject to safeguards. 
In this phase diversions can be implemented by: 
- sinking a purpose-built borehole or shaft to recover . 
one or a few FDP's or 
- reopening the repository, e.g. from a considerable 
distance, to divert larger quantities. 
Periodic inspections of the site to verify the integrity of 
the sealed geological repository are envisaged as safeguards. 
Drilling or sinking activities at the repository site could 
certainly be detected during the site inspections. The inspection 
intervals would therefore only have to be shorter than the 
necessary diversion period, i,e. the time required to sink 
the borehole or shaft, recover the FDP's and cover the traces. 
Whether reopening of the repository can be detected by site 
inspections depends on the distance from which it is reopened. 
Even if the effectiveness of this safeguard is difficult to 
quantify, site surveillance represents in the authors' opinion 
the most suitable safeguard for verifying the integrity of 
the shutdown repository. 
Phase 1 : Transport Above Ground 
. Conditioning Facility Exit -
Beginning of Shaft Transportation 
Diversion 
Strategy 
Diversion 
Model 1 
Safeguards Measures 
Model2 Model3 
..,-
of Whole FDP's I Counting the FDP's 
Repiacement by 
Dummy FDP 
Removal of NM 
from the FDP 
Seal Verification and FDP lntegrityVerification Upon Entering 
the MBA, Subsequent Optical Monitaring 
FDP lntegrityVerification Upon Entering the MBA, Subsequent 
Opticai Monitaring 
Effectiveness: Acceptable 
Table 4-3: Safeguards in Phase 1 - Transport Above Ground 
~ 
I 
Ul 
\0 
Phase 2: TransportUnderGround 
Beginning Shaft Transportalion - Backfilling on Site 
Diversion 
Strategy 
·1st Step: 
Clandestine Removal 
of FDP or NM from the 
Operational Sequence 
a) Diversion of 
Whole FDP's 
b) Replacement of 
FDP by Dummy 
c) Removal of NM 
from FDP 
... 
"' 
Safeguards Measures 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Counting the FDP' s 
Transport Monitaring with lV Camera 
at SP A, 8 and C 
and/or 
Random Seal Verification and FDP lntegrity 
Verification before Emplacement 
and 
Monitaring Potential Diversion Paths 
with lV Camera at SP's 8 and C 
Table 4-4: Safeguards in Phase 2 - 1st Diversion Step 
~ 
0 
()'I 
0 
Phase 2: Transport Under Ground 
Beginning of Shaft Transportalion - Backfilling on Site 
Diversion 
Strategy 
2nd Step: . 
a) Retransportation of FDP's 
to the Surface Disguised 
as Debris or Material 
b) Underground HC Facility 
Repacking the NM in Un- "' 
suspicious Containers~ 
Retranspörtation through 
Existing Faci!ity 
c) ·Underground RP Facility 
d) Clandestine Connection 
to the Surface ~ 
Safeguards Measures 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
1V Camera at 8oth Shafts, Tachograph 
and Load Recorder at the Winding Engine 
of Shaft 2 (25 t-Criterion) 
Permanent Design 
Reverification of all Un-
derground Facilities~ 
Verification for 
Undeclared Design 
and Activity 
Alterations 
Effectiveness: Acceptable since FDP's Still Accessible 
Table 4-5: Safeguards in Phase 2 - 2nd Diversion Step 
-"> 
I 
0\ 
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Phase 3: Storage During the Operational Period 
Backfilling the FDPs - Closing the Geological Repository 
{Backfilling the Shafts) 
Diversion 
Strategy 
1st Step: 
Access to Emplaced FDP's 
a) Uneavering and 
Diverting FDP' s via 
Existing Transport 
Paths 
b) Clandestine Entrance by 
By-Passing Tunnel 
Sealing via Exploratory 
Floor, Waste Store etc. 
Safeguards Measures 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
rlV Gameras at SP B (funnel Closure) 
and SP C (Emplacement Connection 
Drift) 
Random Verification of Tunnel Closures 
by I nspectors 
Permanent Design Reverifi-
cation of All Underground 
Faciiities 
Table 4-6: Safeguards in Phase3-1st Diversion Step 
.,1::-
i 
0\ 
1\) 
Phase 3: Storage During the Operational Period 
Pneumatically Packing the FDP's- Closing_the Geological 
Repository (Backfilling th~ Shafts) 
Diversion 
Strategy 
2nd Step: 
a) Retransportation of FDP' s 
to the Surface Disguised 
as Debris or Material 
b) Underground HC Facility ~ 
Repacking the NM into Unsuspici-
ous Containers, Retransportation 
through Existing Shaft Facility 
c) Underground RP Facility 
d) Clandestine Connection to the 
Surface 
...J 
~ 
Safeguards Measures 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
lV Camera at 8oth Shafts, Tacho-
graph and Load Recorder at the 
Winding Engine of Shaft 2 
Permanent 
Design 
Reverification of 
all Underground 
Facmties 
Verification for 
Undeclared 
Design 
Modifications 
Effectiveness: Unsolved Problems 
and Changes in 
Faciiity Operation 
Table 4-7: Safeguards in Phase 3 - 2nd Diversion Step 
-!> 
i 
0\ 
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Phase 4: Post-Operational Phase 
after Backfilling the Shafts 
Diversion 
Strategy 
Purpose-Built Borehole or 
Sinking a Shaft to Recover 
Individual FDP's 
Reopening the Repository from 
a Considerable Distance to 
Recover a Number of FDP's 
Safeguards Measures 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Optical Survemance of the Site 
by Periodic lnspections 
Effectiveness: Open Problems 
Tabie 4-8: Safeguards Ouring the Post-Operational Phase of the Final Repository 
_p. 
8 
()'\ 
_p. 
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4.6 Resulting Problem Definition 
The basic problern to be quantified in applying CIS measures is 
the probability with which a diversion can be detected by these 
safeguards. In cantrast to material accountancy, there is not 
yet any fully developed method in applying CIS safeguards for 
determining MUF values (Material Unaccounted For). In practice 
this problern is avoided by ensuring that materials safeguarded 
by CIS measures are also in principle directly accessible by 
measurements and the safeguards authorities reserve this option. 
Since this option is no langer avallable for the final repository, 
quantification of the effectiveness of CIS safeguards takes 
on particu!ar significance. 
The weak point which has been identified in safeguarding the 
final repository is the limited possibility of safeguarding 
the integrity of a backfilled and sealed tunnel against tamper 
attempts through clandestinely driven undeclared entrances. 
Containment safeguards satisfying the demands of completeness 
cannot be implemented for a tunnel. The emplaced material 
can therefore not be sufficiently safeguarded in the mathematical 
sense. No measures are currently known or envisaged which could 
ensure sufficient safeguarding. We are indeed convinced that 
with permanent design reverification a diversion by means of 
clandestine, undeclared entrances or facilities is practically 
impossible to implement, nevertheless this cannot be ruled out 
in the sense of a mathematically logical proof nor can its 
detection probability be determined. Precisely this is an 
indispensable requirement for the safeguards system. 
The major problern with respect to the safeguards concept for 
the final repository is that as soon as the material is emplaced 
safeguards can only be reinforced by CIS measures. The option 
of direct verification is no langer technically possible. 
Furthermore, the envisaged CIS measures cannot be objectively 
quantified with respect to their completeness and thus their 
effectiveness. Thus the requirements for an applicable safe-
guards concept required by the safeguards authorities cannot 
be fulfilled, judged by current practice. 
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5 SOLUTIONAL APPROACHES 
5.1 Modifications to the Existing IAEA Safeguards Philosophy 
5.1.1 Relativizing Numerical Detection Goals 
The objective of the safeguards to be applied by the IAEA within 
the framework of the Verification Agreement is defined in 
Art. 28 VA: 
"The objective of the safeguards procedures set forth 
in this Agreement is the timely detection of the diversion 
of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful 
nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons 
or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes 
unknown and deterrence of such diversion by the risk 
of early detection." 
In order to create a planning and eva~uation basis for applying 
safeguards and in order to be able to make the declaration 
required in Article 30 VA on the technical conclusion of 
verifications, the IAEA considers it necessary to quantify 
these objectives. This is achieved by setting up numerical 
detection goals. These are: 
significant quantity 
detection time 
probability of detection and 
probability of false alarms. 
The values currently set up for these detection gbals fuave 
admittedly only been provisionally accepted, however they 
can de facto only be questioned if they can be replaced by 
better alternatives from the IAEA's point of view. 
The definition of quantitative goals 1 even if they are not 
to be mechanically applied but rather only as guidelines, 
leads inevitably to the measures envisaged in a safeguards 
concept having to be quantifiable with respect to the degree 
of achieving their objective or 1 (more or less subjectively) 
quantified, In this technically quantitative approach the 
planning and evaluation of safeguards is implemented under 
the aspect of the numerical contribution they could make 
to the definitions of the goals. 
The IAEA is admittedly aware that the quantified detection 
goals cannot be applied as rigid definitions and thus derives 
inspection goals from the detection goals where technical 
feasibility and facility-specific features are included in 
their determination, nevertheless the principle of a quantified 
safeguards model as such is not questioned, The measurable 
variable of detection probability is the central parameter 
for the IAEA to which safeguards planning, application of 
funds and evaluation of effectiveness are oriented. 
Since there is currently no procedure by means of which the 
detection probability in applying CIS measures can be quantified 
safeguards models which are largely or, as in the final re-
pository, almost exclusively based on CIS measures cannot 
be objectively planned by this approach nor their effectiveness 
calculated. This leads to them being classified by the IAEA 
as unacceptable. This fact has also been identified as the 
basic problern for the safeguards concept of the final repository. 
This can be regarded as the starting point for a fundamental 
criticism. The basically plausible procedure of creating 
an objectifiable planning basis by numerical definition of 
goals cannot be rigorously realized in practice, As long 
as on the one hand CIS measures play, and indeed must play, 
an important role in safeguards practice, but on the other 
hand are not quantifiable or only by subjective evaluation, 
this will lead to a distortion of the planning data which 
then casts doubt upon the aim of an objectifiable planning 
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basis. The task would consist of upgrading the IAEA's safeguards 
philosophy by developing alternative planning and evaluation 
processes in such a way that attributes of eff~ctiveness 
and credibility could also be applied to safeguards concepts 
without objectively quantifiable detection probability. That 
this can be implemented, at least for individual cases, an 
the basis of a consensus is a prerequisite for the applicability 
of the suggested Safeguards Model 3. A consensus would have 
to be achieved with the IAEA concerning the evaluation of 
the envisaged possibility of permanent design reverification 
which apparently represents a considerable obstacle to diversion 
but whose effectiveness can in the last analysis not be verified. 
5.1 .2 Safeguarding of the Fissionable Material FLow 
In signing the NP Treaty an November 28, 1969 the Government 
of the Federal Republic of_Germany· declared that it 
assumed that the agreements described in Article III 
of the NP Treaty between the IAEA and the European 
Atomic Energy Community were concluded an the basis 
of the verification principle and that verification 
would be implemented in such a manner that the 
political, scientific, economic and technical tasks 
of EURATOM would not be impaired (Item 13 of the 
Declaration), 
insisted that the safeguards only be applied to 
source and special fissionable material and in 
accordance with the principle of an effective safe-
guarding of the- flow of fissionable material at 
certain strategic points (Item 14 of the Declaration). 
It further declared that it only intended to ratify the NP 
Treaty if an agreement cor~esponding to Article III of the 
NP Treaty between EURATOM and IAEA were concluded fulfilling 
in form and content the requirements of the above mentioned 
Items in its Declaration (Item 17 of the Declaration). 
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These princ~ples drawn up jointly with other EURATOM states are 
laid down in the Verification Agreement and have determined 
the position of the Federal Government to date. 
Among the considerations for the Verification Agreement it 
is mentioned that 
"the Agency . . has the responsibility to assure the 
international community that effective safeguards are 
being applied under the Treaty", 
In Articles 1 and 3 of the VA 
the States of the Community undertake, in accordance 
with the terms of this Agreement, to accept safeguards 
on all source or special fissionable material for 
the purpose of verifying that no diversion has 
taken place (Article 1) and 
the Community undertakes to co-operate with the 
Agency, in accordance with the terms of this Agree-
ment, with a view to ascertaining that such source 
and special fissionable material is not diverted 
to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
In a strict interpretation of the Verification Agreement it 
could be argued that since safeguards only refer to the material 
and not to the facilities that the consideration of diversion 
seenarios requiring a clandestine alteration to the plant 
design, such as internal diversion or diversion via clandestine 
accesses, need not be taken into consideration. Sufficient 
safeguards could thus be ensured by Models 1 or 2, 
As lang as there is at least in principle the possibility 
of satisfying oneself positively of the presence of the material 
by direct monitoring, the argument of safeguarding the flow 
of fissionable material at strategic points can be put forward. 
Since ·this flow monitaring is no langer possible in the final 
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repository 
- the FDP's and thus the fissionable material 
being no langer accessible after backfilling - there is 
no langer any basis for arguing that safeguards should be 
restricted to the material itself and diversion seenarios 
requiring clandestine alterations to the facility n~ed not 
be considered, 
However, effective safeguards on the basis of monitaring the 
flow of fissionable material at the strategic points can no 
langer be technically implemented in the final repository so 
that additional agreements could be made in order to grant 
the IAEA an equally effective safeguards possibility. However, 
this type of agreement, which would undoubtedly be compatible 
with the spirit of the Verification Agreement, would involve 
legal questions which would be difficult to solve, 
5.1 .3 Releasing Fissionable Material from Safeguards 
The basis for terminating safeguards is laid down in Article 11 
of the VA: 11 Safeguards under this Agreement shall terminate 
upon determination by the Community and the Agency that the 
material has been consumed, or has been diluted in such a 
way that it is no langer usable for any nuclear activity 
relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or has become 
practically irrecoverable." 
These criteria are not fulfilled by the FDP's. The nuclear 
material in the FDP's is neither diluted nor consumed in 
such a manner that it is no langer usable for any nuclear 
activity. The only approach would be the argument that due 
to the type of emplacement the FDP's are practically irre-
coverable. If at all, this argumentation can only be applied 
to the post-aperational phase of the repository, i.e. when 
all tunnels and shafts have been backfilled and the transport 
facilities decommissioned. During the operational phase of 
the repository the emplaced material cannot be classified as 
irrecoverable since all the equipment necessary to recover 
the already emplaced FDP's from below ground is available there. 
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Even if the irrecoverability of the FDP's could be assumed for 
the post-aperational phase this would not improve the safe-
guardability of the repository during the operational phase, 
although due to the rise in rock temperature a diversion 
already becomes more difficult in the operational phase. 
Even in the post-aperational phase recoverability cannot be 
classified as technically impossible in principle. Recoverability 
must rather be regarded as a question of the technical expend-
iture to be employed, In view of the attractiveness of the 
emplaced material it cannot be assumed that the safeguards 
authority would be prepared to classify the material as irre~ 
coverable in the post-aperational phase and thus release 
it from safeguards. 
The criteria of Article 35 of the VA are rather to be applied . 
. Where the conditions set forth in Article 11 are not 
met, but the Community considers that the recovery of nuclear 
material subject to safeguards under this Agreement from 
residues is not for the time being practicable or desirable, 
the Agency and the Community shall consult on the appropriate 
safeguards measures to be applied, 
A statement on what the IAEA regards as appropriate safeguards 
cannot be currently made. 
By way of summary it can be said that in all probability a final 
release of the material from safeguards will not be possible 
for the post-aperational phase either. The Agreement envisages 
a mutual agreement on suitable measures for this case. The 
attitude of the safeguards authorities to these measures still 
has to be sounded. 
5. 1. 4 Cohsiderations of Deterrence 
The aim of safeguards is laid down in Article 28 of the VA: 
"The objective . is the timely detection of diversion 
of significant quantities of nuclear material . and 
deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early de-
tection." 
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The degree of deterrence is the result of weighing the con-
sequences of detection against the advantages of a diversion. 
The concept of risk can be defined as the product of the 
probability of an event occurring and the consequences of 
this event. Of these two variables only the probability of 
occurrence ( = probability of detecting a diversion) is con-
sidered by the IAEA due to their purely technical approach 
in which the probability of detecting a diversion is the 
central value. 
The second component of the risk concept, the consequences 
of a detected diversion, contains a large nurober of variables 
which cannot or only with difficulty, be quantified, No ap-
proaches are currently available which would make such a 
quantification possible. A starting point here would be granting 
a safeguards credit corresponding to a state's degree of vul-
nerability to sanctions, In the case of the Federal Republic 
of Germany for example, as a country poor in natural resources 
and strongly export-oriented, the vulnerability to sanctions 
and thus the extent of the consequences of detection would 
be very great, Taking these factors into consideration, even 
with a low technical probability of detection a high detection 
risk would result for the Federal Republic of Germany. However, 
it is extremely unlikely that the IAEA will accept this modi-
fication in attitude in the short term. 
5.2 Further and Possibly Re-Development of Safeguards Elements 
During the operational phase the problern consists of providing 
a quantifiable certainty by suitable measures on the part 
of the safeguards authority that the emplaced material is 
still present. This quantification is, strictly speaking, 
only possible for accountancy measures, No methods have yet 
been developed for numericallj determining the effectiveness 
of CIS measures. The errors involved in C/S verification 
cannot be precisely specified, This problern can generally 
be ameliorated in other facilities in that material verification 
is basically implemented by accountancy measures and C/S 
measures are only employed for sub-quantities of material 
and for limited periods as back-up measures, These rest~ictions 
(limitation to sub-quantities and limited periods) cannot 
apply to the final repository. Safeguards would only be possible 
with purely a CIS concept and, as already mentioned, there is 
no contractual or methodological basis for this. 
This means, even presuming that safeguards elements could be 
redeveloped or further refined and thus CIS-supported monitaring 
of the emplaced material were possible, it could only be 
included in the safeguards system as a supplementary measure. 
This alone does not represent a basic solution to the problern 
in band. Even assuming that new safeguards elements were 
successfully developed, considerable efforts would still 
be required to further develop the theory on which the safeguards 
system is based in order to incorporate these new elements 
in the safeguards system as essential measures. The development 
of new safeguards elements would thus only be the first step 
in solving the safeguards problem, 
The backfitting problern must also be seen in this context. 
As lang as there is a possibility of measuring the material 
in the fuel cycle again at successive intervals, the safeguards 
system can talerate the application of CIS measures whose 
effectiveness is not precisely quantifiable since this un-
certainty can at least be eliminated in retrospect in a measuring 
process. If there is no langer any possibility of subsequently 
eliminating CIS uncertainty by a measuring process then in 
order to maintain the effectiveness of the safeguards system 
very strict standards must be applied to the tolerable error 
range of CIS measures. 
This can be illustrated by an example. In the intermediate 
storage of fuel elements to be reprocessed at a later stage, 
a diversion from the storage phase will be detected at the 
latest in measuring the material at the reprocessing plant. 
The effectiveness of the CIS measures during the storage 
period can thus at least be verified in retrospect. The langer 
the period to be bridged by CIS measures between two measurements 
in the material cycle, the higher are the requirements which 
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must be made on the effectiveness of these CIS measures. If 
there is no langer any possibility of a final measurement then 
the CIS measures applied must provide the same reliability 
as a measuring process in order to be able to achieve the 
safeguards objective. 
Only a relatively inadequate measurement of spent FE's is 
possible without chemical dissolution. If there is no re-
processing involving this measuring possibility then it could 
be argued that the whole FE repository should be more extensively 
and rigorously safeguarded, In addition to the problems already 
mentioned, others still have to be solved e.g. the tamper-
proofness of the individual components in the CIS system. 
5.2.1 Application and Range of Effectiveness of Surveillance 
Measures (Inspector Presence and Optical Surveillance) 
Optical monitaring is employed as a material flow indicator 
above and below ground: above ground at the hoisting facilities 
of the shafts in order to be able to detect the retransportation 
of FDP's via these facilities, and below ground in order 
to monitor the emplacement process and safeguard the tunnels 
against recovery of the material. For a number of years the 
IAEA has already been gathering experience in employing TV 
cameras for safeguards purposes. The problems arising here 
mainly concern the quality of the pictures and the reliability 
of the instruments. TV cameras have an advantage over film 
cameras due to their greater flexibility with respect to 
adapting to different conditions of application, in this 
case application as a low light-level or infrared camera 
and the possibility of being connected to other equipment 
such as the motion detector and also fading-in date and time. 
The problern of reliability is not so decisive for the final 
repository since a permanent inspector presence at the repository 
is required anyway. By means of automatic operational status 
monitaring it is possible to detect instrument defects within 
minutes or hours. These failures would have to be regarded 
as uncritical with respect to the safeguards objective due 
to the redundant safeguards design. 
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Due to the large number of optical safeguards instrumentations 
envisaged it seems meaningful to install a safeguards control 
room in the final repository from which the oparational status 
of safeguards instruments can be permanently monitared and 
which also houses a central facility for storing and visually 
verifying the recorded frames, Due to the dimensions of the 
facility distances of several kilometers must be bridged 
between the monitaring instruments on site and the control 
room. Extensions and new develo~ments are necessary to bridge 
these distances and to combine the individual instruments 
in one control room. The safeguards system envisaged for 
application in Candu reactors can be regarded as a comparable 
development, even if on a considerably smaller scale. This 
system is still currently at the development and trial stage 
and should be able to contribute valuable experience for 
deBigning camera safeguards in the final repository. 
5.2.2 Application of Novel Safeguards Techniques 
A number of possibilities for detecting diversion attempts 
can be conceived. In this context the application of microseismic 
instruments as sealing·and containment surveillance devices 
for tunnels or fields already backfilled would have to be 
examined in detail. These instruments would have the task 
of indicating the application of mining equipment or drilling 
operations in tunnels and fields already backfilled. A further 
difficulty here is undoubtedly that tunnels are being backfilled 
and new tunnels simultaneously driven in relative proximity 
to each other so that considerable demands must be made on the 
spatial locating ability of the seismic instruments in order 
to be able to differentiate normal oparational processes from 
potential diversion activities. It could possibly be of advantage 
here that emplacement is only envisaged in retreating working 
and thus the direction of a located source of Vibration could 
be used as a differentiating feature for permissible and 
impermissible activities. 
At any rate, the effectiveness of such detector messages would 
have to be investigated in detail since microseismic instruments 
have not yet been employed for safeguards purposes and thus 
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no experienee of any kind is available. Partieular attention 
would have to be paid to the false alarm rates to be expeeted 
and the neeessary subsequent Operations, as well as possibilities 
of tampering and deeeption to eoneeal a diversion attempt. 
Sinee in eonventional applieations very mueh less importanee 
generally has to be attaehed to these aspeets eonsiderable 
efforts will still have to be applied to determine these 
variables. 
5.2.3 Applieation of Faeility Safeguards 
The possibility of permanent design reverifieation has already 
been envisaged as an additional measure for Safeguards Model 3. 
However, ~bis measure has a similar effeet to extensive faeility 
safeguards and thus raises a large nurober of basie problems. 
The deelared objeetive of the Federal Republie of Germany 
and the other EURATOM states has so far been to restriet 
IAEA safeguards to the material itself and to only grant 
the IAEA inspeetors aeeess to the predetermined strategie 
points. Coneeding permanent design reverifieation represents 
a eonsiderable deviation from this basie prineiple and should 
be examined in detail due to its possible trend-setting effeet. 
In addition to the assoeiated surrender of sovereign rights, 
this measure would ilso represent a eonsiderable burden for 
the operator sinee the inspeetor would have to be aeeompanied 
by operating personnel during bis inspeetions. It ean admittedly 
be assumed that no eommereial or industrial proyesses or 
equipment requiring proteetion are used in the final repository 
whieh would neeessitate striet aeeess eontrols, nevertheless 
restrietions on the inspeetor's freedom of movement with 
respeet to time and plaee eould be neeessary to maintain 
an unimpeded operational sequenee. 
Extensive site surveillanee eould be eonsidered in a similar 
or even .more intensified manner as a further safeguard against 
the uneavering of an additional elandestine entranee. Extensive 
mining aetivities would undoubtedly be deteeted by monitaring 
a delimited area, e.g. by helieopter, for the purpose of 
visual site surveillanee or aerial photographs. However, 
it must be eonsidered whether the required losses of sovereignty 
are still aeeeptable. 
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As in all indirect safeguards, the essential aspect in this 
case is that the detection of an anomaly cannot be equated 
with a diversion. If these safeguards indicate an anomaly 
then this can only be used as a reason for closer examination. 
The contribution made by indirect safeguards within the framework 
of a safeguards concept terminates when in examining an indicated 
anomaly no satisfactory explanation can be found for it. 
At this point at the latest, safeguards must then be employed 
which make it possible to provide information about the presence 
of the material with quantifiable reliability. 
5.3 Adaptation of the Reference Concept to Valid Safeguards 
Practice 
With respect to the safeguards system the problematic aspects 
of the reference concept consist of the fact that 
the material must continue to be safeguarded even 
after emplacement and 
due to the inaccessibility of the material, the 
demands made in valid safeguards practice cannot 
be fulfilled with respect to verification possi-
bilities, 
Starting points foradapting the reference concept thus result 
by: 
1. conditioning or storing the material in such a 
way that the criteria for terminating safeguards 
are fulfilled or 
2. storing the material in such a way that it remains 
accessible for verification measures, 
Conditioning the material in such a form that the criteria for 
termination could be regarded as fulfilled would require that 
the fuel be converted into a glass or ce.ramic product. This 
possibility has been considered in more detail by dissolving, 
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diluting and compacting spent nuclear fuel. This was based 
on the conditioning of fuel in the form of PAMELA moulds, 
The essential data for this method of treatment resulted 
in approx, 465,000 PAMELA moulds per year of vitrified nuclear 
fuel at an annual throughput of approx, 700 tons. In order 
to emplace these moulds, approx. 6 - 8 shafts per geological 
repository would be required; a salt dome of the size of 
Gorleben would be able to accommodate a maximum of 425 1 000 
moulds under the most favourable conditions /5-1/. This method 
can thus be ruled out as a realistic alternative. 
In our opinion there is no possibility of unequivocally ful-
filling termination criteria by the type of emplacement in 
the case of final disposal packages with undiluted nuclear 
material. Even in the case of borehole emplacement without 
lost shielding, envisaged as a back-up solution, recoverability 
of the material cannot be ruled out. All considerations of 
recoverability take the current state of mining engineering 
as a variable, Final release of the material from safeguards 
would require that the material should remain irrecoverable 
within the periods of time under consideration, Considering 
that even the inherent selfprotection of unshielded packages 
decreases with time and further progress in mining engineering 
must be presumed, the final classification of the material 
as irrecoverable will not be possible from the perspective 
of the safeguards authority, but this evaluation must rather 
be coupled to technological developments in mining engineering. 
This must be particularly considered in the light of high 
proliferation potential which the final repository represents 
for a state wishing to undertake a diversion. 
I.e. in the case of undiluted conditioning of the final disposal 
products it cannot be expected that the materiai will finally be 
released from safeguards with respect to the two emplacement 
alternatives which can be taken into consideration (tunnel 
emplacement with lost shielding or borehole emplacement without 
lost shielding). The prerequisites for applying Article 35 VA 
are however fulfilled for both types of emplacement, namely 
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that the recovery of nuclear material . . is currently not 
possible nor desirable . In this case it is envisaged that 
the Agency and the Community should consult each other about 
the application of suitable safeguards. A statement on what 
the IAEA could regard as suitable safeguard~ is purely specu-
lative at this point in time since there is no applicable 
experience. A process of intensive discussions with and between 
the safeguards authorities is necessary to elucidate this 
problem~ 
Emplacement in such a manner that the material remains accessible 
for verification would, apart from the technical feasibility, 
not fulfill the essential objectives of the final repository 
concept, namely isolating the material from the biosphere 
and possibilities of further human access. Accessible emplacement 
under ground would probably raise so many problems for reasons 
of heat dissipation and rock stability that this could no 
longer be regarded as a modification of the reference concept 
but would .rather require a new concept to be compiled. 
Under these assumptions the advantages of underground storage 
in comparison to storage above ground do not become immediately 
apparent. From the safeguards aspect storage above ground would 
undoubtedly be preferable since e.g. a diversion by simulated 
accidents blocking the entrance can be ruled out. 
By way of summary it can be said that realistic possibilities 
of ensuring the safeguardability of the final repository 
according to current safeguards practice by modifying the 
reference concept cannot be envisaged at this time. Nevertheless, 
Art. 35 VA could represent a starting point for the discussion 
of a safeguards agreement deviating from current safeguards 
practice. Strictly speaking, the preceding considerations 
are only valid for the case of spent light-water reactor 
nuclear fuel. For fuels from special types of reactors, the 
criteria of Art. 11 of the VA could possibly make a termination 
of safeguards conceivable due to the different conditions in 
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this case with respect to burn-up of the fuel, its dilution or 
the lack of an industrially applicable reprocessing procedure. 
5.4 Possibilities of a Solution in the Institutional Sector 
The starting point for institutional solutions is the fact 
that in order to implement a diversion, apart from the necessary 
technical measures, a considerable degree of organizational work 
must be undertaken. In the organizational sector additional 
barriers could be set up by multinational forms of cooperation 
which would impede the organizational implementation of a diver-
sion and increase the risk of detection. A further aspect is 
possibly that the extension of international interconnections 
would increase vulnerability of the states to sanctions. 
In the case of a final repository in an EURATOM member state, 
the logical consequence of the proprietary conditions is first 
of all considering the inclusion of EURATOM in the management 
and operation of the repository. The establishment of a direct 
final repository under the sole national control of a EURATOM 
state would presume that the Community had renounced its 
proprietary rights to the emplaced material. In view of the 
long-term proliferation aspects of the final repository, 
EURATOM's renunciation of proprietary rights and thus possible 
associated extended safeguards does not appear compatible with 
the objectives of the Community. 
Pursuant to Art. 77 of the EURATOM Treaty, the Community under-
takes to ensure that the nuclear materials are not employed 
for any purposes other than those envisaged, By final re-
nunciation of its proprietary rights the Community would 
relinquish its otherwise derivable extended possibilities 
of Codetermination and safeguards and would thus curtail 
its safeguards function. The final disposal of EURATOM material 
under the sole national control of a member state must therefore 
be classified as difficult to reconcile with the spirit of the 
EURATOM Treaty. It must also be examined whether it is desirable 
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from anational point of view,to operate a direct final re-
pository under exclusive national control since a much greater 
obligation towards the international community can result 
from having to invalidate suspicious factors which could 
be interpreted as diversion attempts. 
A conceivable alternative solution would be that a member 
state could implement final disposal on behalf of the Community, 
whereby Community conditions would have to be observed, This 
variant would correspond most closely to the interests of 
the Federal Republic of Germany. The Community's proprietary 
and safeguards reservations would thus be ensured and inter-
nationally verifiable. This model can also be evaluated as 
advantageaus from the aspect of national acceptance. 
The model wi~h the highest institutional proliferation barrier 
would involve implementation of final disposal by the Community 
itself as a multinational undertaking where the member state 
would make available territory and infrastructure. Final 
disposal could thus ensue analogously to the deposition of 
nuclear material envisaged in Art. 80 of the EURATOM Treaty, 
However, from a national point of view this model raises 
significant acceptance problems·since it implies the possibility 
of the final disposal of foreign material from EURATOM states. 
In view of the geographical and political situation of the 
Federal Republic of Germany it remains to be examined whether 
the extensive loss of sovereignty on the part of the host 
nation associated with this solution would be desirable. 
The INFCE Conference provided essential impulses for considering 
institutional aspects and this is reflected in the IPS working 
group. It must, however, be remernbered that institutional 
aspects are regarded by the IAEA as complementary, i.e. supple-
mentary, measures and not as alternatives to stringent technical 
safeguards. 
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Due to" the associated proliferation barrier 1 institutional 
models with multinational Codetermination or cooperation 
undoubtedly represent an approach to the general NP problems 
of a final repository. However 1 they are not appropriate 
for solving the safeguards problem. In the first instance, 
institutionalization within the multinational EURATOM framework 
must be considered for a direct final repository in the EURATOM 
area as a consequence of the conditions of the EURATOM Treaty. 
From the point of view of the IAEA 1 this is hardly a drastic 
change in comparison to the current situation since the EURATOM 
area is already characterized by multinational safeguards. 
For the IAEA, institutional models would therefore have to 
go beyond the EURATOM framework and involve a form of inter-
national cooperation. Apart from the questions of the extent 
to which international cooperation can be implemented for 
a direct final repository and whether this is acceptable 
to the host country 1 the specific safeguards problern will 
not be solved by an international cooperation model either. 
Institutional models can thus be ruled out in the foreseeable 
future as an approach to solving the safeguards problems 
of a direct final repository. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
The development of an internationally acceptable safeguards 
concept for the direct final repository raises a large number 
of problems which require intensive discussion with the safe-
guards authorities and which cannot be clarified a priori 
with the current state of the art. 
Final Disposal Phase 
Phase 1 : Transport above ground, 
leaving the conditioning 
facility - beginning shaft 
transport 
Phase 2: Transport below ground, 
beginning shaft transport -
backfilling on site 
Phase 3: Storage du ring the 
operational period, backfilling 
the FDP's- sealing the 
geological repository 
(backfilling the shafts) 
Phase 4: post-aperational phase, 
after backfilling the shafts 
Safeguards Effectiveness 
Model1 Model 2 Model 3 
----- acceptable -----
--- acceptable since FDP's ---
still accessible 
---- unsolved problems ----
---- unsolved problems ----
Table 6-1: Safeguards Effectiveness During the Various Oparational Phases of the Final Repository 
As far as the effectiveness of safeguards possible at the present 
state of the art is concerned during the various operational phases 
of the final repository (Table 6-1 ) 1 then the following can be 
ascertaine~: sufficient safeguards can be ensured both during 
the phase of transport above ground (Phase 1) as well as in the 
phase of underground transport of the final disposal packages 
until they are backfilled on site (Phase 2). 
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During the operational phase, the safeguards on the already 
emplaced final disposal packages (Phase 3) can consist of per-
manent design verification, although problems can be recognized 
in evaluating their effectiveness. The same is true of verifying 
the integrity of the shutdown repository in the post-aperational 
phase (Phase 4). 
An initial approach to solving the safeguards problern of a final 
repository (cf. Table 6-2) was envisaged in a modification of 
the existing IAEA safeguards philosophy. The IAEA would accord-
ingly have to accept a safeguards model based essentially, or 
in the post-aperational phase exclusively, on CIS measures. 
Since in this case the probability of detection, i.e. the 
essential parameter of IAEA safeguards, cannot be quantified 
at the present state of development, such an approach would 
be classified as unacceptable by the IAEA. If anomalies occur, 
e.g. in the case of a false alarm, the nuclear material cannot 
be verified, 
Even a second approach envisaging the further technical develop-
ment of safeguards elements cannot provide any basic solution 
to these inherent safeguards problems for the same reasons. 
A third approach consists in modifying the reference concept, 
for example by dissolving and diluting the fuel, to ensure 
the safeguardability of the final repository according to 
current safeguards practice. No realistic possibilities are 
in sight in this case either, since this would cast doubt 
upon many of the desired characteristics of a direct final 
repository. 
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Approach 
Alterations to the existing IAEA 
safeguards philosophy 
Further and possibly redevelopment 
of safeguards elements 
Adaptation of the reference concept 
to valid safeguards practice 
lnstitutional approaches 
Table 6-2: Assessment of the Solutional Approaches 
Model1 Model2 Model3 
IAEA would have to accept purely a 
CIS safeguards concept 
+ intensive per-
manent facility 
safeguards 
---- currently no solution ----
no basic solution to the safeguards 
problern -
-- no realistic possibility in sight --
additional proliferation barrier but not a 
solution to the safeguards problems 
Institutional models with multinational Codetermination or CO-
operation (fourth approach) undoubtedly represent a simplifi-
cation of the NP problems in the final repository due to their 
associated proliferation barriers. Apart from the resulting 
questions of political acceptance they are not appropriate 
for solving the safeguards problern either, In this context, 
the establishment of a direct final repository must pay special 
attention to the role of EURATOM resulting from its proprietary 
and safeguards functions. 
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Before a final resolution, it is interest~ng to compare the 
essential NP aspects of direct final disposal with reprocessing, 
Table 6-3 shows this comparison with respect to differences 
in the fields of facility technology 1 safeguards technology 
and NP policy. This brief summary makes the advantages for 
a backend strategy with reprocessing quite clear, 
On the basis of the facts and. analyses compiled here the con-
clusion becomes obvious that a back-end strategy with direct 
final disposal is problemat~cal from a safeguards aspect since 
doubt must be cast upon the technical realization of a safeguards 
concept. 
For certain types of fuel element where reprocessing is not 
envisaged nor economical, Art. 35 of the VA can provide a 
possible solution. In the case of the limited emplacement 
of spent fuel elements, internation~l safeguards could be 
negotiated pursuant to this Article, 
Reprocessing 
Technical Charracteristics: 
Pu determination after fuel dissolution, 
precision + 1-2%; comparison with 
burn-up computations (destructive assay) 
Pu separation by processing into MOX 
fuel elements 
use of Pu in nuclear ·reactors 
sensitive RP technology required, 
expert control through international 
agreements 
Safeguards: 
Pu and U accountancy by analytical 
methods; complementary: 
near real time accountancy, possibly 
contai nment/ surveillance 
quantifiable IAEA guidelines with back-up 
measures 
NP Policy: 
Storage of excess separated Pu can be 
realized within a future IPS system 
in the EURATOM area unrestricted 
utilization and consumption right 
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Direct Final Disposal 
Plutonium Determination 
Pu determination planned 
by fuel element monitor, 
precision =::: + 5% 
(non-destructive assay) 
G Whereabouts of the Plutonium 
accumulation of Pu in underground 
final repository ("plutonium mine") 
access to Pu increasingly easier 
due to decay of the fission products 
e Technology 
conventionally available mining 
technology 
Measures 
item counting (operational phase) 
containment/ surveillance 
(after backfilling the tunnels) 
Evaluation 
no back-up solution in the case of 
anomalies 
worldwide application of direct final 
disposal on the basis of Iang-term 
perspectives (social and political 
stability) undesirable 
in the EURATOM area, politically 
undesirable consequenc:::es on the 
basis of proprietary rights to the 
nuclear material 
Table 6-3: NP Aspecls of Direct Final Disposal in Comparison to Reprcx:essing 
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